

REPORT

Mapping the Activities of Democracy Assistance Foundations in the Western Balkans and the Black Sea region

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Acknowledgement.....	3
I. Introduction.....	3
1.1 Background	3
1.2 Discussions with OPIC	4
1.3 Objectives	4
1.4 Definitions and limitations	5
1.5 Method	6
1.5.1 <i>Planned method for assignment</i>	6
1.5.2 <i>Challenges</i>	6
2. Overview of target countries of other European political foundations.....	7
2.1 Target Countries	7
2.2 Criteria for selection of countries and activities	7
2.3 Co-ordination and synergies	7
3. Gaps of democracy assistance in the target regions and lessons learned.....	9
3.1 EU Member Countries	9
3.2 Countries regarded as less interesting to work in due to complex political situation or complex relations to the EU	9
3.3 Countries for other reasons not prioritised	10
3.4 General lessons learned	10
4. Areas where further support is needed according to European partners.....	12
4.1 Target groups and contexts suggested by other donors	12
4.2 Civil Society/NGO development	12
4.3 Youth	13
4.4 Women	14
4.5 Trade Unions	14
4.6 Local Politics	15
4.7 Inter-ethnic Co-operation	15
4.8 Cross-border	15
4.9 Regional activities	16
4.10 Increasing awareness in Sweden	16
5. Other issues of relevance when Swedish political foundations chose areas for support.....	17
5.1. International trends: Paris Agenda	17
5.2 European policy: Copenhagen Criteria, EU- relations	17
5.3 Swedish Policy	17
5.3.1 <i>Parliament</i>	17
5.3.2 <i>Government</i>	18
6. Comparative advantage of Swedish political foundations.....	18
7. Summary and recommendations.....	19
7.1 General	19
7.2 Target countries	19
7.3 Priority Activities: Direction of Support	20
7.4 Method	20
<i>Annex I Swedish development assistance to the target countries.....</i>	<i>22</i>
<i>Annex II Meetings and phone interviews</i>	<i>24</i>
<i>Annex III Interview questions</i>	<i>32</i>
<i>Annex IV Bibliography</i>	<i>34</i>
<i>Annex: V Terms of reference</i>	<i>37</i>

MAPPING THE ACTIVITIES OF DEMOCRACY ASSISTANCE FOUNDATIONS IN THE WESTERN BALKANS AND THE BLACK SEA REGION

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I wish to thank all the people I met and interviewed for their time and openness (*see list in Annex II*). They greatly contributed to this report and I hope it will be a stepping stone for further analysis and discussion.

I have been provided a wealth of written material, unfortunately not always possible to cover within the agreed frame and format of this report. In some cases I have chosen to insert additional information in footnotes, but the interested reader is also encouraged to go directly to the sources (*see Bibliography in Annex IV*).

I. INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background

Dr. Gerrits from the University of Amsterdam describes international democracy promotion as "partly altruistic and partly foreign policy self-interest... (It) is advantageous to all: for a fist full of dollars, democracy promotion strengthens the spread of democracy, creates international stability and prosperity."¹

The international community, including the European Union, is increasingly considering political party support as a key aspect of good governance- and democratisation². It is recognised that "political parties are often the missing link in democracy assistance"³. European political foundations have recently beefed up their capacity. Between 2002 and 2004, 27 European foundations had an average budget increase of nearly 20%⁴. More money will soon be channelled to this sector⁵. However, there might be new conditions for those wishing access to these new funds. There is increasing pressure to improve the quality of general development co-operation. The Paris Declaration (2005) outlines an agenda for development with a sharp focus on result management, co-ordination and harmonisation .

It is probably fair to say that political party support has not previously been subject to the same kind of scrutiny and impact assessment as other type of development co-operation⁶.

¹ See Alfred Mozer *Stifting Wave of Resistance: the birth of a new International. A unique event!*

² "Clingendael" seminar report, 2004, "As a result of international bias, most assistance has gone into strengthening of the civil society sector often at the expenses of the political parties. Now, however, it is increasingly being recognised that civil society actors are very capable of expressing specific demands but are less suitable to aggregate broad societal interests. Interest aggregation and other democratic functions like candidate selection and formation of government can only be performed by political parties that in most cases, however, lack the resources to do so. "

³ Ref. *Institute for Multiparty Democracy (IMD). Support for political parties and party systems, The IMD approach.*

⁴ Ref. *Mapping European Democracy Assistance, Tracing the activities and Financial flows of Political foundations, Working paper 36*, Jos van Wersch and Jeroen de Zeeuw, Netherlands Institute of International Relations 'Clingendael', November 2005

⁵ Ref. *A European Foundation for Democracy Through Partnership, A proposal for a new initiative in EU democracy assistance word-wide*, March 2006.

⁶ As mentioned by the *Clingendael 2004 seminar report* (see bibliography), "one of the biggest problems in the field [of political party assistance] is that there are very few, publicly available systematic evaluations, and/or impact assessments on party assistance programs. Apart from one of two exceptions, in general there seems to be little willingness among international party assistance foundations and NGOs to learn from past mistakes or take into account external criticism. This makes it extremely difficult to come up with concrete suggestions for

In order to preserve the independence of political party work, parliaments have often provided finances without requiring a detailed follow-up on results. This could change.

In Sweden, there are generally high demands on transparency and cost-effective use of tax money. In the field of development co-operation, Swedes follow the international trend towards result orientation as well as country- and sector concentration. A new Government is inclined to scrutinise and re-evaluate old policies.

Moreover, on a European level, academia and think tanks are increasingly interested in the sector of party support.⁷ There is agreement on its relevance but ample discussion on effectiveness, result-orientation and transparency of programs.

Some European initiatives have recently been developed indirectly challenging most of the political foundations' partisan approach, based on the notion of like-mindedness of sister parties⁸. These European initiatives are intended to be politically "impartial" with a focus on cross-party activities⁹.

Finally, questions have been raised about the extent European political foundations focus their support to their partners on the fulfilment of the Copenhagen criteria, a necessary requirement for entry into European Union.

1.2 Discussions with OPIC

The planned assignment has been requested by Olle Burell, Programme Manager, responsible for Party to Party Support at the Olof Palme International Center. The idea has been developed in discussions, which took place in July and August 2006, between Olle Burell and the consultant.

1.3 Objectives

The purpose of the assignment:

improving the rationale and modalities of assistance". Moreover, as mentioned by the *Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung*, in 2005 (*Promoting Democracy, Creating Peace, Shaping Globalisation: The International Co-operation of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung*, FES 2005), "there is still a lack of systematic tools which meet the specific requirements of socio-political activities by political foundations. User-oriented approaches are needed which go beyond the actual analysis of the conflict and provide options for conflict-sensitive project activities."

⁷ Three PhD students under the direction of André Gerrits at the *Department of European Studies at the University of Amsterdam* are currently exploring the "role and relevance of external or international intervention..., with a special focus on the development of democratic political parties and party systems" in Bosnia , Kosovo, Georgia, Ukraine and Serbia

⁸ "The fraternal party model faces a major disadvantage or limitation. In many parts of the developing world and the postcommunist worlds (especially the former Soviet Union), parties do not divide along ideological lines that correspond to the main European ideological groupings, or even along a left-right axis at all. As a result, Western party institutes cannot find natural ideological partners in many countries. Insisting on the fraternal party method in such contexts, which are numerous, leads either to artificial attempts to read a particular ideological orientation into certain parties or very spotty coverage of the main parties.... Another danger is that close party-to-party relations can undermine objectivity: the parties providing support may get too close to allow them to assess the effectiveness of their assistance properly. A widespread perception that this is happening can add to a popular climate of mistrust in political parties more generally." Ref. Carothers, T. (2004) *Political Party Aid. Issues for Reflection and Discussion*,

⁹ There is traditionally an opposition between an "impartial" approach supported by US foundations, NDI and IRI, and a more "partisan" European approach. Although in the Black Sea region, in particular, all kinds of political foundations often feel the need to support multi-party projects.

a) To get a clear overview of the activities of democracy assistance foundations in the Western Balkans and the Black Sea region.

b) To find gaps in the work of other foundations and agencies in the Western Balkans and the Black Sea region.

b) Most importantly based on the findings, to assist the Center in defining criteria for selection of future projects and contexts where OPIC may have a comparative advantage. The criteria should be designed so as to avoid overlap of activities of other organisations as much as possible and contribute to more effective promotion of democracy in these regions.

1.4 Definitions and limitations

Democracy Assistance

The focus will be on support for democratic development of political parties in the Western Balkan- and the Black Sea region claiming an affiliation with Western European social democrat- and liberal parties. The general direction of support is given more attention than detailed activities.

It is assumed that the differences between liberal and social democrat parties are sometimes blurred in the target countries, especially in the Black Sea region¹⁰. Their affiliation to social democrat or liberal parties might sometimes be superficial and they may not always have a profound understanding of the issues and values these parties stand for in the EU-region¹¹.

Target Region

Countries in the Western Balkans and the Black Sea region are located in the South Eastern part of Europe.

The region of the Western Balkans refers to:

- Albania
- Former republics of Yugoslavia:
 - Bosnia and Herzegovina
 - Croatia
 - FYR of Macedonia
 - Montenegro (since referendum in 2006)
 - Serbia, including the Kosovo region, which is currently under international administration
 - Slovenia

The Black Sea region refers to the states directly surrounding the Black Sea:

- Bulgaria
- Romania
- Ukraine
- Russia
- Turkey
- Georgia

¹⁰ Where, as in the case of Georgia, "political parties hardly exist", they are "clans ...more or less loyal to individuals" with an "ideology and programme [which] can be easily modified." See in bibliography the *Evaluation of the Matra Political Parties Programme*

¹¹ Foundations do not always follow the policy of the international framework as it is the case with the Armenian Revolutionary Federation "Dashnaktsuyn", which although has become a full member of the Socialist International, is not chosen as a partner by like-minded political foundations "because of its nationalist record" Ref. *Policy plan 2006, Mozer Stichting*.

In a wider sense¹², it is understood that the Black Sea region also incorporates:

- Moldova
- Armenia
- Azerbaijan.

This analysis will also cover:

- Belarus¹³

1.5 Method

1.5.1 Planned method for assignment

The main source of information has been representatives of other political foundations and think tanks that have generously shared their opinions on the main questions of the assignment. They have also shared conclusions on challenges as well as best-practices experienced or perceived by their own organisations in the field of democracy assistance.

The ToR (see *Annex V*) of the assignment outlines some assumptions to be discussed with the interlocutors. Some information from the target regions suggests that inadequate attention might be given the following issues:

- Co-operation on inter-ethnic issues, especially through the youth or women branches of local political parties, most often reflecting the ethnic division of society
- Co-operation on inter-ethnic issues between regional branches of local political parties
- Co-operation on cross-border issues between local political parties of bordering countries
- Lack of influence of youth and women branches on the strategies of local political parties
- The relationship between good governance, economic and social issues with regional security
- Co-ordination between various political foundations and local parties in order to find synergies and avoid overlap.

Consequently, discussions focused at least to some extent on these assumptions.

1.5.2 Challenges

Generally, it is rather challenging to get a clear and detailed picture of the on-going activities in the area of party-to-party support.

Some political foundations might feel somewhat restricted in their sharing of information, as they need to protect and preserve "special relationships" with partner parties. Carothers observes that representatives of party institutes may feel that no one outside political parties really can assess their work properly, and that most people outside parties fail to accept the fact that politics is inevitably a messy, imperfect business¹⁴.

Political party support is also considered as a particular and sensitive aspect of international development co-operation and is easily taken for external interference in a country's domestic affairs. Some countries benefiting from party-to-party support are not appreciating it

¹² This is the case for the Black Sea Forum for Partnership and Dialogue, BSF, (which does not include Russia as member or observer, but includes Greece) and the Organization of the Black Sea Economic Co-operation, BSEC, (which also includes Greece, Albania and Serbia as members).

¹³ Belarus is the only country of the Western part of the Soviet Union, which is neither an EU -NATO member nor a country of the Black Sea Region. Belarus faces major political and democratic challenges, even more serious than the ones faced by its neighbouring countries, Ukraine and Russia. Belarus was denied Council of Europe membership because it "does not respect minimum democratic standards".

¹⁴ Carothers, T. (2004) *Political Party Aid. Issues for Reflection and Discussion*, paper prepared for the Sida.

and even sometimes developing "counter measures". That may also explain the discretion of some political foundations.

As mentioned, the focus of the report will be on the general direction of democracy support, not on precise activities, which in any case might be less valuable than general conclusions.

Consequently, main attention is given general lessons learned and geographic and conceptual direction recommended OPIC by partners.

2. OVERVIEW OF TARGET COUNTRIES OF OTHER EUROPEAN POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS

2.1 Target Countries

The Balkan and Black Sea regions are generally of key interest to all EU countries for political and security reasons. Particular driving forces for co-operation in the area of democratisation are EU integration and the fight against corruption, trafficking and terrorism¹⁵. Hence, EU political parties are increasingly interested in developing "strategic" relations with like-minded political parties in the EU neighbourhood. Activities are generally reduced in candidate countries after they have become members of the EU.

Moreover, foundations notice that it is easier to find suitable partners in Europe, than in other regions, such as Sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East, North Africa and Asia where political parties have not yet developed their ideological profile or where foundations operate according to a different logic¹⁶.

The areas/countries that have received most attention from political foundations are Kosovo and Belgrade in Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina¹⁷, and Ukraine and Georgia since the "Orange" and "Rose" revolutions. Many foundations work in bigger cities, few in the province, particularly in larger countries. Most foundations work in Kosovo.

2.2 Criteria for selection of countries and activities

Countries and activities seem to have been selected mainly based on historical circumstances rather than on reasoning around comparative advantages or other criteria.

2.3 Co-ordination and synergies

Because of different national political cultures, the various political foundations and other actors involved in the field of democracy assistance have so far faced difficulties in establishing harmonisation and co-ordination mechanisms. "Like-minded" political foundations meet once or twice a year under the umbrella of European parties (PES and ELDR) to share information, however, ambitions to find synergies between programmes have been limited. Co-ordination and sharing of information is rather aimed at finding solutions to ad-hoc problems.

¹⁵ The fact that Romania and Bulgaria became EU members on 1st January 2007 has increased the EU interest in the Black Sea region, which is now an EU border region.

¹⁶ Ibid. Clingendael report.

¹⁷ Both Kosovo and Bosnia are largely sustained by the EU, which is very implicated not only in the economy but also in the political sphere, the latter together with the OSCE (ref. <http://www.osce.org/kosovo/13370.html> and <http://www.oscebih.org/democratization/?d=3>)

Some foundations have established a coordination mechanism at the EU level, however with limited capacities¹⁸.

Limited co-ordination and harmonisation has an impact on results.

Some like-minded political parties organise individual evaluations of potential party counterparts rather than joint evaluations. The conclusions sometimes diverge. Consequently, parties, such as in Serbia, get different type of support from like-minded European foundations. The foundations' various and sometimes divergent strategies are not helping to establish a stable environment, conducive to the democratic development of the local political parties.

Harmonisation may be hampered by the substantial discrepancy between the German and the other European foundations as regards resources. In 2004 the German foundations budget represented 90% of the total budget of the European foundations, 358 million Euros out of 400 million¹⁹. The largest foundation in Europe is the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES), which had a budget of 123.5 million Euros in 2004. Another German foundation, the Friedrich Naumann Stiftung (FNST), had a budget of 40 million Euros, while the OPIC budget was 12.5 million Euro and the SILC budget 0.6 million in 2004. The same year, the US foundations, NDI and IRI, had budgets of 45.7 million USD and 29.3 million USD respectively.

Moreover, the German foundations have field offices staffed with international personnel in nearly all countries in the Western Balkans and the Black Sea region²⁰. NDI, which is working in close co-operation with both socialist- and liberal like-minded European foundations, has also field offices with international staff in nearly all countries. In comparison, OPIC has field offices with one local staff in some countries (Bosnia, Serbia/Montenegro, Kosovo/Macedonia, Albania). These offices, however, have no own financial resources and depend entirely on Headquarter decisions. Absence of a solid field representation of the non-German European political foundations makes operational harmonisation in the field more difficult²¹.

In conclusion, the German foundations have management- and financial capacity to run democratisation projects in a manner that can not be challenged by other European foundations, though possibly by US foundations.

However, also the German Foundations suffer from constraints.

¹⁸ The European Forum for Democracy and Solidarity, for example, "aims to contribute to the development of social- democracy by serving as a platform for co-operation between social democratic parties, organisations and personalities. Within the European Forum, 12 social democratic foundations and 20 social democratic parties play an active role. The European Forum is currently managed by the Alfred Mozer Stichting (AMS) and the International Foundation for Social Democracy of the Dutch Labor Party (PVDA). Each year, it organises several large international conferences and some smaller scale assessment visits and seminars" (Ref. European Forum web site). As stated by Lena Hjelm-Wallén, Chairperson of the European Forum, "in the work of the European Forum ...attention [is] given to its information service...Newsflash, Country Updates and Calendar". Ref. *Annual Report 2002 European Forum*

¹⁹ Ref. *Mapping European Democracy Assistance, Tracing the activities and Financial flows of Political foundations, Working paper 36*, Jos van Wersch and Jeroen de Zeeuw, Netherlands Institute of International Relations 'Clingendael', November 2005

²⁰ This is especially the case with FES less with FNST

²¹ As emphasised by FES (Ref. *Promoting Democracy, Creating Peace, Shaping Globalisation: The International Co-operation of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung*, FES 2005), "the promotion of democracy is part of a complex area of action, which calls for good knowledge of local conditions and specifically a high measure of political sensitivity. What really determines the success of socio-political consultancy is long-term presence in the field and the ability to recognise transformation potential and respond to it in a flexible manner at the right moment."

The Netherlands Institute of International Relations 'Clingendael'²², underlines that "under German Party Law, the *Stiftungen* are not allowed to support any political party, at least within Germany". It remains unclear whether the *Stiftungen* are allowed to support political parties abroad, through the 'bi-party' approach. Other European foundations including the OPIC and the ELDR, which management is more directly connected to like-minded Swedish political parties, do not face this type of constraints.

Consequently, given the different kinds of limitations of Germans and non-German foundations, one can already distinguish a *de facto* division of labour (*by default*) in the field; the German foundations running democracy assistance projects with lower political profile, while the others foundations focus more on party-to-party activities.

The different types of constraints facing the various actors can be seen as a strong argument for increased co-operation and co-ordination between foundations and in the interest of all.

3. GAPS OF DEMOCRACY ASSISTANCE IN THE TARGET REGIONS AND LESSONS LEARNED

The focus is not equally strong everywhere in the Eastern Europe and on all kinds of activities. Reasons for this vary.

3.1 EU Member Countries

Democracy assistance is phasing out in Slovenia, as it will have fulfilled the Copenhagen criteria prior to entry into the Union. It is doubtful whether further support can be justified. However, regional activities involving Slovenia as well as Bulgaria and Romania, joining the EU in January 2007, could be considered, especially in order to strengthen co-operation between regional like-minded parties²³.

For Croatia, the same policy should apply, as there are reasons to believe that the country will enter the Union rather soon.

3.2 Countries regarded as less interesting to work in due to complex political situation or complex relations to the EU

- In Belarus, the need for democracy assistance can objectively be regarded as substantial, however, civil society organisations as well as political parties are not very developed due to a strong and repressive regime resisting all expressions of pluralism. It is known to be exceedingly difficult to work in Belarus. For "security reasons"²⁴, some political foundations have chosen to work out of neighbouring countries, such as Ukraine, Poland, and Lithuania. Although many foundations are interested in working in Belarus, the EU has not defined a specific co-operation strategy for the country, not being a member of the Council of Europe²⁵.

²² Ref. *Mapping European Democracy Assistance, Tracing the activities and Financial flows of Political foundations, Working paper 36*, Jos van Wersch and Jeroen de Zeeuw, Netherlands Institute of International Relations 'Clingendael', November 2005

²³ With regard to the Western Balkans, this would be in line with the international strategy. The Stability Pact, "which purpose is to develop a shared strategy among all partners for stability and growth in South Eastern Europe", will soon cease to function. It will be replaced by "a more regionally-owned, streamlined and effective regional co-operation framework". (Ref. Stability Pact web site)

²⁴ Ref. Alfred Mozer Stichting *Policy plan 2006*

²⁵ "Since the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) [which was developed with the objective of avoiding the emergence of new dividing lines between the enlarged EU and its neighbours], builds upon existing agreements

- Turkey, now on the threshold to the EU, could be seen as a strategic co-operation country for political foundations. However, the country's strong political organisations are reluctant to evolve. It is also difficult to find representative partners to work with.

3.3 Countries for other reasons not prioritised

- In Albania, relatively little has been done in the field of democracy assistance and for less clear reasons. Many foundations find the country difficult to work in²⁶. In addition, the country is generally not as politically prioritised as the multiethnic war-torn former Yugoslavia.²⁷
- Armenia is another country regarded as a lower priority in international and EU affairs. Also this country is regarded as challenging to work in.²⁸
- Although perceived as more interesting than Armenia, Azerbaijan²⁹ is also not regarded as a high priority.
- Montenegro is a new country and may formerly have lost out to Serbia and Kosovo listed as higher priorities by foundations.
- Macedonia is perhaps the other least prioritised country among the former Yugoslav republics.
- Moldova. Outside support has focused more on poverty reduction than on democratic development.
- Russia, Turkey and Ukraine are so large and populated countries that gaps remain in the work of political foundations, especially in areas outside of the largest cities.

3.4 General lessons learned

More focus on sustainability is necessary:

- Long-term approach is necessary. Very little can be achieved through activities limited to less than one year
- Local ownership is essential as is bottom-up approaches. Co-operation, in particular, cannot be imposed from above but must be based on common interest at the target level
- Focus on party elite (particularly in the Balkans, Turkey and Ukraine) jeopardise sustainability due to reshuffles and changes of power
- One remedy is to focus on institution building (parties, party branches, local administrations and NGOs), on the local government level and on middle management of party structures

(Partnership and Co-operation or Association Agreements or the Barcelona Process), it is not yet 'activated' for Belarus. ...No such Agreements are yet in force " ENP strategy paper, 2004

²⁶ As in the case of the Alfred Mozer Stichting ref. *Policy Plan 2006*, Alfred Mozer Stichting

²⁷ For instance, FES and FNST have only a small office in country staffed with locals.

²⁸ "The tense relations between the different parties, in opposition and in government, make it very hard to deal with sophisticated and controversial party politics." Ref. *Annual Report 2005*, Alfred Mozer Stichting

²⁹ Azerbaijan, because of its oil reserve, and Georgia because it represents a "safe" transport way for oil to western country, are countries of more strategic interest than Armenia.

- Headquarters of the partner parties should not be bypassed, however, as it risks creating conflicts within the party, between headquarters and party branches
- Training of trainers is a cost-effective activity also contributing to sustainable results
- Training and seminar agendas should be precise and result-oriented. Very general social, economic and political items should be avoided
- Study tours to Western countries are less useful than training in the target country or region

Key issues and incentives for change:

- In the western Balkans, projects must address EU accession
- Projects must both be uncompromising with regard to democratic values, which are a prerequisite for acceding to the EU, and on some level cater to the interest of the leadership of the political party - even if the target is the local level or political branches. Otherwise real results will be weak
- An important objective of projects could be to broaden the party base as a formula to election success
- An eye on the calendar and awareness of election dates is also necessary in order to push dialogue on sensitive issues, such as corruption and codes of conduct at strategic times. The further a country has come in its democratic development and the stronger chance the opposition has of winning the elections, the more the election timeframe becomes relevant in defining project activities
- A general advise is to bring together a mixture of partners in project activities, including political party members, civil servants from the state administration officials and civil society organisations, including trade unions. Joint activities will make them better understand their respective roles and perspectives, as borders between these groups are often blurred in the target countries. This approach become even more relevant in the Black sea region, where Presidents have a tight grip on political powers at the expense of parliaments and political parties

Working methods of Political Foundations

- Unduly involvement in party decision making processes should of course be avoided
- Political party foundations are mainly staffed with people with political party experience. A very limited number of staff members have project management experience³⁰. Both types of competence are needed. Good project managers in the field are essential for achieving results
- Measurement and evaluation of programme results should be improved and shared between foundations. Targeted groups and areas should be followed over time and conclusions on the effects of support should be reflected in formal or informal strategies of political foundations

³⁰ "Unlike persons working in bilateral or multilateral development agencies, persons who work in Western party institutes are not developmentalists or diplomats. They are political actors..." Ref. Carothers, T. (2004) *Political Party Aid. Issues for Reflection and Discussion*, paper prepared for the Sida.

- Improved co-ordination would be advantageous for all³¹.
- Partners are never perfect. If they were, the support would not be needed. The weaker the partner, the stronger awareness, strategy, co-ordination and support is needed from western political foundations

4. AREAS WHERE FURTHER SUPPORT IS NEEDED ACCORDING TO EUROPEAN PARTNERS

4.1 Target groups and contexts suggested by other donors

Groups: By focusing on civil society, trade unions, youth, and women, political foundations become less entangled in the search for suitable like-minded political party elite.

Contexts: Training on European affairs in the Black Sea region, excluding Turkey, risks raising too high expectations and is therefore not advised by some other foundations³².

Focus on the Copenhagen agenda seems more relevant in countries with "low civic culture and civic self organization", as in the case of Southern Caucasus³³.

In the most challenging countries, such as Belarus, the focus should be less on political issues and more on general civil society development.

In the western Balkans training of parties on European affairs is highly relevant especially if it involves people beyond the party leadership³⁴.

4.2 Civil Society/NGO development

Civil Society is the most relevant focus in countries with little experience of democratic processes and where political parties are not well developed according to the Copenhagen criteria³⁵. It is also a suitable focus in local areas where political parties are not active,

³¹ In particular in order to avoid having like-minded political parties in a country fighting amongst themselves to get the attention and support of the various political foundations and consequently developing superficial democratic agendas to please them.

³² "Europe should intensify the contacts with the former Soviet Republics. Europe should employ all the means available to assist these countries in their political and economic reforms. All means, according to Gerrits, with the exception of one: EU membership." See *Alfred Mozer Stifting Wave of Resistance: the birth of a new International. A unique event!*

³³ Ref. *For a Rights Based-Integrated Approach of Democracy in the South Caucasus: Alternative democratic policies and initiatives for Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia* Armineh Arakelian, IDEA South Caucasus

<http://www.yes-dk.dk/YES/index.php?option=content&task=view&id=143&Itemid=169>

³⁴ "All participants [to the ninth meeting of the heads of state and government of the South-East European co-operation process] agreed on the importance of good neighbourly relations and on the need for finding mutually acceptable solutions on outstanding issues with neighbouring countries. Also, the participants agreed that each country's progress towards the EU continues to depend on individual merits in meeting the conditions and requirements set forth in the Copenhagen criteria and in the Accession and Stabilisation and Association Processes, including full co-operation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia". Ref. *Thessaloniki declaration of the ninth meeting of the heads of state and government of the South-East European co-operation process (SEEC)*

³⁵ "One very common problem with political parties in new and struggling democracies is their lack of connection to civil society. ...In looking at civil society they tend to focus on NGOs, particularly the circle of Western-funded advocacy NGOs and social service NGOs, rather than on the much broader range of formal and informal social organizations that make up civil society. Yet [these] groups more oriented toward broad membership and mobilisation, such as teachers organizations, or indigenous persons organizations, might well

and/or where activities supported by western political foundations are not warmly welcome.
Example:

- Remote areas in large countries: Russia (Siberia), Ukraine (Eastern) and Turkey (Eastern Anatolia)
- Belarus
- Caucasus
- Serbia (outside of Belgrade)

In Belarus, it would be appropriate to support interest groups that are perceived as less "political" or threatening, such as environmental- women- and youth groups as well as trade unions. The important goal in this type of contexts is to foster civil society development in the broadest sense.

4.3 Youth

The key advantage of a youth focus is the shift away from the short-term political situation to the long-term investment in the future. The generation in power in many countries were often educated during the Cold War and some individuals even held key positions in communist regimes. Again, this is especially relevant in countries weakly committed to the Copenhagen agenda.

The goal is to change the culture of the future leadership and to promote critical thinking as well as political tolerance. Youth branches are often the vanguard of the political party, more flexible than mother parties, which tend to be dependant on their senior members and have a sometimes unhealthy attachment to their history. Moreover, youth branches are not totally identified with their mother political party. They can get involved in activities, which would not be accepted if organised by the mother party. They also have the ability to test new approaches without having to pay a political price³⁶.

From a pragmatic perspective it is equally important, however, to also on some level involve key members of the mother party in programs. Otherwise successful attainment of objectives may not be feasible given the hierarchical structures in many of the target countries.

The European Youth Forum³⁷ claims that the European CIS countries need special attention and support in order to develop their youth organisations³⁸. Quite a few foundations³⁹ are very aware of this and are already working with youth branches. The International Union of

find it useful to engage in strategic mobilisation with parties. In short, both party aid and civil society aid representatives will have to move away from formulaic ideas like "civil society should be politically neutral" or "parties and civil society need to work together more" and really examine what they mean and what they want in detail and in relation to the reality of the local context "Ref. Carothers, T. (2004) *Political Party Aid. Issues for Reflection and Discussion*, paper prepared for the Sida.

³⁶ As mentioned by Magolowondo, Augustine Titani in *Democratisation Aid as a Challenge for Development Co-operation (see bibliography)* "donors themselves, especially the governmental ones, exercise restraint or selfcensorship in the interest of maintaining 'cordial' relations with the government of the host country. The problem here is that pursuance of democracy itself challenges the extent to which donors can continue to stick to these formal restraints, for ...the democratic agenda may in practice, entail occasional 'unorthodox' way of conducting development co-operation by being more intrusive."

³⁷ Most Youth branches of political parties in Europe are members of the European Youth Forum, <http://www.youthforum.org/>, which stressed in its Position paper on the youth sector in the CIS that "despite the liberalisation of political life in the European CIS region in the last decade, non-governmental youth organisations live under difficult conditions and do not receive the recognition and support from their governments to which they are entitled."

³⁸ The European Forum web site provides interesting and recent assessments of youth organisations in the CIS countries.

³⁹ Including Alfred Mozer Stichting

Socialist Youth (IUSY) and the Youth European Socialists (ECOSY), socialist like-minded parties, have extensive experience in organising regional cross-border round-tables involving socialist youth branches. Activities include the Balkan Round-table, the Kosovo Round-table, the Round-table on the Kurdish issue, the Round-table for Eastern European Co-operation as well as the Black Sea Co-operation meeting. On these occasions "member organizations can share opinions and experiences ...to build their organizations and fight for common values of democracy, peace and social justice in their region".

These positive initiatives could be further developed into firmer action-oriented structures, to allow for follow-up and more long-term results.

4.4 Women

Women are also a comparatively marginalized group, which stronger inclusion in public debate is not only desirable from a normative equality- and democracy perspective but which would also be politically beneficial for all political parties. NGOs may not be the institutions best fit to fight for women's social, political and economic rights. A focus on women party branches is thus important, as well as to broaden and develop the place of women in politics beyond the issue of the number of women represented in national parliaments.

Most political foundations have an inadequate focus on gender. Relatively few support women party branches to develop their strategies, policies and networks with trade unions and civil society. OPIC is currently the largest sponsor of the CEE Gender Network of the European Forum for Democracy and Solidarity.

So far good results have been achieved by "issue coalitions", organised across party lines or different trade unions. For practical reasons, one political party must be designated to take the lead.

In the Black Sea region, where the role of political parties is more marginal, targeting women within parties becomes less relevant than targeting women in NGOs.

4.5 Trade Unions

Local trade unions warrant special attention. Usually they are not as well established as in western countries and often are they lacking a positive image, particularly since the on-set of transition. It is, however, in the strong interest of European trade unions that the social conditions in the target countries approach European standards.

Trade union organisations, including the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) or the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) ⁴⁰, are not regarded as politically intimidating and are therefore able to work with local trade union partners with relative ease.

Local trade Unions have a long history in the Western Balkans and the Black Sea region. Most of them would welcome external support, particularly for development of competence and capacities⁴¹ in the fields of labour law, energy, transport policy, free trade agreements, health- and pension system reform and the integration into international frameworks. The support should be long-term and help them to move into strategic thinking and organisational development, creating a core of knowledge to be passed on.

⁴⁰ See <http://www.stabilitypact.org/soc-cohesion/default.asp>. It is to be noted that as a partner of the Initiative for Social Cohesion (ISC) of the Stability Pact for SEE, the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) has been one of the rare organisation successful in helping to break the ethnic barrier in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

⁴¹ Brain drain should be especially avoided.

Priority should be given to transfer of knowledge between similar countries, such as for example between the Western Balkans and Slovenia or Slovakia benefiting from lessons their own transition.

Compared to in the Western Balkans, trade unions in the Black Sea region are weaker and blatant violations of union rights are common.

It may be possible to tap into the experience of the German FES, which more than other organisations has extensive knowledge of trade union support and local conditions.

4.6 Local Politics

It is clear that many foundations have given a considerable attention to key members of the like-minded political parties but less attention to the local branches and mid-level management.⁴²

The power and position of top members vary with election results and in heavily politicised environments their raise and fall in the party can be most unpredictable.

The targeting of local branches is to be preferred from a sustainability perspective and is particularly relevant in large countries, such as Russia and Turkey, and in regions where minorities play a key role, such as western Macedonia, Sandjak, Voivodina and Presevo Valley in Serbia, and eastern Ukraine.

Some interlocutors suggested twinning-programmes between western cities and local municipalities. It could be encouraged in Turkey, where the Swedish organisations or foundations could be regarded as an "honest and neutral broker".

4.7 Inter-ethnic Co-operation

Co-operation between ethnic- or religious groups either within or across national borders could be valuable from several perspectives; both as a means to promote tolerance and democratic values, but also as a means to build confidence between peoples in areas marked by a history of conflict. The co-operation must be based on a common and tangible interest, such as environmental management or the formation of special purpose associations in order to gain advantages of scale in technical areas, such as water management.

4.8 Cross-border

Cross-border activities could be valuable from the same perspectives as inter-ethnic co-operation⁴³. The focus has again to be on the local level, where advantages of co-operation

⁴² "The selection of Local Democracy and Cross-border Co-operation/Euroregions as a combined field of work is built upon the fact that a truly regional, economic as well as social development, further democratization and stabilisation of South-Eastern Europe (SEE) are not possible without a strong commitment towards the local level, in particular local authorities. At the same time, sustainable solutions for SEE countries can only be achieved through enhanced local ownership." Ref. Stability Pact <http://www.stabilitypact.org/loc-dem/default.asp>

⁴³ "Transfrontier co-operation remains an essential feature of the action pursued by the Council of Europe to promote democratic stability and mutual understanding between the nations, through enhanced dialogue, joint action and institution- building at local and cross-border level...cross-border co-operation between territorial authorities with the involvement of the civil society can contribute to the easing of tensions, facilitate reconciliation between communities and pave the way to formal or more structured co-operation" Ref. *Fourth annual report to the Committee of Ministers covering the year 2004*, Strasbourg, 15 February 2005 DG1

are more obvious, and as hostility between local actors may be easier to overcome than on the highest political level.

Swedish foundations could also in this case serve as an "honest and neutral broker"⁴⁴.

Examples:

- Cyprus: Co-operation between the two sides of the green line.
- Twinning between cities in Armenia and Turkey

Support can again be focused on co-operation around issues, which are less political or less politicised. The new financial instrument of the EU, the European Neighbourhood Instrument, will specifically address cross-border co-operation⁴⁵.

4.9 Regional activities

Regional projects are beneficial when they involve countries with historic, linguistic and/or cultural ties. For example, a country of the region that has fulfilled the Copenhagen criteria can easily work with those that have not, constituting a non-threatening example or even incentive for the others. (For example: promoting co-operation between Slovenian organisations with those from other Balkan countries⁴⁶) The EU pre-accession instruments support this type of positive peer pressure. As a consequence, EU countries are also supporting the transformation of the Stability Pact into a regional organisation for the Balkans, where some countries, already members of the EU, can serve as an example for others.

In the Black Sea region, a regional approach can be more challenging due to the absence of authentic ties, as it is composed of former soviet satellites on one hand and Turkey on the other. The counterparts may also be more reluctant to become involved in regional activities because of historical disagreement, although programs on the local level may be feasible.

As in the case of local level cross-border co-operation, it is important that co-operation is not imposed from above. Bottom-up approaches are necessary and local demands and interests must be the driving forces of the co-operation.

4.10 Increasing awareness in Sweden

The legitimacy of key local brokers involved human rights protections or trade union development could be strengthened if political foundations give them space and visibility in the public debate of their own western European countries. Increased understanding among westerners of the situation in Belarus and in Turkey may also inspire high level political commitment to support a constructive development in those countries.

(2005)4, Committee of Advisers for the Development of Transfrontier Co-operation in Central and Eastern Europe

http://www.coe.int/t/e/legal_affairs/local_and_regional_democracy/documentation/Library/Transfrontier_Cooperation/tfc_fourthannualreport.pdf

⁴⁴ "Those promoting democracy should encourage strong links and collective solidarities among the different organizations. Acting as a sort of marriage broker and providing support to relations across national borders could be particularly worthwhile. It might help generate regional and international civil society networks that can stand up to authoritarians at home.." Ref. *Democracy Promotion: The Elusive Quest for Grand Strategies*, PETER BURNELL 2004.

⁴⁵ Ref. *ENP strategy paper*

⁴⁶ As it is already organised by the Alfred Mozer Stichting.

5. OTHER ISSUES OF RELEVANCE WHEN SWEDISH POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS CHOSE AREAS FOR SUPPORT

When Swedish political foundations reflect on selection criteria and on contexts where their involvement could be valuable, also global and national policy issues should to be taken into consideration.

5.1. International trends: Paris Agenda

A new guiding principle for international development co-operation is the Paris Declaration, agreed upon at a meeting of the OECD-DAC countries in December of 2005.

The Paris Declaration promotes a model of partnership that improves transparency and accountability on the use of development resources. Donors and co-operation countries should improve their reporting of results.

Developing countries will assume greater responsibility and donors must improve co-ordination of their efforts. Among the recommendations are joint planning, joint evaluation and generally simplify procedures among donors. Aid should be aligned to priorities of partner countries and there should be a mutual responsibility for reporting and follow-ups.

Support should be aimed at promoting democratic trends and increased transparency of recipient country administrations.

Indicators of aid effectiveness were developed as a way of tracking and encouraging progress.

It is not unlikely that also democracy assistance will have to be adjusted to the principles of the Paris Agenda.

5.2 European policy: Copenhagen Criteria, EU- relations

According to the Copenhagen criteria, EU membership requires that "candidate country has achieved stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and, protection of minorities, the existence of a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union." Membership presupposes the candidate's ability to take on the obligations of membership including adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union"⁴⁷.

In 2007, the EU Commission will propose the introduction of a new financial instrument, the European Neighbourhood Instrument, which will address specific areas of co-operation, in particular cross-border co-operation, in addition to the areas addressed by existing instruments or their successors.

When designing strategies for partner countries, one has to pay particular attention to relations to the EU and availability of EU-instruments for that particular country.

5.3 Swedish Policy

5.3.1 Parliament

⁴⁷ Ref. the *EU Copenhagen Presidency conclusions*

The Policy of Global Development (PGD) obliges all Swedish actors to work towards the overall goal of Swedish development co-operation, which is to contribute to making it possible for poor people to improve their living conditions. Two perspectives should permeate international co-operation: the perspective of the poor and the human rights perspective. The latter is particularly relevant in an Eastern European context. Political foundations hence should take the PGD into consideration in the assessments of partners and selection of targets.

5.3.2 Government

The Government also adopts Swedish Co-operation Strategies for many countries in the region. These should be considered in the selection of countries.

Although the most important goal should be to avoid the countries most crowded by other donors, another important selection criteria should be that there is a Swedish Co-operation Strategy for the country, particularly if the strategy prioritises democratic governance.

The new Government alliance has signalled strong focus on results and poverty levels, security relevance and EU-accession as criteria for country concentration.

6. COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE OF SWEDISH POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS

The most important criteria is that Swedish political foundations reflect on their and the Swedish society's comparative advantage when they select focus on countries and activities in area of democracy assistance.

Some advantages are:

- Swedish political foundations can support political parties without the constraints experienced by the German foundations
- Swedish organisations can benefit from the Swedish neutrality policy, which may be an asset in some challenging countries-
- Swedish organisations are flexible and generally focus on small projects absorbing limited resources
- The "Swedish model" must be considered an asset with large and strong social organisations, including youth and women branches of political parties, and developed trade unions. Since decentralised youth and women organisations within political parties are not fully identified with the political mother parties, they are less "politically" visible and may have more leeway in their activities. It could be a key advantage in "difficult countries" like Belarus or when the political partners have not been clearly defined
- Sweden has great credibility in the international dialogue on issues such as transparency, social and trade union dialogue, gender equality, and the environment
- Sweden has credibility and legitimacy in areas with which Sweden has strong historical links, such as in the Baltic States (although now in the EU), but also in North-western Russia, and to some extent in Belarus
- Unlike EU related organisations (EU commission, EU regional foundation and political parties), Swedish political foundations are not only perceived as connected to EU integration

7. SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

7.1 General

- Swedish party-to-party support should be integrated into the wider conceptual framework of development co-operation. Political Foundations may want to consider important policy changes or trends on national-, European- and international level when they choose priorities. (Ex: EU-integration, Paris Agenda and Swedish Co-operation Strategies).
- Swedish foundations should consider their comparative advantages in the selection of target countries, activities and partners. (See Chapter 5)
- Specific but unpretentious strategies should be formulated for each target country. Contexts must define the best type of approach in each country. With a clear strategy, less time and work will be required down stream in order to select appropriate projects. Strategies could be developed in close co-operation with like-minded foundations with information and evaluation/monitoring capacity in the field, such as German foundations, or with other Swedish political foundations. The latter option may facilitate access to cross party resources.
- Lessons learned by own organisations and other donors (see 3.4) should be integrated into strategies and considered in the elaboration of activities together with partners.

7.2 Target countries

Appropriate targets should be those countries less crowded by other donors, such as Albania, Macedonia, and Montenegro in the Balkans. Expansion of activities in Serbia (inc. Kosovo) is probably not advisable unless they are involving several countries in the region.

As stated democracy assistance would probably benefit from alignment with priorities of general Swedish development assistance as defined in the Strategies for Development Co-operation (See *Annex I*).

In the Black Sea area, Moldova is a priority country for Swedish Development Co-operation and Sweden is known as a major donor. There is rather extensive Swedish development co-operation with Georgia (Southern Caucasus), however a large number of donors are active on the central level in the area of democracy support. The same goes for Ukraine. There may be clear justifications to work on the local level, however. The least donor crowded country in the Caucasus is Armenia, where also democratic governance is the main priority sector in the Swedish regional strategy for the Caucasus.

In addition, Swedish foundations may want to review the challenge of working in Belarus, Turkey and North-western Russia, countries of considerable strategic importance, where they may be able to use their comparative advantages if the democracy support is smartly designed.

In most other countries (including Serbia, Kosovo region, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Russia outside of the North-western region, Ukraine, Georgia), where FES has an office, it is recommended that OPIC finds a way to work through or with FES.

7.3 Priority Activities: Direction of Support

Activities have to be adapted to local contexts, comparative advantages of Swedish actors and lessons learned.

- Generally, need for support is greater on the local level where donor focus also is relatively scarce.
- Focus on youth, women and trade union is particularly important
- In multiethnic or post-conflict areas, interethnic/cross-border co-operation and building of confidence between antagonists should be promoted in activities.
- In challenging countries, focus could be on civil society development in general and on less politicised issues, such as the environment
- EU-accession and integration is always a relevant topic in the Balkans
- The Copenhagen criteria is relevant in the Black Sea region

In order to have an even clearer picture of reality, a more detailed study could be undertaken in one potential target country in the Balkan- and the Black Sea region respectively, such as for example Macedonia and Georgia.

7.4 Method

Although not a primary aim of the assignment, some suggestions could be made, which are only indirectly connected to the issues of selection criteria but rather focused on working methods and efficiency. The suggested measures are worth considering in order to achieve an even greater impact of the important democratisation activities of Swedish organisations⁴⁸:

- Swedish foundations could consider work through or in close collaboration with German foundations, which have a like-minded approach and more resources, not the least in terms of field staff.
- Synergies can generally be sought with the work of other European foundations.⁴⁹
- Swedish foundations can contribute to the creation of an EU framework of like-minded political parties. It is more efficient if foundations + political parties + EU parties undertake joint assessments of countries and partners⁵⁰.

⁴⁸ A recent evaluation of the Dutch *MATRA Political parties Programme* (see bibliography), comes to the following conclusions. "The implementation of the [the Dutch Political Parties Programme] is shifting to countries where the political situation is unstable, where chances for EU membership are uncertain or absent, and where a plural, democratic society is solely a distant possibility. It is difficult for Dutch political parties to select a sister party in these countries based on a relationship to programme. The evaluation shows that the work in countries of this sort is impossible without a clear strategy, a vision as to party support, knowledge of topical, political context and co-ordination and fine-tuning among the Dutch party foundations and with party foundations from other Western countries."

⁴⁹ European Forum formulates valuable political updates of countries, and carries out assessments, which could be useful in a harmonisation context. These updates are posted on the web (<http://www.europeanforum.net/>) and should be systematically used in the formulation of project proposals submitted to like-minded EU political foundations.

- Swedish foundations can work through civil society and sections of parties, but these partners have to learn more about projects; formulating objectives, sustainability, risks and measuring results⁵¹.
- Headquarters capacity may also have to be developed in order to meet new demands in these areas⁵².

⁵⁰ In particular, in case they disagree with the like-minded political partner, defined as such by the International co-ordination framework of the like-minded political party, the foundations could co-ordinate an approach between themselves. Co-ordination (formally or informally) could be as well considered in order to decide when co-operation should be stopped or end (for instance when the like-minded to do not follow basic democratic principles or because of their poor managerial record). More transparent approach becomes even more pertinent in a non-democratic environment (when limiting flow of information is of key importance)

⁵¹ "A ..lesson drawn from the last decade of democracy assistance is that the problems of state-building and the promotion of good governance are complex and must be addressed by experienced practitioners." Ref. Axworthy, Thomas S. and Campbell, Leslie and Donovan David *A blueprint : an International Survey the Democracy Institute*, May 2005 - The Democracy Canada Institute. In particular the voluntary supply driven approach has to change to a more professional demand driven culture.

⁵² As mentioned by a recent evaluation of the Dutch Political parties Programme (see bibliography), "it would be better for party foundations to work on a strategy with a longer term, incorporating a clear vision of party development, and an offer of activities per country, best fitting the actual political situation there."

ANNEX I

SWEDISH DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE TO THE TARGET COUNTRIES

WESTERN BALKANS

Albania:

- More than half (34 million) of the SEK 64 million Swedish assistance to Albania in 2005 involved human rights and democratic governance.
- Swedish assistance is " increasingly focused on institution building and capacity development, where both central and local levels must be involved, ...and promotes human rights and the building and deepening of a culture of democracy".⁵³

Macedonia:

- More than half (35 million) of the 62 million SEK Swedish assistance to Macedonia in 2005 involved human rights and democratic governance.
- The "goal of Swedish development co-operation is to reduce poverty by means of social change, based on EU integration as an engine of development."⁵⁴
- Regarding Human rights and social cohesion, the objective, "which is to be co-ordinated with the EU, aims to help bring about fair and non-discriminatory social development for women, men and children in Macedonia and thereby enhance opportunities for poor people to improve their conditions". However, in this area, "Swedish activities will primarily comprise a continuation of previous successful projects that the Macedonian side has identified as being amongst its priorities. These projects are to draw on Swedish comparative advantages and expertise, and are to particularly emphasise co-operation between Swedish and Macedonian authorities, institutions and NGOs."⁵⁵

Montenegro:

- "Swedish development co-operation..[is] primarily focus on the following sectors: Democracy and good governance, Respect for human rights, Gender equality, Economic growth, Sustainable use of natural resources and concern for the environment"⁵⁶

BLACK SEA REGION

Moldova:

- More than a quarter (17 million) of the 63 million SEK Swedish assistance to Moldova in 2005 involved human rights and democratic governance.
- The overall objective of Swedish-Moldavian development co-operation is to support the country ambition to create preconditions for reduced poverty and increased prosperity through contributions promoting democratic governance, sustainable economic growth in favour of the poor, prevention of social marginalisation and improvement of public health.⁵⁷
- Assistance contributing to democratic development in Moldova is allocated to both central and local levels. Sida is also financing projects to promote co-operation between Moldavian and Swedish non-governmental organisations.

Belarus:

- Some 40 %(SEK 11 million) of the SEK 28 million Swedish assistance to Belarus in 2005 involved human rights and democratic governance.

⁵³ Ref. Swedish country strategy for Albania (2004-2007) See <http://www.sweden.gov.se/>

⁵⁴ Ref. Swedish country strategy for Macedonia (2006 -2010), See <http://www.sweden.gov.se/>

⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁶ Ref. Swedish Country Strategy for Serbia and Montenegro for the period 2004-2007

⁵⁷ The new Country Strategy for Moldova has not been approved yet.

Russia:

- "Deeper relations between Sweden and Russia are to be sought as part of the anticipated transition to normal co-operation between neighbouring countries".⁵⁸
- Geographically, "co-operation should be concentrated to the north-western part of the country: the city of St Petersburg, the counties of Murmansk, Archangel, Leningrad, Novgorod, Pskov, Vologda and Kaliningrad, and the republics of Karelia and Komi. Occasional efforts may be required in other regions".⁵⁹
- The "main areas of Sweden-Russian development co-operation will continue to be deepening democracy, economic transition, social security, environment matters, common security, and education and research. The principal working methods will be consultancy, exchanges of experience and other forms of knowledge transfer".. "Sweden should provide training in support of democratic forces, institutions and individuals who are themselves engaged in strengthening the democratic process."⁶⁰
- "Twinning programmes with Russia...are a suitable instrument for direct communication between Sweden and Russia at the local and regional level, and are expected to increase over the next few years."⁶¹
- Co-operation projects "aimed at strengthening the role of politicians and the democratic task in Russia should be continued. It is also important for Sweden to support the development of civil society, for instance through closer contact between grassroots movements and other popular organisations."⁶²

Armenia:

- The "objective in Armenia [of the approx. SEK 20 million per year budget] is to support the democracy process and to enhance respect for human rights."⁶³
- Support should "primarily be directed at public structures such as the ombudsman system, but supplementary initiatives may also target civil society."

Azerbaijan:

- The objective in Azerbaijan [of the approx. SEK 10 million per year budget] is to "improve conditions for democratic governance, by means of efforts to:
 - give citizens greater access and influence in political processes and heighten awareness of the need for gender equality between women and men, girls and boys,
 - ensure that the differing needs of men, women and minorities are taken into greater account in political processes, and
 - strengthen civil society and its ability to influence decision-making."⁶⁴

Turkey:

- Nearly all (SEK 17.9 million) of the SEK 18.6 million Swedish assistance to Turkey in 2005 is targeting human rights and democratic governance.
- The objective is to "promote increased contacts with the Turkish society" and "focus on the country's European Union membership negotiations", in which "the work to strengthen human rights is central".⁶⁵
- "Areas in which Sweden has a comparative advantage or where the country's experience is very much in demand should be prioritised, as should the needs of south-eastern Turkey. Swedish authorities, organisations, popular movements, municipalities and enterprises should be encouraged to participate in the implementation of the support."⁶⁶

⁵⁸ Ref. Swedish Strategy for development Co-operation with Russia (2005-2008),

⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁶¹ Ibid.

⁶² Ibid.

⁶³ Ref. Swedish strategy for the Caucasus (2006-2009) 2009)

⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁵ Swedish Co-operation strategy for Turkey (2005-2009)

⁶⁶ Ibid.

ANNEX II

MEETINGS AND PHONE INTERVIEWS ⁶⁷

STOCKHOLM, Sweden

Tuesday, 15 August

- ***Olof Palmes internationella center / The Olof Palme International Center***
Box 836, S-101 36, Stockholm, Sweden
<http://www.palmecenter.se/>

Olle Burell, Partistödshandläggare / Programme Manager Party to Party Support
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Johan Moström, Project Manager
Tel: +46 703 24 59 49, E-mail: Johan.Mostrom@palmecenter.se

Monday, 21 August

- ***UN Mission in Côte d'Ivoire***

Axel Queval, Political Officer⁶⁸
Tel: +225 06203367, Email: Queval@un.org

Monday, 25 September

- ***Socialdemokratiska Arbetarpartiets ungdomsförbund (SSU)***
Ringvägen 100 A
Box 115 44, 100 61 Stockholm, Sweden
Tel: 08-714 48 00
www.ssu.se

Laila Naraghi, Responsible for international questions at the SSU Board of Directors
& Vice president of ECOSY (Young European Socialists)
Mob: +46 70 66 00515, Email: laila.naraghi@ssu.se

Faraj Abu-iseifan, International Secretary
Mob: + 46 70 2266867, Email: faraj@ssu.se

- ***International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA)*** ⁶⁹
International IDEA,
Strömsborg, SE-103 34, Stockholm, Sweden
Tel: +46 8 698 37 00, Fax: +46 8 20 24 22, E-mail: info@idea.int, www.idea.int

Rita Taphorn, Programme Officer
Political Party Department

⁶⁷ Regarding phone interviews, check footnotes

⁶⁸ Former Head of the International Relations at the Jean Jaurés Foundation (see below). Interviewed by phone.

⁶⁹ Contacted through Roger Hällhag, who heads the Political Party department at IDEA, r.hallhag@idea.int, Tel: +46-8 698 37 20

Tel: +46 8 698 37 00, Email: r.taphorn@idea.int

Armineh Arakelian, Head of the South Caucasus Programme⁷⁰
Resident Representative and Head of IDEA Office in Armenia
Tel: + 37410- 58 14 89 , Email: a.arakelian@idea.int

- **National Democratic Institute (NDI)**

National Democratic Institute
2030 M Street, NW, Fifth Floor, Washington, DC 20036-3306, USA
Tel: 202.728.5500, <http://www.ndi.org/>

Francesca Binda, Head of NDI Office in Cairo and former NDI employer
1 Middan Vinni, 2nd Floor, Apt 22, Doukki, Cairo, Egypt
Tel: +20-2-335-4772, Email: fbinda@ndi.org

Wednesday, 27 September

- **Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES)**

Västmanagatan 4
S-113 25, Stockholm, Sweden
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Uwe Optenhoegel, Head of the (new) FES office in Stockholm
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Tuesday, 26 September

- **The Swedish International Liberal Center (SILC)**

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Erik Jennische, Secretary General
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Friday, 6 October

- **Uppsala universitet**

Box 256, 751 05 Uppsala
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Roland Kostić, Phd student
Department of Peace and Conflict Research.
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⁷⁰ phone Interview

BRUSSELS, Belgium

Monday 9 October

- ***EU Commission, Directorate General for Enlargement***

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Alain Servantie, Counsellor, Inter-institutional relations

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- ***Stability Pact***

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- ***The European Liberal Democrat and Reform (ELDR) party***

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Daniel Tanahatoe, Political Advisor

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- ***European Liberal Youth (LYMEC)***

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Srd Kisevic, LYMEC Secretary General⁷¹

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Mob: +32 47 29 33 100

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AMSTERDAM, The Netherlands

Tuesday 10 October

- ***University of Amsterdam***

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⁷¹ Not met but M. Kisevic sent an extensive response by email

Professor Andre W.M. Gerrits, Department of European Studies
also Chairman of the Board of the Mozer Foundation
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- **European Forum for Democracy and Solidarity and Mozer Foundation**,
Herengracht 54,
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⁷² The Konrad Adenauer Foundation, one of the largest political foundations in the world, is linked to the Christian Democratic Party of Germany. Nevertheless, mapping its activities in the region in question is of interest

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⁷³ Phone interviews

ANNEX III

INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

Goal of the interviews

- What is being done?
- What is not being done?
- What should be the criteria for selection?

Questions

1. List of activities.
2. Do you have an overview of political party support in the field? Do your field offices have a view of this issue?
3. What are you doing in the field of democracy assistance?
4. What are your target countries?
5. Based on which principles or criteria do you design programs and choose countries?
6. What has worked well/not so well in your programs? And why so? (Good and bad partners and co-operation institutions?)
7. Do political foundations work together to find synergies?
8. Are there sufficient co-ordination systems in the field and how are they set up?
9. What gaps need to be filled and what problems need to be resolved in the field of democracy assistance?

Special questions?

- a) Sustainability Is it possible to build party institutions without too much focus on individuals who may not stay in politics?
- b) Sustainability: how can programmes to build party institutions be designed without being vulnerable to changes of power and elections?
- c) Relevance: how can activities promote European integration? Security (cross ethnic, corruption, good governance)?
- d) Risks: mistakes, what activities should be avoided, what could empower the wrong people?
- e) Belarus: What if anything can be done here?

Other questions:

- How can the political parties get away from the pressure of elections? How can they continue to exist after winning an election? How can they build a party organisation through the elections?
- How can the political parties be interested in cross ethnic co-operation? Co-operation on inter-ethnic issues, especially through the youth or women branches of local political parties, most often reflecting the ethnic division of society. Co-operation on inter-ethnic issues between regional branches of local political parties
- Is there anything directly or indirectly which pressures accession member states to democratise their political parties?
- Which are the key partners in political party support in these regions? Country by country?
- Where to access proper information?
- Co-operation on cross-border issues between local political parties of bordering countries.
- Lack of influence of youth and women branches on the strategies of local political parties

- The relationship between good governance, economic and social issues with regional security
- Co-ordination between various political foundations and local parties in order to find synergies and avoid overlap.
- What are the key questions with political party support?
- How can one improve/ensure that political party support projects are evaluated correctly?
- How can one ensure maximum co-ordination in project design in order to limit overlap and increase focus on the required type of political party support?
- What kind of co-ordination is required between organisation doing political party support?
- Co-operation on inter-ethnic issues between regional branches of local political parties

ANNEX IV

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⁷⁴ The IDEA web site provides some interesting links to key documents. Ref.

http://www.idea.int/parties/international_assistance.cfm

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⁷⁶ Only the executive summary is available in English

⁷⁷ See publications on Clingendael web site <http://www.clingendael.nl/>

⁷⁸ http://www.idea.int/parties/upload/Political_Party_Aid_by_Carothers_Oct04.pdf

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⁸⁰ See http://www.idea.int/publications/funding_parties/index.cfm

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Inauguraldissertation Zur Erlangung des akademischen Grades eines Doktors der

⁸³ Ref. Heinrich Böll Stiftung www.boell.de

⁸⁴ Ref.

⁸⁵ <http://www.fes.de/europolity/finalversionAgh.PDF#search=%22%22Andre%20Gerrits%22%20foundations%22>

⁸⁶ <http://www.alfredmozerstichting.nl/renderer.do/menuId/24587/clearState/true/sf/24587/returnPage/24587/itemId/231418/realItemId/231418/pageId/24638/instanceId/24672/>

⁸⁷ <http://www.alfredmozerstichting.nl/renderer.do/menuId/24587/clearState/true/sf/24587/returnPage/24587/itemId/272306/realItemId/272306/pageId/24638/instanceId/24672/>

⁸⁸ <http://www.europeanforum.net/report/1>

⁸⁹ Ref. Heinrich Böll Stiftung www.boell.de

⁹⁰ http://www.europeanforum.net/gender_network/policy_plan

⁹¹ http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/strategy/strategy_paper_en.pdf

⁹² http://europa.eu/scadplus/glossary/accession_criteria_copenhagen_en.htm

⁹³ <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/11/41/34428351.pdf>.

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Terms of Reference:

Mapping the activities of Democracy Assistance Foundations in the Western Balkans and the Black Sea region

August 2006

Western Balkans and the Black Sea region



* Belarus is not part of the Western Balkans or the Black Sea region but could be included in this study (see para.3.)

1. Background

The planned assignment has been requested by Olle Burell, Senior Official, responsible for Party oriented democracy support at the Olof Palme International Center. The idea has been developed in discussions, which took place in June and August 2006, between Olle Burell and the consultant. The Palme Center has asked the consultant to provide draft terms of reference (ToRs) as basis for further discussion and eventually the actual assignment.

2. Objective

The purpose of the assignment:

a) get a clear overview of the activities of democracy assistance foundations in the Western Balkans and the Black Sea region.

b) find gaps in the work of other foundations and agencies in the Western Balkans and the Black Sea region.

b) based on the findings, assist the Palme Center in defining criteria for selection of future projects. The criteria should be designed so as to avoid overlap of activities of other organisations as much as possible and contribute to more effective promotion of democracy in these regions.

3. Definitions and Delimitation

Activities of Democracy Assistance

The focus will be on activities aimed at supporting the democratic development of political parties in the Western Balkan- and the Black Sea region claiming an affiliation with Western European social democrat- and liberal parties.

It is assumed, however, that the differences between liberal and social democrat parties are sometimes blurred in the target countries. Their affiliation to social democrat or liberal parties might sometimes be superficial since they do not always have a thorough understanding of the issues these parties stand for in the EU-region.

Target Region

Countries in the Western Balkans and the Black Sea region are located in the South-Eastern part of Europe.⁹⁶

The region of the Western Balkans refers to:

- Albania,
- Former republics of Yugoslavia:*
- Bosnia and Herzegovina
- Croatia
- FYR of Macedonia

⁹⁶ See enclosed map

- Montenegro (since referendum in 2006)
- Serbia, including the Kosovo region, which is currently under international administration
- Slovenia

The Black Sea region refers to the coastal states of the Black Sea:

- Bulgaria
- Romania
- Ukraine
- Russia
- Turkey
- Georgia

In a wider sense⁹⁷, it is understood that the Black Sea region also incorporates:

- Moldova
and the two other Southern Caucasus countries:
- Armenia
- Azerbaijan.

This analysis should also cover:

- Belarus⁹⁸

Target Institutions

a) There is a large number of political party foundations working in the target regions with political party development as defined above (see Annex I, II and III).

The study will focus only on the largest foundations, affiliated to social democrat or liberal parties, active in the mentioned countries:

- [Olof Palme International Center](#)
- [The Swedish International Liberal Center](#)
- [Friedrich Ebert Foundation](#)
- [Friedrich Naumann Foundation](#)
- [Konrad Adenauer Foundation](#)⁹⁹
- [Renner Institute](#),
- [Jean-Jaurès Foundation](#),
- [Robert Schuman Foundation](#) ,
- [Alfred Mozer Foundation](#),
- [The Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy \(IMD\)](#)

⁹⁷ This is the case for the [Black Sea Forum for Partnership and Dialogue](#), BSF, (which does not include Russia as member or observer, but includes Greece) and the [Organization of the Black Sea Economic Co-operation](#), BSEC, (which also includes Greece, Albania and Serbia as members).

⁹⁸ Belarus is the only country of the Western part of the Soviet Union, which is neither an EU -NATO member nor a country of the Black Sea Region. Belarus faces major political and democratic challenges, even more serious than the ones faced by its neighbouring countries, Ukraine and Russia.

⁹⁹ The [Konrad Adenauer Foundation](#), one of the largest political foundations in the world, is linked to the Christian Democratic Party of Germany. Nevertheless, mapping its activities in the region in question could be of interest.

- [National Democratic Institute International Affairs \(NDI\)](#)
- [International Republican Institute \(IRI\)](#),
- [Westminster Foundation for Democracy](#),

b) However, interest in democracy and political assistance is not limited to political party foundations. In some cases, international as well as women or youth branches of political parties have not totally delegated the design and management of activities with sister parties to their respective party foundations¹⁰⁰.

The activities of the following parties will be studied:

- The [Party of European Socialists](#),
- The [European Liberal Democrat and Reform \(ELDR\) party](#)
- [SAP](#)¹⁰¹
- [Folkpartiet](#)¹⁰²

c) There are also co-ordination bodies of political foundations.

The activities of the following will be examined:

- [European Forum for Democracy and Solidarity](#)

d) International and Inter-governmental organisations as well as NGOs support democratic development as well.

The work of the following will be examined:

- [EU](#)¹⁰³,
- [The Stability Pact of South Eastern Europe](#),
- The [Council of Europe](#),
- The [OSCE](#)¹⁰⁴,
- The [International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance \(IDEA\)](#)
- [The Open Society Institute \(OSI\)](#) (the Soros Foundation)

e) There are many think- and action tanks also promoting democratic development in the target region.¹⁰⁵ Their work will NOT be included in this study.

¹⁰⁰ [SSU](#), for example, considers the Balkan region as a priority project area in 2006, with special focus on Albania, Serbia and the Kosovo region.

¹⁰¹ [European Liberal Youth \(LYMEC\)](#), [ECOSY - Young European Socialists](#), [SSU](#), [S-Kvinnor](#), [Liberala Kvinnor](#), [Liberal Ungdom](#)

¹⁰² [European Liberal Youth \(LYMEC\)](#), [ECOSY - Young European Socialists](#), [SSU](#), [S-Kvinnor](#), [Liberala Kvinnor](#), [Liberal Ungdom](#)

¹⁰³ Especially with regard to the [European neighbourhood policy](#) (or [Relations to Eastern Europe and Central Asia](#)) which includes Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova and the Caucasus countries (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia) and the [Enlargement process](#) (or the [The Stabilisation and Association Process: The Western Balkans](#)) which incorporates the acceding countries (Bulgaria and Romania), the candidate countries (Croatia, FYR of Macedonia and Turkey) and potential candidate countries (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Serbia, Kosovo Issues)

¹⁰⁴ The OSCE and the EU have offices in all countries of the Western Balkan and the Black Sea region.

¹⁰⁵ For example [Global Policy Forum](#) based in New York (USA) and in Bonn (Germany), [the Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies](#) based in Stockholm (Sweden), [the European Policy Centre \(EPC\)](#) based in Brussels (Belgium)

Analytical tool

Anecdotal information from the target regions suggests that the actors mentioned above may not focus adequately on the following issues:

- Co-operation on inter-ethnic issues, especially through the youth or women branches of local political parties, most often reflecting the ethnic division of society
- Co-operation on inter-ethnic issues between regional branches of local political parties
- Co-operation on cross-border issues between local political parties of bordering countries
- Lack of influence of youth and women branches on the strategies of local political parties
- The relationship between good governance, economic and social issues with regional security
- Co-ordination between various political foundations and local parties in order to find synergies and avoid overlap.

Consequently, the planned study will give special attention to precisely these issues.

5. Activities

In order to achieve the stated objectives of the assignment, the following activities will be undertaken:

- Search of the web,
- Phone interviews
- Travel
- Direct interviews
- Writing
- Discussion of work in progress with the Palme Center
- Preparation of power point presentation
- Oral presentation of findings in Logical Framework Analysis Seminar

Travel:

Air travel will be limited to two destinations Brussels (Belgium) and either Berlin (Germany) or Vienna (Austria).

Many of the mentioned organisations interested in EU issues are based in Brussels¹⁰⁶. A trip covering two full days (3 nights) will be required in order to give sufficient time for meetings.

Amsterdam and Paris can be reached from Brussels in less than three hours by fast train. In Amsterdam are the headquarters of the European Forum for Democracy and

¹⁰⁶ including the EU, the Stability Pact, the Party of European socialists and the European Liberal Democrat and Reform party

Solidarity¹⁰⁷, the Alfred Mozer Foundation as well as The Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy (IMD). In Paris are the headquarters of the Jean-Jaurès Foundation and the Robert Schuman Foundation.

Vienna is the location of the Headquarters of the OSCE, the Renner Institute¹⁰⁸ and the ÖVP Political Academy whilst Berlin is the location of the headquarters of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation¹⁰⁹ and the Friedrich Naumann Foundation¹¹⁰. Preliminary analysis and availability will decide whether Vienna or Berlin ought to be the destination of a second Air Travel.

6. Reporting

The consultant will provide a written report of approximately 10 pages to the Olof Palme International Centre as well as at least one oral briefing at a LFA workshop.

7. Timeframe

It is estimated that the work will amount to some 240 man-hours (1 1/2 month full time) stretched over three months. The assignment will start on 10 September 2006 and the report is to be completed by 10 December 2006. The consultant will also participate in LFA-seminar of the Palme Centre planned for 16-19 December 2006.

...

¹⁰⁷ Lena Hjelm-Wallén chairs the European Forum for Democracy and Solidarity (as well as International IDEA, and Olof Palme International Center). Alfred Mozer Foundation is responsible for the co-ordination of the European Forum and the implementation of the working program. Arjen Berkvens is the Director of the Mozer Foundation and the Coordinator of the European Forum for Democracy and Solidarity.

¹⁰⁸ Very active in the Western Balkans, the Renner Institute works closely with the Friedrich Ebert Foundation.

¹⁰⁹ The Friedrich Ebert Foundation foundation has an office in all countries of the Western Balkan and the Black Sea region beside Armenia and Azerbaijan.

¹¹⁰ The Headquarters of the Friedrich Naumann Foundation is actually in Potsdam, in Berlin's vicinity.

Annex I

POLITICAL PARTY LINKS **As mentioned on IDEA Web site**

Political Party Internationals:

- [Centrist Democrat International \(IDC-CDI\)](#)
The organization of Christian Democrat & People's Parties in the world
- [Liberal International \(LI\)](#)
The world federation of Liberal Political Parties
- [International Democrat Union \(IDU\)](#)
Working association of Conservative, Christian Democrat and like minded political parties of the centre and centre right.
- [Socialist International \(SI\)](#)
The worldwide organisation of Social Democratic, Socialist and Labour Parties.
- [Global Greens](#)
The international network of Green parties and political movements

Political Party Foundations

Austria

- [Renner Institute](#)
The political institute of the Austrian Social Democratic movement.
- [ÖVP Political Academy](#)
The Austrian People's Party Foundation.

France

- [Jean-Jaurès Foundation](#)
Foundation closely associated with the Socialist movement in France
- [Fondation Robert Schuman](#)
Supporting democracy in Europe and in the rest of the world

The Netherlands

- [Alfred Mozer Foundation](#)
Foundation linked to the Social Democratic movement in The Netherlands

Germany

- [Konrad Adenauer Foundation](#)
Foundation loosely connected to the Christian Democratic Party of Germany
- [Heinrich Böll Foundation](#)
Foundation associated with the Green movement in Germany
- [Friedrich Ebert Foundation](#)
Foundation loosely connected to the Social Democratic Party of Germany
- [Rosa Luxemburg Foundation](#)
Foundation associated with the German Party of Democratic Socialism
- [Friedrich Naumann Foundation](#)
Foundation loosely connected to the Liberal Party of Germany
- [Hanns Seidel Foundation](#)
Foundation connected to the German Christian Democratic movement

Sweden

- [The Center Party International Foundation](#)
Foundation linked to the Center Party of Sweden
- [Council for Democracy and Development](#)
Foundation linked to the Christian Democratic Party of Sweden
- [Green Forum](#)
Foundation linked to the Green movement in Sweden
- [Jarl Hjalmarsson Foundation](#)
Foundation connected to the Conservative (Moderate) Party of Sweden
- [The Left International Forum](#)
Foundation connected to the Swedish Left Party
- [The Swedish International Liberal Center](#)
Foundation of the Swedish Liberal Party

- [Olof Palme International Center](#)
Foundation connected to the Social Democratic and Labour Union movement in Sweden

Spain

- [Pablo Iglesias Foundation](#)
Foundation connected to the Spanish Socialist movement
- [Foundation for Analysis and Social Studies \(FAES\)](#)
Foundation connected to the People's Party of Spain

United States

- [National Democratic Institute International Affairs \(NDI\)](#)
Foundation loosely connected to the US Democratic Party
- [International Republican Institute \(IRI\)](#)
Foundation loosely connected to the US Republican Party

Multiparty Organizations and Foundations

- [The Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy \(IMD\)](#)
- [Norwegian Centre for Democracy Support](#)
- [Westminster Foundation for Democracy](#) (United Kingdom)

Political Party Link Collections

- [Electionworld.org's Political Parties on the Web](#)
Gives entrance to the lists of the main parties in each country and contains links to these and other political parties, election results etc.
- [Political Resources on the Net](#)
Provides listings of political sites available on the Internet sorted by country, with links to Parties, Organizations, Governments, Media and more from all around the world.
- [Governments on the WWW, political parties](#)
Lists and links to political parties by country, government sources etc.
- [Richard Kimber's Political Science Resources](#)
Links to political parties, interest groups and other special movements by country
- [The Thomson-Nelson Introduction to Political Parties](#)
Links to political party websites around the world.

Law Collections on Political Parties

- [World Legal Information Institute www.worldlii.org](#)
Integrates 449 databases from 55 countries including 21 international databases on national and international law.
- [Legal Information Institute of Cornell University](#)
Database with links to national and international legislation worldwide.
- [University of Essex Project on Political Transformation and the Electoral Process in Post-Communist Europe](#)
Provides a database on electoral legislation for Central and Eastern Europe.
- [IFES Arab Election Law Compendium](#)
Collects election laws in Arabic and either English or French from all Arab countries in the world.

The Network of Political Barometers

- [Global Barometer](#)
Carries out political surveys in transitional countries.
- [Afrobarometer](#)
Measures the social, political and economic atmosphere in Africa.
- [East Asia Barometer](#)
Carries out a comparative survey on democratization and core values in East Asia.
- [Latinobarometer](#)
Surveys the development of democracies, economies and societies in Latin America applying attitudinal, opinion, and behavioral indicators
- [New Europe Barometer](#)
Conducts political surveys in post-Communist countries in Europe

Political Party Research:

- [GRC Exchange on Political Parties](#)
Provides an introduction to the topic of political parties and a guide to research materials.
- [Social Science Information Gateway on Political Parties](#)
Selected, high quality Internet information for researchers and practitioners in the social sciences.

Annexe II

Organisations which participated in the Worldwide Co-ordination of democracy support foundations Paris, March 20th-21th, 2003 *(in addition to the ones already referred in Annex I)*

Greece

- [Constantin Karamanlis Institute for Democracy](#)
- [Andreas Papandreou Foundation](#)

Italy

- Fondazione Alcide de Gasperi fondazione degasperi@virgilio.it
- [Fondazione Nova ResPublica](#)
- [Istituto Luigi Sturzo](#)

Hungary

- [Szazadveg Foundation](#)

Poland

- [The Polish Robert Schuman Foundation](#)
- Poland Education Foundation

Spain

- [Fundacion Pablo Iglesias](#)
- [Fundacion para el analisis y los estudios sociales](#)

Bulgaria

- [Free & Democratic Bulgaria Foundation](#)
- [Institute for Social Integration](#)

Russia

- [Gorbachev Foundation](#)

Australia

- [Center For Democratic Institutions](#)

Canada

- [Rights and Democracy](#)

Japan

- Diet members League to Aid Democracy for Peace Building

Taiwan

- [Foundation for Democracy](#)

USA

- [National Endowment For Democracy](#)
- [Center for International Private Enterprise USA](#)

Annex III

Other organisations interested in political party assistance.

Austria

- [IUSY International Union of Socialist Youth](#)

Belgium

- EU
- Stability Pact
- [Party of European Socialists](#)
- [International Federation of Liberal Youth](#)
- [European Liberal Youth \(LYMEC\)](#)
- [European Liberal Democrat and Reform \(ELDR\) party](#)
- [ECOSY - Young European Socialists](#)
- [the European Policy Centre \(EPC\)](#)

Germany

- [Global Policy Forum](#) (also in New York, USA)

Norway

- [Norwegian Human Rights Fund](#)

Sweden

- [International IDEA](#)
- [Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies](#)
- [SAP](#)
- [SSU](#)
- [S-Kvinnor](#)
- [Folkpartiet](#)
- [Liberala Kvinnor](#)
- [Liberal Ungdom](#)

The Netherlands

- [European Forum for Democracy and Solidarity](#)

UK

- [Socialist International](#)
- [Socialist International Women](#)
- [International Liberal](#)
- [International Network Of Liberal Women](#)

USA

- [The Open Society Institute \(OSI\)](#) (the Soros Foundation)
- [American Center for International Labor Solidarity](#)
- [World Movement for Democracy](#)
- [Center for International Private Enterprise](#)
- [Global Policy Forum](#)