

**DEMOCRACY IN DEVELOPMENT:
How can both processes mutually reinforce each other?**

“Development depends upon good governance. That is the ingredient which has been missing in far too many places, for far too long. That is the change that can unlock Africa's potential. And that is a responsibility that can only be met by Africans”

(Speech delivered by President Obama, Accra, 11 July 2009)

“In the terrible history of famines in the world, no substantial famines have occurred in any independent country with a relatively free press”

(Amartya Sen in ‘Development as Freedom’, 1999)

**BACKGROUND PAPER PREPARED BY
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What is the note all about?

The overall theme of the 2009 European Development Days (EDD) is citizenship and development. Within this framework, a plenary session will focus on the ***complex relationship between democracy and development and how they can reinforce each other mutually***. The Swedish Presidency requested ECDPM, an independent foundation specialising in ACP/EU cooperation, to prepare a short background paper to frame the debate and provide food for thought. Based on a rather sobering contextual analysis, this note argues that the time seems ripe to reconsider the linkages between democracy and development (section 1). A review of key insights from both literature and practice is provided to facilitate such a re-assessment (section 2). The note then goes on to explore avenues that may help democracy to deliver better development outcomes (section 3).

I. DEMOCRACY UNDER SCRUTINY: TIME TO REVISIT THE LINK WITH DEVELOPMENT

1. Discussions on the links between democracy and development are not new. In policy and academic circles, ***fierce battles*** have been fought for many years between ‘believers’ and ‘non-believers’ in the existence of causality links between democracy and development (in either direction). Adherents of modernisation theory, which argues that development is a precondition for democracy confront those who believe economic development is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for the emergence of democracy. The nature of the relationship between democracy and development remains a ***“hotly contested and debated issue”***¹.
2. While it has proven ***difficult to establish a direct casual relationship*** between democracy and development, a broad international consensus has emerged on the ***potential positive role*** democracy –or ‘democratic governance’²- can play in development processes, particularly in the long run. The end of the Cold War and the ensuing democratisation wave of the early 1990s did much to propel this vision to the forefront, both in Europe and in the developing world.
3. Democracy has underpinned the political, social, cultural and economic development of the European Union. It is considered both as a ***‘value’*** and a ***‘process’*** in the sense that it develops from within through people and institutions of the country concerned. Support to democracy building has gradually become an objective in its own right and a feature of all strands of the EU’s external policies (foreign affairs, development and security). However, for the EU the democratic process also has a clear ***instrumental value*** in terms of effectively fighting poverty, promoting growth, ensuring government accountability (including civilian control of security) and protecting human rights (through an independent judiciary and free media). The embedding of democracy in third countries is perceived to hold out the best (though not guaranteed) prospect for jointly managing global issues (of particular concern to EU citizens) and for promoting effective multilateralism.
4. In varying degrees, ***most developing regions have formally embraced this agenda*** and recognised the ‘democratic advantage’ in terms of delivering development. In Africa, a stream of policy declarations have been issued, pointing to the positive links between democracy and development. Both the NEPAD and the Africa Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) are premised on this belief³. The Inter-American Charter (adopted in Lima in 2001) considers that “democracy and social and economic development are interdependent and are mutually reinforcing”. The Asean Charter stresses the need to promote both “principles of democracy” and “sustained economic growth, prosperity and social progress” yet without directly linking these core objectives.
5. This analysis confirms that there are few dissenting voices when it comes to formally recognising the potential added value of democracy for development. ***Yet do these high expectations resist the test of reality?*** How do democratic processes actually operate in third countries? Is democracy effectively promoted for its developmental value? Do we see a mutually beneficial relationship between democracy and development? Is democracy delivering better development outcomes for the poor? Is there really a shared vision between Europe and its partners on the value of democracy for development?
6. The ***reality check on the potential symbiosis between democracy and development looks rather sobering***. Admittedly, the impact of democracy on development is not simple and straightforward.

It is acknowledged that “a lengthy and complex chain links the act of expressing a preference through casting a vote with ... the eventual management and delivery of public goods and services designed to alleviate pervasive poverty”⁴. This chain is a fragile one, particularly in poor (emerging) democracies. Yet **recent developments seem to be further weakening this chain:**

- *Democracy on the defensive.* In many developing countries, democratic processes are stagnating, if not losing ground. The backlash is reflected in the growing number of sham democracies, manipulations of constitutions to retain power (an increasingly popular practice in Africa) and the emergence of ‘hybrid regimes’ – systems that combine rhetorical acceptance of democracy and its formal trappings with limited freedoms and authoritarian traits. Elections have become a major trigger of conflicts. All this tends to have a damaging impact on the development prospects of citizens, as evidenced in the economic and social decline experienced by once well-performing countries.
 - *Doubts about the delivery capacity of democracy.* There is growing scepticism and disillusion with the delivery capacity of democracy. Solidarity and equitable distribution are key components of the social contract between state and citizens. Democracies that fail to deliver development outcomes risk losing legitimacy or remain fragile and unstable. Latin America offers a case in point. Overall the region has advanced in both democratic and market reforms. Yet poverty rates continue to rise and income distribution is the most unequal in the world. This has shaken the confidence of citizens in the value of democracy and political institutions, particularly parties. Delivery failures may, in turn, increase the attractiveness of populist democracies as well as authoritarian rule.
 - *Difficult dialogue on democracy.* Experience across regions suggests there is a (growing) deficit of dialogue on democracy between Europe and its partners. Many factors contribute to this including: (i) resistance from incumbent leaders; (ii) the lack of nationally owned democracy agendas that can serve as a basis for dialogue; (iii) the tendency of European actors to revert to normative or technocratic approaches when supporting democracy abroad; (iv) the use of ‘double standards’ limiting the credibility of European discourse on democracy. The current global ‘scramble’ for resources may further reduce the scope for policy coherence. The appearance of new players on the international scene which do not necessarily share the same democracy agenda, further compounds the challenge. It should furthermore be acknowledged that democracy also constitutes a never-ending challenge for European countries as well, as evidenced by a growing literature pointing to democratic deficits in European societies⁵.
7. Yet the **picture is not all that gloomy**. Several ‘barometer surveys’ in different regions show that citizens hang on to democracy and consider it the preferred form of government. In many parts of the world, people continue to mobilise for democracy and to confront authoritarian regimes. In pushing for better development, citizens across regions increasingly express voice, claim rights and demand accountability. In the developing world, a wide variety of democratic experiments and innovative governance arrangements are being tested and are contributing to better development outcomes. New communication and media solutions offer major opportunities for enhancing the effectiveness of social mobilization in favour of reform.
8. All this suggest that the debate on democracy-development finds itself at a **critical juncture**. The above mentioned trends invite the various stakeholders to *reconsider the question of inter-linkages* regarding democracy and development. Normative approaches (pro-democracy) will no longer suffice (because the credibility of democracy depends on its delivery capacity). Neither is it a promising path to focus only on development (MDGs) and forget about politics and democracy. The way ahead is to take stock of ‘what works and doesn’t work’ and on this basis, identify realistic (long-term) strategies that make it possible to both deepen democracy and improve development outcomes.

II. KEY INSIGHTS ON LINK BETWEEN DEMOCRACY AND DEVELOPMENT

9. This critical reappraisal of the relationship between democracy and development should not be done in a vacuum. There is an impressive body of knowledge which can be used as a source of inspiration⁶. In order to facilitate the plenary debate at the EDD, the main lessons learned from

literature and practice have been clustered in *three main categories*: (i) issues on which a relative consensus seems to exist; (ii) issues which remain controversial and contested; (iii) issues which have been relatively neglected so far, despite their potential role in making democracy deliver for development.

10. There are obvious limitations to such a clustering. The analysis below provides only a broad-based picture of evolving insights into the complex relationship between democracy and development. Yet it may help to focus the discussion and help identify critical challenges ahead.
11. The literature review suggests the existence of a *significant consensus* (in Europe and in the developing world) on a set of critical issues in the democracy-development equation.
 - *Positive effects*. There is no direct, empirically validated causal connection between the introduction of democracy and economic growth. However, evidence suggests that safeguarding the rule of law and equality before the law, upholding the ground rules of a market economy, including the protection of property rights and contractual freedom, protecting free media and freedom of expression, and ensuring relatively equal distribution of productive resources, all tend to create conditions conducive to “*sustainable development*” (including social justice).
 - *Link with poverty reduction*. If one has a multidimensional understanding of poverty as lack of power, opportunities and security –as this is the case in EU policy frameworks– democratisation is to be considered a part of development.
 - *Emergence and sustainability of democracies*. There is no solid empirical base for the view that various ‘preconditions’ need to be in place for democracy to *emerge*. Yet structural factors, including low levels of human, economic and institutional development, may seriously hamper the prospects of *consolidating* and *sustaining* democracies. Hence the need to invest in the *foundations* underpinning democracy (e.g. education, citizen awareness on rights, employment, human security).
 - *Moving beyond elections and formal institutions*. In order to overcome the limitations of representative democracy (focused on elections) there is a need to invest more in *substantive democracy* by promoting principles such as participation, transparency and domestic accountability in the overall development process and at various levels (regional, national and local). This includes constructing a ‘public space’ for free, open, pluralistic and critical debates among political and societal actors. However, the construction of a basic societal consensus constitutes a major challenge (both in the developing world as in Europe) amongst others because the time-horizon of politicians, media and citizens tends to be focused on the short-term.
 - *Response capacity of the state*. Legitimate, capable and effective state institutions are key to promoting both the democracy and development agenda. This implies the need to properly articulate strategies respectively aimed at strengthening democracy, development and state building.
 - *No democracy without democrats*. Experience clearly demonstrates the critical importance of well-informed and active citizens in promoting both democratisation and sustainable development. Yet in many countries a wide range of barriers need to be overcome to fully mobilise the potential of citizens to claim their rights and demand accountability. The road from being a mere ‘subject’ to becoming an (informed) voter and acting as a ‘citizen’ is long⁷.
 - *Need to rethink donor support strategies*. In their discourse donor agencies admit that democracy is a ‘*home-grown*’ process and that external efforts to impose democracy from abroad are likely to fail. Yet the practice support to democracy building has not lived up to expectations. The design and implementation flaws of democracy programmes have been widely documented. Awareness is growing that a major overhaul is required to increase relevance, coherence and impact of the overall EU approach to supporting democracy abroad.
12. With regard to the points that remain *controversial and contested*, the following issues can be mentioned:
 - There is a link between democracy and economic and social development, but it is debated what comes first.
 - Democracies outperform other forms of governance when it comes to human development. While there is abundant evidence that democracies produce positive development benefits⁸,

there are also well-known examples of authoritarian states having achieved strong economic performance. Different views therefore exist on this position.

- In order to promote better development outcomes there is a need to focus much more on the *political economy* underlying the organisation of society. This means looking ‘behind the façade’ of formal democratic systems in order to understand the patrimonial/patronage networks that have a major, often detrimental impact on economic opportunity and development.
- A more refined understanding of the ‘*demand side*’ for improved democratic governance is needed. This implies a critical assessment of both the “drivers of change” in a society and the possible limitations of formally established agents of democratisation (e.g. national election bodies, parliaments, the judicial system, etc).

13. Points that are ***relatively neglected***, though essential for fruitful synergies between democracy and development, include:

- The need for a ‘*social contract*’ strengthening the bond between state and citizens through a mutually agreed set of rules, roles and responsibilities, contributing to social cohesion and redistributive justice.
- Closely related to this, the importance of fair and equitable *taxation systems* for constructive State-Citizen relations. Recent research indicates that taxation affects the quality of governance: state reliance on broad taxation can provide the basis for a responsive democratic system, state building, improved accountability and broad economic prosperity. Taxation, if well designed, can also contribute to sustainable funding for essential public services, such as health, education, and security, which in their turn are essential for economic growth and social development.

14. Two main conclusions can be drawn from this brief overview. First, there is an important ***potential*** that could be further tapped for a mutually reinforcing relationship between democracy and development. Second, in order to unleash this potential fresh thinking and innovative action are required. This implies (i) reviewing some of the fundamentals of using democracy as a trigger for development; (ii) integrating the ‘missing elements’ of the chain that may lead democracy to deliver better development outcomes (e.g. issues such as taxation and fiscal governance) and (iii) exploiting much more the substantive elements of democracy as well as the transformative power of citizens.

III. AVENUES TO IMPROVE THE DELIVERY CAPACITY OF DEMOCRACY

15. Building on these insights derived from experience, the following approaches could be considered to enable democracy to deliver better development outcomes:

- (1) Adopting a much more *realistic and long-term approach* to promoting democracy for development
- (2) *Deepening democracy* for improved development outcomes by focusing on domestic accountability systems and inclusive forms of participation
- (3) Enhancing the *response capacity of the state* (central and local)
- (4) Clarifying the role and responsibility of the *various external actors*

1) Adopting a much more realistic and long-term approach

16. This is the first priority to better connect democracy and development agendas. With hindsight, one could argue that expectations placed on (emerging) democracies to generate development outcomes were generally too high and unrealistic:

- In poor economies the ‘surplus’ to be distributed tends to be limited and subject to external shocks which may further reduce ‘the pie to be shared’. This makes it difficult for the state to deliver key development outcomes. The necessary institutional arrangements and capacities are also often not in place to carry out the complex task of equitable distribution in deprived and polarised societies.

- Furthermore, it is now widely acknowledged that the governance and accountability systems in many developing countries are heavily influenced by ‘patron-client networks’. While these states may display the formal trappings of a modern democratic state, power and decision-making are generally not based on rule-based political processes. Key decisions on policies and resources are taken outside the formal institutions, by elites that are linked through patronage networks that exist parallel to state structures. In such governance systems, developmental effectiveness is not likely to be the core priority. Corruption tends to be rampant because public and private funds are co-mingled by those in power. The idea of democracy: acceptance of an opposition, a tolerance of dissent, effective checks and balances, a rotation of parties to power through fair elections, a vocal and organised public is an anathema to rulers if this threatens their control of power⁹.
 - Many of the countries engaged in democratisation processes, especially the most poor and vulnerable, are not only trying to put in place a functioning democracy but also to build legitimate, capable and effective states. This further compounds the complexity of the task at hand - as it should not be assumed that fostering democracy and state building are one and the same thing.
 - The international donor community has invested heavily in building democratic and accountable states. In the process, a wide range of valuable initiatives have been supported, many of which have produced democratic and developmental outputs and outcomes. Yet evaluations on democracy promotion programmes clearly show the limits of such external action, particularly in terms of supporting profound, systemic changes in democratic patterns.
17. All these factors call for a much more ***down-to-earth approach to supporting democracy building for better development***. Instead of adopting a normative approach –which may lead domestic actors and external actors to look at what is *not* there- it is much more promising to analyze *what the reality is* and understanding *why it is so*. This may help to avoid the trap of only considering the formal aspects of democracy while neglecting the more fundamental informal rules of the game, cultural norms, power structures and incentives that determine the conduct of public affairs in a given country. In essence, this means adopting a ‘*political economy*’ approach to the promotion of democracy and development. This also applies to development efforts in key social sectors (such as health and education). To this end, the EC recently developed a specific tool to analyse address governance in sectors in order to ensure better pro-poor outcomes¹⁰.
 18. A case in point is ***the role of key democratic actors*** such as parliaments, political parties, electoral commissions, Court of Auditors, Anti-Corruption bodies, etc. In theory, they can play a critical function as countervailing powers. However, experience suggests that it makes little sense for donor agencies to provide capacity support to these key democratic institutions *before* having done a serious political economy analysis on whether the right incentives are in place –in the prevailing environment- for these bodies to act as effective agencies of restraint.
 19. Another way to instil more realism into the democracy-development equation is to adopt a ***long-term perspective*** on social and political change processes. Both local campaigners and external agencies stress the need to respect the inevitable ‘*longue durée*’ of democratic transitions. This is essential from a constructivist perspective. Consolidating a democratic culture; redefining a social contract between state and society; reviewing constitutions in a participatory manner with a view to agree on a set of cultural norms and values subscribed to by officialdom and the public at large; elaborating ‘home-grown’ democracy agendas; supporting political parties; promoting active citizenship, ...these are all long-term processes that need to be carefully nurtured and supported in order to impact positively on both democracy and development outcomes.
 20. ***Fascinating experiments*** are taking place across developing regions to foster pro-development democratic changes. In West Africa, for instance, the ‘Laboratoires Citoyennetés’ is building up a network of actors trying to create viable and legitimate local governments that can deliver public services ‘from the bottom-up’. The focus on concrete development outcomes is perceived to be the most appropriate method of promoting active citizenship (as people are sensitised on both their right to claim adequate services and their responsibility to pay taxes). In Ghana efforts have been made to define a full-fledged national democracy agenda –spelling out a vision on how democracy should function and deliver development outcomes. The social pension scheme in Mauritius contributed to the social cohesion necessary to support the transition from a vulnerable mono-crop economy with high poverty rates into a growth country with the lowest poverty rates in Africa.

Some key questions to be considered during the plenary session

- *How to support active citizenship that is pro-democracy and pro-development?*
- *How to promote and strengthen social contracts in ways that contribute to a secure and effective state and a reinvigorated sense of citizenship?*
- *How to combine a long-term perspective to democracy and development support with the need to show short-term results?*

2) Deepening democracy

21. This is the second priority. It means adopting a broader transformation agenda in pushing forward democracy (beyond formal attributes) and investing much more in the *substance* of democracy. This includes giving greater prominence to both '*accountability*' (vertical and horizontal) and to '*participation*' –conceived as a political project to develop and sustain more substantive and empowered citizen participation than that which is normally found in liberal representative democracy alone¹¹
22. ***With regard to accountability***, it is increasingly agreed that enhancing the '*voice*' of citizens and making the state more responsive to their rights and needs, is key to meeting development goals and delivering basic services. Accountability –rather than being a bureaucratic or legal term- is about substantive democracy, rights and citizenship. It is about investing simultaneously in effective states and empowered citizens/social capital. Weak governmental accountability can lead to a sense of collective public frustration about what democracy can actually deliver and erode state legitimacy.
23. There is no shortage of examples, across regions, testifying to the positive development outcomes generated by effective accountability processes and mechanisms. Improved *horizontal accountability* (i.e. through Parliaments exercising their right to control the budget) has helped to curtail trends of patronage and corruption that divert national resources from the public good, and to safeguard citizens' right and space to demand accountability. *Vertical accountability* is about empowering citizens to make claims and demand power-holders ('answerability') to explain their actions, and to sanction their poor performance when they fail to respond ('enforceability').
24. Improving accountability requires a long-term process that needs to be carefully nurtured through a wide range of strategies, mechanisms and concrete step-by-step achievements all along the accountability chain. Experience furthermore suggests accountability tends to work best when (i) it is claimed by citizens for a broader social and economic good; ii) when individual agency is complemented with collective action (e.g. through social movements); (iii) when collective actors participate in negotiating reforms, can ensure medium- to long-term access to decision-making centres; (iv) when alliances between public sector reformists and civil society actors are formed¹².
25. In practice, strengthening domestic accountability has proven a difficult task for donor agencies, This is linked to a (i) lack of adequate strategies to identify the 'demand side' and 'drivers of change'; (ii) a tendency to rely on normative or technocratic approaches; (iii) unrealistic assumptions about social change processes; and (iv) hostile political environments.
26. Over the past two decades ***participation*** has become the new development mantra. This approach has many potential virtues. It may (i) create space for non-elite groups (rural poor, traditional leaders, minorities, women, youth, etc.) to make inputs into decision-making processes that affect them directly; (ii) inform and improve development policies and practices; (iii) enhance the sustainability of development interventions. As a result, the approach has been widely embraced and used in many developing regions by both states (at central and local level) and external agencies (including the EU). As with accountability, a wide range of examples could be provided where participation has made a real difference in terms of development outcomes in relation to the MDGs, provision of basic services, the protection of political, social and economic rights, inclusion of marginalised groups, local development planning, etc.

27. However, strong voices are coming up in favour of a ***more contextual and political approach to participation***. Experience suggests that participation has often remained blind towards social difference, local power constellations and cultural norms. Also here a political economy approach is most desirable to understand the reality of state-society interactions. The capacity of civil society to act as a pro-democracy/development force should not be assumed but based on a solid analysis of the interests and incentives driving these actors. In a similar vein, one should recognise that ‘inclusiveness’ is often secured through patronage, cooptation and bribery¹³ which renders participation a toothless mechanism of democracy. The linkages between participation, on the one hand, and ‘voice’ and (legal) ‘empowerment’ on the other hand, could be further strengthened. The same holds true the cross-fertilisation between ‘rights-based’ approaches to development and participatory approaches. Practice furthermore shows the limits, if not risks, of donor agencies imposing participation on reluctant governments in contexts where civil liberties are severely constrained.

Some key questions to be considered during the plenary session

- *What development outcomes emerge from greater accountability?*
- *How can accountability for better development outcomes effectively be promoted (including through linking actors together at a larger scale to achieve change at the national level)?*
- *How to engage in difficult settings where space to demand accountability and ensure genuine participation is limited?*
- *How can non-state actors be enabled (also in terms of knowledge) to effectively act in accountability and participation processes?*

3) Strengthening the response capacity of the state to deliver

28. The State has moved up the development agenda during the last decade. It is now widely accepted that “the orientation and effectiveness of the state is the ***critical variable*** explaining why some countries succeed whereas others fail in meeting development goals”¹⁴. In order to make democracy relevant for all citizens, greater importance needs to be given to the response capacity of the state. Yet many emerging democracies, particularly poor ones, lack the foundations of coherent functioning states and public administration systems. This has resulted in a growing concern for ‘*state building*’ –a concept that is increasingly integrated into donor policies with regard to fragile and/or post-conflict environments. It is also interesting to note that the once officially preached rigid approach to state sovereignty has now been replaced by lively debates on the right and duty of external actors to intervene.
29. In many ways, the issue of state building has evolved from the governance agenda. Initially, the international policy debates on development and key functions of the state focused on outputs such as social service delivery, economic management and delivery of justice. But increasingly, the discussion is also about the so-called constitutive dimensions of the state: political settlements, security and basic administrative structures.
30. State building is, admittedly, a complex process with numerous obstacles. First, the field lacks conceptual clarity. Intervention strategies are generally based on ideal-typical models of modern (Western) states and tend therefore to be ill-adapted and over-ambitious¹⁵. Second, there is little real experimentation or more systematic sampling of evidence of what works and what does not. Third, the assumption too often prevails that the process of state building can be consensual, inclusive, participatory, bottom-up and democratic. Such rosy picture obstructs a view on the messiness, the non-linearity and the violent and tumultuous features that most often accompany state building.
31. Experience (brought together by OECD-DAC) indicates that the first principle for good international engagement in fragile states and situations is to ‘take context as a start’. A more realistic approach to state-building would consist of: (i) setting less ambitious, but attainable goals, (ii) avoiding an overload of reform demands and fragmented capacity building efforts, and (iii) monitoring and managing political economy and governance risks on a continuous basis. Some good practices are emerging that follow these principles. They conceive state building as primarily

a political process that largely involves political deals (usually stitched by elites), prioritization of core government functions (usually security and the monopoly over the use of force, and basic administrative functions) and the willingness to combine efforts to enhance the legitimacy of states while ensuring the delivery of services to populations.

Some key questions for consideration during the plenary

- *How to avoid the trappings of an overly normative approach?*
- *What examples and experiences can inform the search for effective and context specific engagement policies and approaches to state building?*
- *If the MDGs are not the appropriate yardsticks for measuring progress in fragile environments – how can progress in terms of state building then be measured?*
- *We have some evidence, some knowledge and guidelines for working in fragile environments. Then why does collective action not seem to meaningfully contribute to state building?*

4) Clarifying the role and added value of the various external actors (EU, UN, political foundations, civil society)

32. Democracy is one of the pillars of EU external action. Yet particularly in this area, there tends to be quite important a gap between stated policies and actual practice *both* in terms of supporting democracy building and in making the link between democracy-development. Several factors contribute to this, including: (i) the lack of strongly owned national democracy agendas (upon which to base external support); (ii) the tendency to adopt a rather narrow focus on democracy (as a self-standing entity disconnected from development) and within democracy an even narrower focus on elections; (iii) a relative neglect of investing in ‘political society’ as opposed to ‘civil society’; (iv) the often less than optimal use of diplomatic and economic pressure on autocratic regimes; (v) issues of coherence between stated objectives (defending democratic principles) and practice (co-determined by foreign and economic interests); (vi) lack of adequate and flexible support modalities and procedures : (vii) limited evaluation, stock-taking and learning.
33. Various avenues exist to improve overall effectiveness and coherence of EC/EU support to democracy, both as a self-standing objective and a means to promote development such as: (i) making a much more effective, coordinated and consistent use of ‘multi-actor’ political dialogue; (ii) improving the interplay between development and foreign policy in supporting democracy building; (iii) further developing common positions that transcend national interests (on issues such as anti-constitutional changes,, human right abuses, etc.); (ii) providing smart support to the consolidation of domestic accountability systems between state and the society.
34. Other external actors (UN family, political foundations, civil society organisations, municipalities, trade unions) involved in democracy building/development are also confronted with the challenge of innovation for better impact. The plenary debate could take stock of lessons learnt by these various external actors and consider the challenges ahead to improve the linkages between democracy and development.

Key questions to be considered during the plenary session:

- *How to ensure greater effectiveness and coherence in the area of democracy support?*
- *How can the potential of the other key external actors (political foundations, civil society organisations, trade unions) be better used for democracy and development?*
- *How can EU external action benefit from the possible coming into force of the Lisbon treaty to ensure that coherence is achieved?*

ENDNOTES

¹ Menocal, Alina, R. 2007. *Analysing the relationship between democracy and development: Defining basic concepts and assessing key linkages*. Background Paper (1) prepared for the Wilton Park Conference on Democracy and Development (23-25 October 2007).

² The concept of *democracy* is often understood in a narrow fashion as implying a political process whereby control over government is constitutionally vested in elected officials; where regular elections are held on the basis of universal suffrage; where freedom of expression, association and access to information is upheld; and where the rule of law is supreme. Over the last 2 decades there has been a gradual focus on the concept of *democratic governance*, which is as much about the process of elections and political legitimacy as it is about institutions, structures and rules required to create a democratic society. This concept allows for a comprehensive and more nuanced analysis of democratic processes by taking into account factors such as accountability, the quality of participation, etc. Therefore, in this paper the term *democracy* is used in a sense that implies *democratic governance*.

³ New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), which states that 'It is generally acknowledged that development is impossible in the absence of true democracy, respect for human rights, peace and good governance.' Similarly, the APRM was put into place on the basis of the belief that 'democracy and good political governance as a basis for the reduction of poverty and the attainment of sustainable development.'

⁴ Norris, P. 2008. *Making Development Deliver: Innovative Governance for Human Development*. UNDP. New York

⁵ See for instance Calame, P. 2003. *La démocratie en miettes. Pour une révolution de la gouvernance*. FPH, Paris

⁶ For a recent analysis see Inglehart, R and Welzel, C.. 2009. *How Development Leads to Democracy. What we Know About Modernization*. In: Foreign Affairs, Vol 88, No 2

⁷ Bratton, M. and C. Logan. 2008. *Voters But Not Yet Citizens: Democratization and Development Aid*. In: Smart Aid to African development, J. Richards and A. Gilles (eds). Lynne Rienner

⁸ Halperin, M. and others. 2005. *The Democracy Advantage : How Democracies Promote Prosperity and Peace*. Lagon.

⁹ Cammack, D. 2007. *The Logic of African Neopatrimonialism: What Role for Donors?* Development Policy Review, No 5

¹⁰ European Commission. 2008. *Analysing and Addressing Governance in Sector Operations*. Tools and Methods Series. Reference Document No 4. EuropeAid.

¹¹ Gaventa, J. (2006). *Triumph, Deficit or Contestation? Deepening the "Deepening Democracy Debate"*. IDS. Working Paper 264. Brighton: IDS.

¹² IDS Bulletin. 2008. *Accountability. State Reform and Social Accountability*. IDS: Brighton

¹³ Ghana Center for Democratic Development. 2001. *Governance, Democracy and Development in Africa: A Cultural Approach*. Paper presented at the International Conference on the Cultural Approach to Development in Africa, IDEP, Dakar.

¹⁴ Menocal, *ibid*.

¹⁵ Robert Egnell and Peter Haldén. 2009. *Laudible, ahistorical and overambitious: security sector reform meets state formation theory*. In: Conflict, Security and Development.