

THE ROLE AND CHALLENGES OF POLITICAL PARTIES:

REFLECTIONS OF REPRESENTATIVES OF SEVEN INDONESIAN POLITICAL PARTIES

**A Series of In House Discussions and Public Seminars
August-December 2007**

The Community for Political Party Dialogue

The National Mandate Party
The Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle
The Democrat Party
The Functional Groups Party
The Prosperous Justice Party
The National Awakening Party
The United Development Party

Editor:
IGNAS KLEDEN



The Indonesian Community for Democracy (KID)
Jakarta 2008

**THE ROLE AND CHALLENGES OF POLITICAL PARTIES:
REFLECTIONS OF REPRESENTATIVES OF SEVEN INDONESIAN POLITICAL PARTIES**

**A Series of In House Discussions and Public Seminars
The Community for Political Party Dialogue (KDPP)**

Partai Amanat Nasional (The National Mandate Party)
Partai Demokrasi Indonesia-Perjuangan (The Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle)
Partai Demokrat (The Democrat Party)
Partai Golongan Karya (The Functional Groups Party)
Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (The Prosperous Justice Party)
Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (The National Awakening Party)
Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (The United Development Party)

Editor: Ignas Kleden
Design of cover and contents: Yola
English Translation by: Dr Joan Hardjono

Published by The Indonesian Community for Democracy (KID)
Jl. Tirtayasa VII No. 1, Kebayoran Baru, Jakarta Selatan
Tel.: (021) 72801219, (021) 72801223

www.komunitasdemokrasi.or.id

© The Indonesian Community for Democracy (KID)

Copyright protected by law.

CONTENTS

Foreword.....	i
1 Introduction.....	01
2 Independent Candidates in Local Elections, and Representative Democracy.....	02
3 The Question of Local Parties.....	10
4 Party Funding and Public Accountability.....	20
5 The Direct Election of Regional Heads, and Local Democracy.....	32
6 Conclusions.....	42

FOREWORD

POLITICAL PARTIES, POLITICAL DIALOGUE AND THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF DEMOCRACY

*by Ignas Kleden**

I

Political collaboration between countries occurs most frequently at the executive level, that is, between the government of one country and that of another. At other levels we also hear of inter-parliamentary collaboration between members of parliament from one country and members of parliament from another. It is much less common to encounter collaboration between political parties in one country and political parties in another. Collaboration between political parties can occur in cases where the countries in question have approximately the same orientation, for example, between two political parties that follow similar social democrat, liberal or religious ideas, and collaboration that is in nature *en bloc* in the sense that a group of parties in one country works together with a similarly orientated group from another country. *En bloc* collaboration is usually conducted between the parties that are most dominant in a certain period of time.

It was with thoughts of this kind in mind that representatives from the seven Indonesian political parties that are the largest in terms of representation in the People's Representative Council (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, the Indonesian parliament) were invited by a political foundation in the Netherlands to make a working visit between 25 and 27 April 2007. The seven parties were Golkar, PDI-P, PPP, PD, PAN, PKB and PKS, while the foundation that extended the invitation was NIMD (*the Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy*), a political association that was formed by seven Dutch political parties (four opposition parties and three government parties) with the primary mission of assisting the expansion of democracy in countries considered to be "young democracies".¹

1 NIMD (the Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy) is the partner of KID (the Indonesian

The theme of the visit was comprehensive partnership in collaboration between countries. This theme was the outcome of the ideas of Dutch politicians, specifically those from within the Ministry for Cooperation in Development, to expand further a pattern of collaboration in international development based more on equal partnership and participation by those involved in the collaboration and covering wider dimensions than just economic cooperation or development assistance:

Development cooperation and democracy can only be effective if we look for solutions that reflect the reality of people... Development cooperation can encourage and support home-grown processes that will contribute to a world with less poverty and more justice. It needs to aim at increasing access to and participation in these processes by the poor themselves.²

It was very much hoped that the visit of these representatives of the seven political parties to the Netherlands would lead to further meetings in the form of visits from the representatives of Dutch political parties to Indonesia, as such visits would form the embryo of cross-country interparty collaboration. Even so, implementation of a comprehensive partnership, which is regarded as the ideal pattern for cross-country collaboration, should obviously be tested through collaboration among parties in the same country before it is developed further into cross-country collaboration.

It was thoughts of this kind that encouraged the members of the Indonesian delegation to the Hague, as the representatives of the seven parties mentioned above, to continue the collaboration among themselves after their visit. After a fairly short process, these ideas were made manifest in the establishment of a forum for dialogue, which was named the **Community for Political Party Dialogue** (abbreviated to **KDPP**) and which was launched on 14 June 2007 in the KID office in Jakarta. In accordance with the wishes of the political party representatives, KID was asked to be the facilitator for this forum.

At the time of its formation the forum was intended to be a place for meetings and discussions among representatives of the seven political parties. The

Community for Democracy). These two institutes together prepared and conducted a visit by representatives of these seven political parties to the Netherlands in April 2007. KID is one of NIMD's 17 national partners, most of which are located in Africa and South America. It should be noted that KID is NIMD's first partner in the Asian region.

2 Bert Koenders (Minister for the Development of the Netherlands), *Democracy and Development: Thinking Forward*, Lecture to the Society for International Development, The Hague, 14 September 2007.

main objective was to discuss basic, long-term matters concerning national politics or matters that had reached a dead-lock in debates in the Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat (DPR). It was hoped that this forum would be able to form a second way in political discourses and in the process of achieving political agreement. During the initial stages participants were limited to people from the seven parties, while resource persons with expertise relevant to the issue under discussion were usually invited to attend each of the gatherings. In the long term, however, the forum opened itself to participation by representatives of other political parties that had the same interests, in so far as they could agree with the principles and stipulations that applied within the forum.

There are three things that should be noted in connection with the establishment of this forum. The first is thoughts about whether or not this forum should be conducted and about the reasons for its formation. The second is the principles that form the foundation for collaboration among the parties. The third is the understanding of the components of democracy that are institutionalized through the existence and performance of political parties. It was felt that implementation of this forum would be possible because the representatives of the seven political parties believed that national interests were above the differences that existed between the political parties. The principles underlying collaboration between the parties are equality, common responsibility, mutual trust among members and an attitude of mutual respect. Any institutionalization of democracy must give attention to the characteristics of democracy as a means, as a principle and as an objective. As a means, democracy is related to mechanisms, procedures and protocols. As a principle, democracy is related to ethics and values. As an objective, democracy is related to freedom, equality, welfare and justice.³

3 *Format Dialog untuk Masa Depan Politik Indonesia: Kesepakatan Tujuh Partai Politik* [Format for Dialogue for the Future of Indonesian Politics: Agreement among Seven Political Parties]; press release at the launching of the Forum of the Community for Political Party Dialogue, Jakarta, 14 June 2007.

II

The activities of the forum for dialogue during 2007 consisted of two kinds of discussions: in-house discussions in the form of discussions among forum members with resource persons, and public seminars to which outside persons and the mass media were also invited. In the five months of forum activities from August 2007 to December 2007, eight meetings were held consisting of five in-house discussions and three public seminars. During these eight gatherings four topics were discussed: Independent Candidates in Local Elections, Local Parties and the Possibility of their Realization in Indonesia, Funding of Political Parties and Public Accountability, and Direct Election of Regional Heads and Local Democracy.

As can be seen from these titles, the topics represented actual issues that were encountered in Indonesian politics during 2007. These topics emerged as specific challenges that demanded answers from Indonesia's political parties. The document that is now in the hands of readers consists of summaries of the discussions of the representatives of the seven political parties during this five-month period. It contains the agreements that were reached among them about the attitudes that political parties must take towards these four issues, and at the same time the differences in opinion among participants in the discussions. Differences of opinion occurred not just between one party and another but also among participants as individuals. It should also be noted that the views that were put forward and the positions that were adopted in the discussions during the five months must be regarded as the views of a number of party representatives and not as the official views of the political parties whom they were representing. Furthermore, these views must be seen as their responses at that time to issues that had arisen. They cannot be regarded as the final opinions of the representatives of the seven political parties.

Meanwhile, the wish of the political party representatives to discuss more basic matters of a long-term nature was not carried out in the five-month period, but hopefully it can be implemented in future times. The long-term problems – which were actually planned as the main agenda of this forum – concern views about the form and basis of the state, relationships between the state and the people, the national basis for democracy, the role of ideology in political parties, accountability that must be understood not just as managerial responsibility but also as a form of political responsibility, the three-way relationship between freedom, justice and welfare within

democracy, the importance of the role of political parties as the institutionalization of democracy, the position of democracy as a means, mechanism and process on the one hand, and as an objective and target that must be achieved on the other hand, and the importance of checks and balances to ensure effective government and at the same time strong democracy.

Although these basic concepts have not yet been discussed specifically, the views of some participants have already been reflected in their consideration of the four issues covered by the discussions during the five-month period. For example, the cautious attitude adopted by party representatives to the possibility of local party formation reflected their commitment to the totality and the unity of the Republic of Indonesia (quite apart from whether or not this supposition was valid). In the same way, their critical view of independent candidates reflected not only the attitude of caution adopted by political parties to alternatives in political recruitment but also the consequences of their conviction that political parties are the primary and most important pillars in a democratic system.

The fundamental issues that have just been touched on represent one level of problems faced by political parties concerning the existence or, more correctly, the *raison d'être* of the state and democracy. These are matters of a fundamental nature. On the contrary, the discussions during the five-month period in 2007 constituted the responses of political parties to actual problems that were being faced in a practical way in national politics in a given period of time. The existence of matters that have not yet received sufficient attention are problems linked to the strengthening and consolidation of the political parties themselves, before those parties are faced with matters that arise from outside.

Three dimensions can be put forward at this point: (1) development of the institutions of political parties, (2) linkages between the party system and political parties, and (3) relationships between political parties and civil society.⁴

Development of the institutions of political parties covers internal democracy within the body of the party itself, internal unity, the organizational strength, political identity and the campaign capacity of parties.

Internal party democracy takes in whether or not the party functions in accordance with procedures, whether decision-making is based on the party's

4 NIMD, *Suatu Kerangka Kerja Pengembangan Partai Politik yang Demokratis*, [A Framework for the Democratic Party-Building], The Hague, 2006: 24-25.

constitution and by-laws, whether decentralization of economic resources has been carried out, and whether there is supervision of party leaders by members.

Internal unity concerns matters such as the party's ability to overcome the differences, both personal and political, that exist among members, the existence of a clear understanding of the party's ideological attitude and vision, the party's ability to settle disputes through lower-level organs, and the extent of striking differences in voting behavior in the legislature.

The integrity of party organization is connected with such issues as human and material resources to run the party's activities, strategies for effective organizational development, rational management of resources, the party's ability to undertake recruitment, and the party's capacity to make itself an actual presence at the national, regional and local levels.

Political identity will be seen from the commitment to the party's political objectives and political concepts and the practices that run parallel with the objectives of the party's concepts.

Campaign capacity is revealed in the availability of financial and human resources, access to the mass media, good procedures in selecting and introducing party candidates, strategic campaign plans, and a broad base for party organization.⁵

The linkages between the party system and political parties cover the following matters: Does the environment make law enforcement possible? Are there staff who understand the legal regulations that apply? Is the legal environment used effectively? Is the number of parties sufficient in the party system? Can the ideological and political distance between parties be handled? Does the party have a loyal and militant group of voters?⁶

Finally, the relationships between political parties and civil society cover the following: Is there a feeling of mutual trust between political parties and civil society? Is there an overlap in membership between political parties and civil society organizations? Another matter is the relationship between the political parties, the influence of the state, certain business groups, and the level of trust between the political parties and the media. Even so, observations must be made to ascertain whether the political participation of members of society is apparent in the usefulness of the concepts that they put forward.⁷

5 NIMD, *ibid.*

6 NIMD, *ibid.*

7 NIMD, *ibid.*

III

As already noted in an earlier section, the forum for dialogue was established at the initiative of politicians from political parties themselves for the purpose of holding regular meetings and discussing political matters that did not manage to reach Parliament and consisted more of matters of a basic nature in politics, and also matters that had reached an impasse in debates among the people's representatives in the DPR. In the course of time, this forum increasingly took shape as a place where political parties were not competing in a struggle for their own respective political interests but were involved in thinking together about issues that were important for the democratic development and continuity of politics in Indonesia.

In this way an arrangement was gradually created in which there occurred a kind of competition that concerned not a power struggle but rather political discourse. Since this competition had no connection with attempts to acquire a certain proportion of power, there was a big possibility that the competition in discourse would take place in a more open, fair and substantial way. The forum then expanded into a place for learning where no one taught and no one was taught, but where all participants were involved in cooperative learning with participants of equal standing.⁸ Through this small experiment, an attempt was made to achieve the practice of democracy as a process of mutual learning among people through interaction and active communication, with the knowledge and values that were obtained as a common output. It can be seen from this that democracy is a dialectical process involving individual and common responsibility at one and the same time. This pattern neutralises any tendency towards egocentric individualism and any temptation towards collectivist dependency on the group.

It is clear that this kind of forum cannot be directly useful in expanding the political participation that is one of the constituent elements of a democratic system. Nevertheless, the point that is often forgotten when talking about participation is that it is not participation *per se* (that is, participation merely as participation) that will strengthen the life of democracy and a democratic political system, but participation

8 Cooperative Learning is a kind of learning among equals (peer teaching) with at least five supporting conditions, namely, positive interdependence among participants, retention of individual responsibility, direct face-to-face opportunities, the development of effective communications among members, and a willingness to make an evaluation of the process in the group. Anita Lie, *Cooperative Learning*, Gramedia, Jakarta, 2005, pp. 30-31.

that is supported by strong political discourse. The relationship between political participation and political discourse is asymmetrical in nature. On the one hand, wide participation (particularly if it expands to a range of different social classes and educational levels) tends to reduce the quality of political discourse. On the other hand, the person or group that possesses better mastery of political discourse will have a greater chance of creating access to political participation. Thus, a healthy democratic life assumes the existence and application of these two conditions at the same time, namely, a widening in both participation and the quality of political discourse. To use the well-known formula of the political philosopher Juergen Habermas: Democracy will always be a synthesis between the quantity of participation and the quality of discourse.⁹ If only one component is applied, the outcome will be disadvantageous to democracy. Expansion in participation alone without the support of strong political discourse will produce politics that have nothing to hold on to and to provide guidance. On the other hand, a strengthening of political discourse without the support of political participation will produce only domination by educated people and could end in an oligarchy of experts.

Another point to be noted is that the existence of a forum of this kind will unintentionally lead to the open discussion of matters once regarded as the private affairs of each political party. This will change the issue under discussion into a public matter. For example, the question of political party funding tends to be regarded as the private business of each party. If, however, this issue is opened up in a public discussion by the forum, it will become a public issue that can be perceived and controlled by the wider political public. The shift from a private to a public matter will ultimately encourage the achievement of transparency and accountability because problems that were once concealed within the private domain of each political group are put under public scrutiny and become public knowledge and must therefore also be accounted for to the public.¹⁰

9 Craig Calhoun, "Introduction: Habermas and the Public Sphere", in Craig Calhoun (ed.) *Habermas and the Public Sphere*, MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, 1996:2-3. Juergen Habermas, "Further Reflections on the Public Sphere", in Craig Calhoun (ed.), *op.cit.* pp. 452-457.

10 Jean L. Cohen and Andrew Arato, *Civil Society and Political Theory*, MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, 1995, pages 180-182.

IV

If the main task of the political parties is to encourage the institutionalization of democracy, it is necessary to identify the situations that can obstruct the effective implementation of this task. Obstacles can come from two directions, that is, from the ability of the political parties to institutionalize the values, objectives and procedures of democracy, and from the challenges faced by democracy itself at the present time.

The general requirements for political party institutions have been briefly outlined in Section II of this Introduction, but in the particular case of Indonesia a number of more specific matters can be identified. As we know, institutionalization or the formation of a social institutions occurs if a value, a custom or a practice is accepted collectively by a group of people who then apply it jointly and repeatedly in a fixed and regular fashion. The General Election Law, which was ratified by the DPR and the government on 3 March 2008, puts into effect the requirement of a parliamentary threshold of 2.5 per cent. This means that parties that obtain less than 2.5 per cent of the popular vote at the national level will lose their right to obtain a seat in the DPR. This stipulation represents a step towards simplification of the party system to bring it into accordance with the presidential system of democracy, which requires a simple multiparty system.¹¹

At the time of writing, the Regional Representative Council (Dewan Perwakilan Daerah, DPD) and eight small political parties were still expressing their objections to this legislation. The DPD even planned to put forward a request for a judicial review of the General Election Law, citing two reasons. First, the General Election Law permits a party member/office-bearer to stand in the election of DPD members. Second, the residence requirement that a candidate should be domiciled in the province that he/she seeks to represent, no longer applies. These two matters are considered to be in conflict with the Constitution and therefore need to be taken to the Constitutional Court. In addition, the Election Law is being criticized because it contains too many clauses concerning criminal acts related to the Elections (51 clauses), whereas Law No. 12/2003 concerning the General Elections (as the basis for the 2004 General Elections) contained only 31 clauses on this topic.¹²

At the same time, certain circles regret the transitional regulations in the new

¹¹ *Kompas*, 11 March 2008, p. 3

¹² *Kompas*, 5 and 6 March 2008, p. 3

General Elections Law, which gives the opportunity to all parties with seats in the DPR (as an outcome of the 2004 General Elections) to take part in the 2009 General Elections without undergoing the verification process conducted by the General Elections Committee (KPU). These transitional regulations are clearly incompatible with Law No. 12/2003 concerning the [2004] General Elections, which states that to be able to participate directly in the 2009 Elections, a political party that takes part in the 2004 Elections must win a minimum of 3 per cent of the seats in the DPR or 4 per cent of the seats in the District/City DPRD, with a distribution of half of the total number of districts (*kabupaten*) and cities (*kota*) throughout Indonesia. It is this transitional regulation that has caused eight parties that took part in the 2004 Elections but failed to win any seats to feel that they are being treated unfairly.

This case is a good example of the need to raise the capacity of political parties to overcome differences in views and interests to the point where they can reach political consensus. This would enable a law to be institutionalized as a democratic procedure because it has been accepted and implemented collectively by a group of people.

At another level, political institutionalization and in particular the institutionalization of democracy can take place without problems if there is not just a minimum consensus between one party and other parties but a wider consensus between the political parties and civil society. At this point it is necessary to stress once again that this consensus will be more easily achieved if there is not too great a discrepancy between the actual needs of the various social groups and the programs of political parties. One major aspect of the institutionalization of democracy will be measured by the ability of a political party to identify the main needs of the different social groups and then translate them into a political program. If there is convergence between the needs of social groups and the programs of political parties, it is likely that consensus will increase. On the contrary, the larger the discrepancy and the wider the divergence, the greater the possibility that consensus will decrease and conflict will increase.

In addition to the challenges to institutionalization, attention must be given to the challenges of democracy. These two challenges, which are directly relevant to the institutionalization of democracy in Indonesia, require a brief description.

The first challenge emerges from criticisms of democracy's universal values, and consists of the view that the application of universal values can become a new kind

of imperialism which crushes the specific values that have emerged in the history of a nation or a cultural group. An example of this objection, which echoed internationally, is Lee Kuan Yew's statement about Asian values. He declared that a number of South-east and East Asian nations (known as the four tigers: Singapore, Hong Kong, Taiwan and South Korea), which had been strikingly successful in economic development, had achieved their success by holding fast to the values taught in Confucianism such as order, discipline, responsibility to the family, hard work, collectivism and an attitude of frugality. These values were contrasted with Western cultural values such as the tendency to follow one's own wishes, individualism, a lack of respect for authority and mental rigidity. Lee Kuan Yew's statement, made at the beginning of the 1990s, was called the "Singaporean cultural offensive" by Western observers.¹³

Now that the notion of Asian values has passed through a number of discussions and debates, the conclusion can be drawn that this declaration played several different roles. In the economic sphere the idea of Asian values functioned as a cultural self-affirmation of the economic success achieved by nations whose cultural orientation was of a "Sino" nature. In the sphere of basic human rights, Asian values became a kind of self-defence of Asian nations against the hegemony of Western countries that tended to dictate the basic human rights that had to be respected. In actual fact those rights were also respected in each cultural tradition in Asia. Here Asian values functioned as a kind of legal self-defence on the part of non-Western nations in matters of basic human rights. In the political sphere, the concept of Asian values functioned as political self-justification for political practices of a non-democratic or anti-democratic nature on the part of those who held political power. This self-justification was put forward on the excuse that local cultural values did not justify certain democratic practices and that infringement of a number of democratic rights was acceptable in the local culture. This justification attracted criticism from Asian politicians themselves:

If the term Asian values is not to ring hollow, Asians must be prepared to champion ideals which are universal. It is altogether shameful, if ingenious, to cite Asian values as an excuse for autocratic practices and denial of basic rights and civil liberties. To say that freedom is Western and unAsian is to offend our traditions as well as our forefathers who gave their lives in

13 Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, Simon & Schuster, New York, 1996, p. 108

*the struggle against tyranny and injustice. It is true that Asians lay great emphasis on order and stability. But it is certainly wrong to regard society as a kind of deity upon whose altar the individual must be sacrificed.*¹⁴

Another challenge comes from the school of Realpolitik. Two arguments are usually put forward by followers of this school of thought. The first is that in politics there are values but there are also interests. If conflict occurs between the two, values have to be sacrificed for the sake of political interests. The second argument is that in politics the universal values of democracy sometimes do not run parallel to national interests. In a conflict between the two, national interests must take precedence and, if necessary, the universal values in democracy can be sacrificed.¹⁵

Indonesia has already experienced the application of these two arguments in its political history since independence. President Sukarno put forward the concept of “Guided Democracy” when he dissolved the Constituent Assembly (Konstituante) in July 1959, after which he governed with virtually all power in his own hands. Political parties that did not follow the same course as his own political lines were disbanded. His political opponents were arrested and jailed without a trial. Democracy that guaranteed the democratic rights of citizens was ignored, because it was regarded as obstructing the phenomenon that was considered to be the highest national interest, namely, the revolution that was not yet finished and had to be completed.

After the fall of Sukarno, government of the country was taken over by President Soeharto, who then introduced “Pancasila Democracy”. The Soeharto government decreed that economic development was the national interest, with which issue could not be taken and for which political stability was a prerequisite. The political parties were simplified to three, political opposition and demonstrations were prohibited because they were not in keeping with Indonesian culture, the press was closely supervised, newspapers and magazines could be closed down at any time, and books that the authorities did not like could be banned without debate, if they were considered disruptive of the national interest.

14 Anwar Ibrahim, *The Asian Renaissance*, Times Book International, Singapore and Kuala Lumpur, 1996, p.28.

15 David Milliband, *Democratic Imperative*, Aung San Suu Kyi Lecture, St. Hugh’s College, Oxford University, 12 February 2008.

The reforms (*reformasi*) of 1998 that followed the fall of Soeharto revealed a determination to return national politics to the rails of democracy. The democratic rights of members of society were retrieved and the press was able to function once again. Demonstrations were no longer prohibited and it seemed as if every person had the right to establish his own political party. At this point the attitude and behavior of community members in utilizing their democratic rights would determine whether democracy would continue or whether it would again face a dead end. At a certain moment national interests were so much prioritized that the democratic rights of the people were sacrificed. Today, in the era of *reformasi* and freedom, all members of a democratic society must know how to use their rights properly so that there can be no excuse that democracy harms national interests and hence must be restricted once again.

Jakarta, 15 March 2008

** Ignas Kleden was moderator of the discussions conducted by the Community for Political Party Dialogue (KDPP).*

1

Introduction

Criticism of political parties is normal. But when that criticism is directed towards the role of parties as the institutionalization of democracy, it then touches on something of a fundamental nature and must therefore receive attention and be given a proper response. In recent times, Indonesia's political parties have had a sharp spotlight focused on them by the mass media, intellectuals and civil society. Many matters related to the functions and tasks of the political parties have been questioned by critics. In their view, the parties – especially where empowerment of the economy is concerned – have not yet succeeded in fulfilling the community's aspirations, are centered on their own interests, are busy looking for funds for the party and its functionaries, and tend to be an instrument of control by certain political elites and not a forum that struggles for the hopes and demands of voters.

As the representatives of seven Indonesian political parties, we have given our attention to the opinions and views that have emerged and we gladly welcomed the suggestion of the Indonesian Community for Democracy (KID) that we take part in a series of discussions and seminars that reconsider the existence and performance of political parties in Indonesia. This series of discussions and seminars, which was held between August 2007 and December 2007, examined real topics such as the possibility of independent candidates standing in local elections, local parties, party funding and the dynamics of local elections as a whole. From these discussions and seminars there emerged several points of agreement, which we wish to communicate to the general public. The document that you are reading is nothing other than a summary of the discussions and the points on which there was agreement. It should be noted that the document reflects the assortment of opinions among us. If there was a difference in views on a certain issue, those other views are also recorded in the present document.

2

Independent Candidates In Local Elections and Representative Democracy

In July 2007 the Constitutional Court reached the decision that Law No. 32/2004 on Regional Government, which stated that candidates in the election of regional heads¹ (*Pilkada*) could only be nominated by political parties, was in contradiction to the Constitution. For that reason the government and the People's Representative Council (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, DPR) agreed to amend Law No. 32/2004 so as to open the way for individuals (*figur perseorangan*) to nominate themselves as independent candidates (that is, without nomination by a party) in regional elections. Details of this agreement are still being discussed by the government and the DPR (especially the question of the number of supporters' signatures that must be collected by an independent candidate as a requirement for his nomination) but we can already draw conclusions about several general matters, without becoming involved in technical and administrative discussions. The conclusions and understandings that we present here are based on both legal and political considerations.

a. Legal considerations of the Constitutional Court's decision

Although the decision of the Constitutional Court that enables individuals to participate in *Pilkada* is acceptable and should be respected, several matters that have a connection with the legal reasons put forward by the judges of the Constitutional

¹ The term "regional heads" is used throughout the present report to refer to provincial governors, district heads and city mayors.

Court should be noted. First, it is appropriate to question whether the plaintiff in this case possesses a strong and convincing legal standing. This claim has been put forward by a party politician, who is also a member of the Regional People's Representative Council (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah, DPRD). We are of the opinion that a party functionary or member who wishes to participate in a *Pilkada* has already been given several opportunities by Law No. 32/2004 and by the political party itself to nominate himself through the political party. It is therefore hard to understand how a party politician can feel that he has been placed at a disadvantage by the implementation of Law No. 32/2004, especially if that person has never passed through the screening process of candidates that is carried out by the political party.

Secondly, a Law should be tested against the Constitution, not against other legislation. In this instance, the Constitutional Court decided that Law No. 32/2004 is in conflict with the Law on the Government of Aceh, which allowed independent candidates to take part in the 2006 and 2007 *Pilkada*. According to the Constitutional Court, this gave rise to legal dualism that was unacceptable, and for that reason individual independent candidates had to be given the opportunity to participate in *Pilkada* throughout Indonesia. Nevertheless, in its legal history Indonesia has put into effect several special laws (among them laws for Aceh, Papua, Yogyakarta and Jakarta), based on the principle of the superiority of special laws (*lex specialis*) over general laws (*lex generalis*). Implementation of a special law is ordinary and proper, especially in the case of Aceh. In that province an independent candidate could stand only once in the 2006 and 2007 *Pilkada* after which he had to return to the system of nomination by a political party.

Nevertheless, it should be emphasized that this decision of the Constitutional Court has to be accepted fully. The Constitutional Court was established by legislation with the task of providing legal certainty that is final and binding. As representatives of political parties we respect the rights of its judges. Therefore, it is also necessary to accept the challenges that arise as a result of the Court's decision, that is, the decision that Law No. 32/2004 has to be adjusted to the need to include individuals in elections for regional heads.

b. Political implications of the Constitutional Court's decision

We are aware that the Constitutional Court's decision to allow individuals to stand as candidates in *Pilkada* was welcomed by the majority of people. A number of surveys

show that independent candidates are seen as an alternative to political party candidates who during this time have been regarded as not meeting the hopes and aspirations of voters. In this connection the Court's decision can become an opportunity for introspection, particularly about the failure of the political parties to nominate high-quality cadres to occupy important positions, whether as governors, district heads or city mayors, in local governments. This shows the weakness of the kaderisation process in the internal organization of political parties and obliges us to change the system. In future days the leaders of political parties must work harder to produce cadres who are more readily acceptable within the community as prospective government officials who are competent, honest and clean. Besides the matters that the political parties and their functionaries have to improve, there are several problems that should receive our collective attention, both within the circles of the political parties and among civil society activists and political observers. It must be admitted that the political parties are the main pillars in all democratic systems in developed countries. In a representative democracy the community decides on its representatives through the political parties, which take part in free, open and regular elections.² In a parliamentary system voters who are not satisfied with the performance in government of a certain political party, can choose some other political party in the following election in order to change the government.³ The phenomenon that has developed and been socialized in Indonesia, however, is dissatisfaction not just with a certain political party but with the party system as a whole. This tendency can weaken the democratic institutions that we have succeeded in building since the fall of Soeharto's authoritarian regime in 1998. Critics must therefore help to improve the party system in Indonesia and not just try to replace it with a system that is not necessarily any better.

In connection with the Constitutional Court's decision about independent candidates in local elections (*Pilkada*), it is necessary to find a solution that can achieve two objectives at the same time: first, the solution must respect the political rights of non-party figures, and second, this compromise may not be allowed to reduce

2 Representative democracy is the opposite of direct democracy. Representative democracy is created through the people's representative institutions, where the political parties are the institutions that nominate and guide members of those institutions. However, political parties are not identical with representative democracy because political representation can also be carried out in an individual manner.

3 The above information applies to a parliamentary system. In the case of Indonesia, which has a presidential system, there is not always a connection between the victory of a political party and the presence of a new leader of government.

the strength of the political parties as the main foundation of the system of democracy in Indonesia. If it should transpire that giving individuals the right to nominate themselves in a *Pilkada* makes the political parties increasingly isolated from socio-political life in Indonesia, there could be fatal consequences for the continuation of democracy in the *reformasi* era. For that reason, the amendment that is currently being made to Law No. 32/2004 must continue to hold firm to the principle that the political parties constitute the institutionalization of democracy. In other words, the presence of independent candidates must be made possible as a political fact in the transitional period but not as the main path by which the political elite achieve their aspirations. Thus the ultimate objective of the nomination of individuals is to increase pressure on the political parties to improve their performance and not to put an end to the important role that the parties play in putting a democratic system into effect.

The political commentators and observers, who in recent days have been praising the decision of the Constitutional Court as an ideal solution to the *Pilkada* issue, must be reminded of several matters of some substance. The first is the fact that provision of an opportunity for independent candidates will increase the political costs for participants in the *Pilkada*. Candidates who stand without the support of political parties must first collect signatures from their supporters, which will require considerable expense. Experiences in the election of members of the Regional Representatives Council (Dewan Perwakilan Daerah, DPD) in 2004, showed that many political operators sold signatures in the form of photocopies of Identification Cards (KTP) at a price of Rp 25,000. This means that an independent candidate must spend hundreds and even billions of rupiah just to be able to take part in a *Pilkada*. This does not yet include the cost of establishing a network of supporters, campaign expenses and salaries for witnesses at polling booths. As a result, *Pilkada* participants will still be limited to the circles of well-off entrepreneurs and bureaucrats, to the point where it will be difficult to achieve the hope expressed in many circles that the Constitutional Court's decision will open the door for NGO figures and other activists.

So far, experiences in the regions have shown that incompatibility between the head of a region and the local DPRD can make the implementation of effective governance and social services difficult. There have been several cases where a candidate put forward by small parties has won the *Pilkada* but has then had to work together with a DPRD that is controlled by the big parties. Since this "cooperation"

has not gone well, a political crisis has often followed. The "small people" of the community become the main victims of the rivalry between the regional head and the local parliament because many government activities are disrupted. To avoid crises of this kind, law-makers in actual fact should make it obligatory for a candidate for the position of regional head to have obtained the support of a minimum of 15 per cent of party votes in the previous elections. With the Constitutional Court's decision about independent candidates, however, this legal and political construct no longer applies. Hence it is necessary to remember that the rise of independent candidates to positions as regional heads will certainly increase the number of cases of regions that undergo political disturbances. This likelihood must be thought through carefully before the new regulations about the nomination of non-political party figures come into effect.

In this context a question arises that is both structural and philosophical: is the participation of independent candidates in conflict with the system of representative democracy or would such candidates actually enrich the system? Some observers say that the transfer of political power from the political parties to individuals would slow down or even halt the process of institutionalization of political infrastructure that is at present taking place. There is, however, the view that non-party figures who became government officials could watch over the behavior of political party functionaries. In this way a system of checks and balances would be carried out properly. In our opinion these two views are not always in conflict with each other. As we have argued above, the new regulation, which makes possible the nomination of independent candidates in a *Pilkada*, should merely *supplement* and not *replace* the system of representative democracy. In many countries it is possible for independent candidates to stand as an exception to the mechanism of representation that uses the path of political parties. The Indonesian political system, too, can accept the presence of independent candidates, provided that this stipulation does not damage the form of government that was laid down through the amendments to the Constitution from 1999 to 2002. Nevertheless, we must remain on our guard and prevent any tendency for independent candidates to attempt to take over the function and role of political parties.

In addition to these considerations, the opening up of opportunities for independent candidates contains a number of risks and negative effects on the institutional strength of political parties. It is indeed true that the nomination of non-party figures can help the political parties to increase their ability to compete with other socio-political forces. Nevertheless, it is also clear that there can be bad

consequences. Erosion can occur in the party's internal solidarity and discipline. For example, if in future days a political party functionary nominates himself to represent his party in a *Pilkada* whereas the party concerned selects another candidate, the functionary has the opportunity to stand in the *Pilkada* as an independent candidate. Since the number of independent candidates is unlimited, all party leaders who fail to obtain nomination by their parties can make use of independent candidature as an alternative route. As a consequence, political party leaders will experience difficulty in their efforts to maintain party unity. This means that political parties would become steadily weaker.

The presence of independent candidates has the potential to weaken the parties not only in matters of an organizational nature but also in the fields of ideology, perspective and nationalistic values. Several participants in the discussions and seminars drew attention to the fact that many racist, radical and populist figures in other countries actually appeared as independent candidates. One example is that of Australian Pauline Hanson, who received great support from "small people" due to her discriminative views towards immigrants and the indigenous people of Australia. In Indonesia, the possibility of radical candidates of this kind emerging must be anticipated, in view of the fact that there are many regions that are multi-ethnic, multi-religious and multi-lingual. Parties that have branches throughout Indonesia are usually still tied to the concept of nationalism, which means that there is very little likelihood of political party functionaries putting forward an anti-Pancasila agenda to win a *Pilkada*. Nevertheless, this does not apply in the case of independent candidates. As can be observed in Aceh, an independent candidate can easily use a populist platform to mobilize supporters who are dissatisfied with the political *status quo* and even with the existence of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia (NKRI). In such a situation, the role of political parties as a forum that can unite a number of ethnic, religious and social groups would increasingly lose its relevance. In this connection there must be commitment on the part of political party candidates and independent candidates alike to certain basic matters, such as the guarantee of national unity in the Republic of Indonesia and the creation of a structure of social life that is pluralistic and non-discriminative.

The decision of the Constitutional Court will also influence the ability of the political parties to fund their operational activities. It is well known that the political parties are extremely dependent on regular, legal and transparent contributions from

external donors because they are not yet able to finance themselves from membership fees. Since 2005, when the direct election of regional heads commenced, there has already been a tendency for these external donors to cease making donations to political parties but instead to give them directly to candidates for the positions of governor, district head or city mayor. As a consequence, the income of the parties from outside sources has declined. Concern has arisen that the Constitutional Court's decision about the candidature of independent figures will cause an even sharper fall in contributions, because donors will make direct contact with candidates and no longer with the political parties. For that reason, although the Court's decision is intended to improve the long-term performance and strength of the political parties, the danger has arisen that the political parties will experience a short-term financial crisis. This would obviously be an obstacle in the efforts of parties to undertake better caderization and socio-political activities. The question of funding for political parties will be discussed in greater detail in Section III.

c. Recommendations

In view of the points made above, the community needs to respect the decision of the Constitutional Court and to anticipate all of its consequences. The Court's decision is a reflection of the dissatisfaction of voters with the candidates who in recent times have been nominated in *Pilkada*, and the political parties must accept this criticism as a positive, constructive challenge. Even so, the nomination of independent figures in *Pilkada* must be handled in a clear, proportional and cautious fashion. In particular, the new regulation, which provides an opportunity for independent candidates, must position the political parties as the main actors in the system of representative democracy that applies in Indonesia. Hence there must be certain limits on the nomination of non-party figures. On the one hand, this limitation may not violate their political rights, yet on the other hand independent candidates cannot be given special treatment in free, fair political competition. In the interests of the stability of democracy in Indonesia, it is hoped that the Constitutional Court's decision will make the political parties more competitive, of greater quality and more solid, rather than increase their shortcomings, which up to now have been criticized by political observers and the general public.

In this context it is to be hoped that the wider community will be honest and open in evaluating the capacity of a chosen independent candidate to occupy

a strategic position in the local government. So far there is the impression that the political parties are often blamed as if they are responsible for all the economic, social and political shortcomings since the fall of Soeharto in 1998. For this reason the activities and statements of the political parties are scrutinized very critically by the mass media, NGOs and community figures. Hopefully, the performance of the governors, district heads and city mayors who have been elected since 2005 through direct elections will be judged by the same ethical, moral and political standards. If this is done, the community can obtain a more objective picture of the complexity of the socio-economic problems that the Indonesian government is currently facing at all levels. Moreover, it is our hope that civil society activists, especially NGO leaders and journalists from the mass media, will help to provide clarification for the community about the functions, missions and tasks of the political parties. Only if there is a balanced understanding of the importance of the role of political parties in democratic life can the community distinguish between criticisms that are genuine, well based and constructive and polemics that are merely populist and subjective in nature.

3

The Questions of Local Parties

In the context of discussions about independent candidates in *Pilkada*, it was also suggested that local political parties should be allowed to take part in elections in Indonesia. The term "local political parties" refers to political parties that exist only in certain regions and do not have a national network. Up to now the legislation concerning political parties requires a political party to establish branches in the majority of provinces, districts and subdistricts in Indonesia. In accordance with the Law on Political Parties, which was ratified in December 2007, a party must have branches in 60 percent of the provinces, 50 percent of the districts in each province, and 25 percent of the subdistricts in each district. In order to take part in General Elections, a political party must have even more branches. After the collapse of the Soeharto regime, these requirements were put into effect in order to prevent the appearance of parties that promoted issues of a primordial nature, such as racial, religious or ethnic exclusivism. Besides that, the political elite in Jakarta were worried that local political parties could be utilized as political vehicles to encourage the secession of certain regions from the Republic of Indonesia.

Discussions about local parties began to become heated after the government agreed to the formation of a local political party in the Province of Aceh. During the negotiations with the separatist group GAM (the Free Aceh Movement) in Helsinki in 2005, the Indonesian delegation offered the idea of a local party so as to convince GAM to cease its struggle to separate Aceh from the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia. GAM finally accepted this offer, and the agreement then became part of the Law on the Government of Aceh, which was approved by the DPR in 2006. In March 2007, the government issued a Government Regulation (Peraturan Pemerintah, PP)

on Political Parties in Aceh, which clarified details of the formation of a local political party in Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam. This legislation states that local political parties in Aceh can participate only in elections for the legislature at the provincial and district levels, and that they can nominate candidates in the elections for governors, district heads and city mayors. Local parties in Aceh cannot take part in elections for the national DPR. Even so, this PP created an opportunity for members of local parties to hold membership in a national party also, so that they could participate in elections for the national legislature as independent candidates.

After the Government Regulation on Aceh had been issued and after the Constitutional Court permitted independent candidates to take part in *Pilkada* throughout Indonesia, some people were of the opinion that regionally based political parties should be allowed to be established elsewhere and to participate in General Elections. Some observers asserted that so far national parties have not succeeded in channeling the aspirations of local communities because they are too much focused on the intrigues of Jakarta's political elite. In addition, it was felt that the Central Leadership Councils (Dewan Pimpinan Pusat, DPP) were too dominant in determining the policies of national parties, to the point where branches in the regions were unable to influence the strategies of their political party at the national level. The emergence of this controversy encouraged discussion of the question and led to a number of comments about the possibility of establishing local parties in Indonesia.

a. Historical considerations

In the history of Indonesia, local parties once existed and succeeded in winning the support of the community. In the 1955 General Elections there were several parties that had constituents only in certain regions. In fact, some of these local parties almost won the election in their province. For example, the United Dayak Party in West Kalimantan (Partai Persatuan Dayak) and a small Islamic Party called Perti in Central Sumatra occupied second place in their respective regions. This proves that these parties were able to channel community aspirations at the local level and could compete in a healthy way with national parties like the PNI (Indonesian Nationalist Party), NU (Nahdatul Ulama), Masyumi and the PSI (Indonesian Socialist Party). In the 1950s the presence of local parties enriched the plurality of the political system in Indonesia. The 1955 General Elections were conducted with fairness, freedom and safety. From this point of view there would seem to be sufficient reason to open up

the opportunity once again for local political parties to give greater life to the party system in Indonesia.

Nevertheless, there is also an historical perspective that warns us to be cautious in this matter. Most of the local parties that were dominant in the 1950s were supported by primordial groups, like the Dayak ethnic group or adherents of certain religious organizations. For that reason their success in winning community sympathy did not necessarily reflect progress in the process of political institutionalization in Indonesia. On the contrary, it could have been that the popularity of a local party in that period was a reflection of the immaturity of voters and political players. A modern party should adopt a paradigm of inclusivism by integrating as many religious, racial and language groups as possible in one national and nationalistic organization. Only if this approach is adopted can a political system that gives priority to programs and policies (and not to populism and primordial ties) be created. The establishment of a local party cannot always be interpreted as a progressive step, since it can also be a sign of shortcomings and weaknesses in the political process and mechanisms themselves.

The negative consequences of the existence of local parties in the 1950s were extremely clear in the fate of the parliamentary system after the 1955 General Elections. In reality, even the big parties of that period were local in nature: NU was the party of Central Java and East Java, Masyumi was the party of Sumatra, Sulawesi and Kalimantan, and the PKI (Indonesian Communist Party) was the party of Java. In addition, many small parties also had a strong base in certain regions. Thus the rebels who opposed the central government in 1956 and 1957 were able to use the regional fragmentation of the party system to push forward their political agenda. They succeeded in getting Masyumi, which was extremely strong in the islands outside Java, to unite with the anti-Jakarta movement, especially in Sumatra and Sulawesi. The consequences were declaration of a military emergency, the introduction of Guided Democracy by Sukarno and an increase in the role of the military in politics. These consequences revealed the fact that the linkage of a political party with a certain region could weaken the stability of the national political system, especially if the central government was experiencing a crisis of confidence in the economy, in social affairs and in security.

Even so, it must also be admitted that during the New Order period there was remarkable centralization in political decision-making. All aspects of community life in the fields of the economy, education, health, agriculture, industry, public services

and infrastructure were determined by the central government. The local-level social hierarchy, which in general had already existed for hundreds of years, was made uniform with the governmental standards set by the Soeharto regime. The result was that communities in the regions no longer had access to ways of conveying their socio-political aspirations to those in authority, because at the same time the New Order had also replaced the multi-party system with "Pancasila Democracy", which was tightly controlled by the central government. For that reason, after the beginning of the era of *reformasi* in 1998, there arose a community desire to have the authority to decide local matters given back to local socio-political leaders. There were even political and party figures who suggested that Indonesia should become a federal state. To answer this demand of the community, the Habibie government commenced a program of decentralization to the district level in 1999. This process culminated in the introduction of direct elections for regional heads throughout Indonesia in 2005.

The conclusion can be drawn that historically the existence of local parties has had a varied effect on the quality of the Indonesian political system as a whole. On the one hand, several of the local political parties in the 1950s had a strong role in regional government and obtained great support from constituents. On the other hand, many local political parties mobilized their supporters by making use of primordial sentiments that were clearly in conflict with the values of a modern society. As representatives of the present-day political parties, we are therefore faced by a question that is both important and controversial: should local political parties be allowed to reappear in Indonesia in response to the dissatisfaction of the community at the lower administrative levels with national parties? Or must this be prevented so as to guard against the emergence of populism, primordialism and regional fragmentation? In answering this question, we can take into consideration comparative material from other countries.

b. The comparative aspect

In discussing the question of local political parties, we must realize that Indonesia cannot ignore developments in other countries, many of which have had experiences, both positive and negative, with local parties. In the Federal Republic of Germany, for example, there is a party that operates only in Bavaria, which is one of the states in the Federal Republic. This party is the *Christlich-Soziale Union* (CSU), which at the national level is affiliated with the *Christlich-Demokratische Union* (CDU). The

CSU has already been in government in Bavaria for more than 50 years, and almost always gains an absolute majority in elections (more than 50 percent of the votes). The existence of the CSU, however, has never seriously threatened the union and unity of Germany, even though Bavarians are often very critical of the central government in Berlin. For that reason the CSU can be regarded as a positive example of a local party that is able to channel the aspirations of the local community on the one hand while preventing the growth of separatist feelings on the other hand.

Besides the CSU, Germany has hundreds of small parties that participate in local elections at the level of the region (state, subdistrict and neighborhood). These parties have no connection with the large national-level parties and focus their attention only on government affairs in their area. For example, there are parties that are formed only to fight for an issue that is considered important in that area (such as the construction of a school or hospital). With programs that are extremely pragmatic and not at all ideological, parties of this kind frequently succeed in competing with or even defeating the large parties, which are considered to be too rigidly tied to the interests of national politics. Since these small parties generally give priority to technical and administrative matters, they have never involved themselves in attempts to separate from the German federation. In other words, the presence of local parties does not threaten the national solidarity of the country. In fact, by absorbing the aspirations of local communities, these parties help the central government to prevent any expansion in feelings of dissatisfaction with the political system as a whole.

The presence of local parties in Germany also contains one sign that can give hope to national parties. In many cases voters who at first supported local parties because of their own disappointment with national parties, have ultimately become displeased with the performances of those local parties. As a result, at the next general elections they return to the choice of a national party. In addition, local parties often lose momentum after the issue for which they were fighting has been successfully settled, for example, if the school or hospital has already been constructed. Because they have no other topic, local parties of this kind often disappear from the region's political map – until another new local party is formed to fight for a new interest. For that reason the existence of local parties does not always have a negative meaning for the national parties, for the community is given an opportunity to see directly the ability of politicians from local political parties in running the government. In reality, voters frequently come to the conclusion that the expertise of local party leaders is no

better than that of the functionaries of national parties.

Apart from positive examples, there are also less encouraging experiences with local parties. Unlike Germany, many countries have problems with separatist groups, and in such countries the appearance of local parties can become a source of conflict. In Scotland, for example, a party that was fighting for the independence of the region from England won the general elections for the legislature in 2007. As a result, the leader of that party became prime minister. The party, which is called the *Scottish National Party* (SNP), has stated quite openly that the aim of the government that it leads is to make Scotland an independent nation. In Spain, Canada and Belgium, there are also areas where the aim of a local party is to separate the region from a unitary state. Examples of this kind show that the formation of local parties is not always an ideal solution in handling the dissatisfaction of the local community with the central government. In several cases the existence of a local party even has the potential to exacerbate feelings against the national state. As a country that consists of many races, ethnic groups and religions, Indonesia would be wise to be alert to this possibility.

c. Socio-political considerations

The appearance of the notion of local parties in Indonesia is perhaps linked to community disappointment with the performance of national political parties. Together with the Constitutional Court's decision, which has opened the way for independent candidates to stand in local elections, the concept of local parties could hopefully thaw out the relationships between people in the regions and the political elite. As functionaries of national political parties, we accept this criticism and we understand that action must be taken to improve political communication between the regions and the centre on the one hand and among regional political components on the other hand. Nevertheless, it is necessary to ask whether the attempt to form local parties is the best way to achieve that objective. There remain many other options that can be undertaken to improve the quality of democracy at the local level. Assuming, however, that local parties were given the opportunity to flourish in Indonesia at the present time, it is possible to visualize a number of political risks that could endanger national political stability, which at present is passing through a period of transition.

Since the fall of the New Order, Indonesia has experienced a number of ethnic and religious conflicts that have taken thousands of lives. Many of these conflicts, which have been of a primordial nature, were started by political rivalry at

the local level. In Poso, for example, the unrest first began as the election of a district head drew near in 1998. In Ambon, conflict between Christian and Muslim groups was also connected with competition between the governor and the regional secretary over strategic positions in the local government. At this point it is appropriate to ask whether a situation of that kind would make possible the establishment of local political parties that were formed on the basis of a certain religion or ethnicity. For example, would the peace process in Poso be helped by the presence of local Muslim and Christian parties, which would certainly fight for their own respective interests? In West and Central Kalimantan, would reconciliation between the Dayaks and the Madurese be hastened or actually hindered by the formation of a Dayak Party or a Madurese Newcomers Party? It is our impression that these areas of recent conflict are not yet ready for a risk-filled political experiment of this kind. It is therefore better for the wounds left by the bloody conflicts that occurred in those regions to be allowed to heal first, before further steps towards political reform are taken.

Many people have expressed their concern about the tendency for certain regional governments to introduce regional regulations that contain nuances of religious values. The threat by a Christian group in Manokwari to issue a regional regulation based on the Bible shows that an issue of this kind is a very sensitive one in a heterogeneous society like that of Indonesia. While we respect the right of a regional government to create regulations that are inspired by the religion observed by the majority of the people at the local level, it is necessary to remember that this problem is easily politicized by irresponsible persons. In a situation like this, it is difficult to believe that local political parties could help to calm down and control the populist sentiments that often develop in a community. In order to remind the local elite and their supporters that all their political steps must still be taken within the framework of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia and its nationalist values, national parties are needed that have commitments and networks with the different races, ethnic groups and religions found throughout Indonesia.

In view of all the risks associated with local parties, the community needs to think about alternative ways in which to make the political process in the regions smoother, more dynamic and more transparent. The national political parties admit that there are immense challenges in this matter. During the last few years the national parties have attempted to strengthen their branches in the regions so that the branches can be less restricted in determining party lines at the local level. For example, in the

process of nomination of candidates for a *Pilkada*, branches at the local level have been given greater authority to choose figures who are popular in their respective areas. It must be noted, however, that this attempt has proved to be insufficient to reduce the disappointment among the local elite and the local community. There are still many other changes that the political parties must make to overcome the dissatisfaction. The national parties must listen genuinely to aspirations from the regions, irrespective of whether these hopes are passed on through their own party cadres or through ordinary members of the community. Only people at the local level know the precise situation in their region, and only they can decide which policies are suitable.

The crisis of democracy in the regions must be settled within the political framework that was already determined in the *reformasi* period. This can be done without having to make radical institutional changes. NGOs, community figures and government officials must therefore work together in an effort to raise the quality of democracy at the local level. This kind of democracy depends not just on the system and institutions but also on the norms and values that prevail within the community. For example, institutional changes will not have any influence (and even the establishment of local political parties will have no impact) if the practice of corruption is not overcome. We are grateful to the NGOs and other community elements that during this time have played a part in keeping an eye on the activities of government and legislative institutions in the regions, including the behavior of politicians from the political parties themselves. We are aware that many political party functionaries have had to have dealings with the legal apparatus because of various violations of the law, and we have taken steps to prevent the occurrence of similar cases in the future. To ensure a political process that is clean, open and honest in the regions, however, close cooperation is needed among all components of the community.

One way in which to empower local communities is to give authority to regional leaders to manage their own resources. At present, governors, district heads and city mayors spend a lot of time in Jakarta lobbying the central government in connection with the allocation of general and special budget funds. It is hoped that in future regional government officials will have greater freedom in managing their budgets. Regional figures should be able to allocate funds in keeping with needs in the field, and not have to spend time in Jakarta just to ensure that the central government releases their funds. In this context the representatives of the political parties in the national executive and legislature must help their colleagues at the local level to obtain

the release of budget funds to the regions rather than in actual fact slowing down the process. It is regrettable that cases of 'go-betweens' (*calo*) still occur in the DPR and government institutions at the national level, involving representatives of the people and officials who 'sell' their help with the release of the budget to regional leaders. Practices like this have created anger and frustration at the local level and have helped to trigger the birth of the idea of establishing local parties. For that reason success in preventing these corrupt practices could reduce such demands.

d. Recommendations

Discussions about the presence of local political parties in democratic countries have produced some interesting conclusions. First of all, local political parties once played an important role in Indonesian history, that is, in the period of parliamentary democracy in the 1950s. Not all of that experience, however, was positive. Many local parties had an ethnic and religious foundation and were unable to do much in facing the collapse of the democratic system at the end of the 1950s. Secondly, even though there are several countries that have had very good experiences with local parties, the international world has also had negative cases. On the whole, democratic countries with high ethnic and religious homogeneity (like Germany, for example) rarely experience any problems with local regional parties. On the other hand, countries that are ethnically, religiously and linguistically very heterogeneous (like England, Spain and Canada) tend to face extraordinary challenges in controlling the negative effects of local party activities. Even in England, which is regarded as the country that gave birth to modern democracy, a local party that has developed in Scotland is currently threatening the unity of Great Britain. Thirdly, in this context Indonesia is an extremely heterogeneous country and must therefore be very careful in dealing with the question of local parties. Fourthly, in the transition from an authoritarian regime to a more democratic system, Indonesia has already experienced a number of regional primordial conflicts that have not yet been fully overcome. In a situation like this, which is still sensitive, the presence of local parties would very probably create new tensions in the regions in question.

From the historical, comparative and socio-political considerations described above, it is clear that ethnic, religious and cultural heterogeneity is not a conducive environment for allowing local parties to exist in Indonesia at the present time. Even so, the idea of local parties warrants reconsideration in keeping with socio-cultural and

socio-political dynamics in Indonesia. In this connection it must be noted that there are so many complaints about the quality and dimensions of democracy in the regions that there has to be a rapid, comprehensive response to the matter. The national political parties will therefore try hard to improve communications between their central leadership councils and their regional branches. As far as possible, decisions about regional political policies must be made in the regions, and leadership at the central level must restrict itself to just giving general directives and to matters involving long-term planning. Party branches in the regions must make popular figures at the local level into party cadres and nominate them in elections for the legislature and the executive. Surveys have been carried out to identify these popular figures, but popular regional figures cannot yet be convinced to join national parties. Meanwhile, relations between the centre and the regions, which are becoming increasingly untroubled in the field of government and in party matters, will be able to muffle community demands for the establishment of local parties.

4

Party Funding and Public Accountability

The question of the funding of political parties is one of the most important issues in the life of representative democracy. Without adequate funds, political parties cannot carry out their functions properly. Parties need funds to build organizational networks, finance party operations, undertake campaigns and maintain relations with their constituents. Besides that, political parties are also expected to carry out social activities such as the provision of assistance for the community if natural disasters occur, eradication of poverty, offers of political education and the holding of special programs on public holidays. All of these things require considerable funds, which means that the parties need regular sources of income. The efforts of the political parties to find funds, however, are often suspected of being indications of political corruption. Particularly in countries that are experiencing an economic crisis, requests put by the parties to the state or to the community to help finance their activities are regarded as something inappropriate. This suspicion can be understood but it must also be emphasized that the funding of political parties is an important matter for national politics and a challenge for all citizens and not only for party functionaries.

Many political observers and NGO activists in Indonesia and other countries say that political parties should be able to finance themselves through membership fees alone. Their argument is that political parties may not use the state's money or contributions from businessmen because this would weaken their independence. This is an ideal that is hard to reconcile with political facts in the field. We must accept the fact that in a modern democracy in the 21st century, there are no longer any parties that can cover their costs just from membership fees. Parties of this kind existed only

in the 1960s and 1970s in western Europe, at the time when political parties still had millions of members and volunteers who were willing to work for the party. Those days have passed, and today's democracy is controlled by electoral parties that have a much smaller base of supporters. These electoral parties need funds to pay the salaries of professional advisers and to carry out campaigns through the media. Dramatic changes have occurred in the paradigm, with a shift from direct campaigns in kampongs to media campaigns that reach hundreds of millions of voters. It is this fact that has caused a very sharp rise in costs.

In Indonesia the question of party funding is even more complex. Although many parties have millions of members and supporters, only a small number of them are willing to pay a monthly fee to the party's cash box. It must be admitted that the economic situation in Indonesia does not make it possible for the greater majority of its people to give money to community organizations or political parties. On the contrary, many people expect political parties to help them surmount their economic difficulties by distributing foodstuffs, paying for scholarships for their school-aged children or funding religious activities. At the same time, the money that has to be expended by the political parties to finance their own activities has more than doubled since 1999. In 1999 there was only one election in Indonesia, namely, the General Elections for the national legislature. The president was still chosen by the MPR, and governors, district heads and city mayors were chosen by the DPRD's. This situation changed, however, in 2004. In that year there were three elections in Indonesia, namely, one general election for the national-level legislature, and two rounds of the direct election for the presidency. Starting in 2005, even the district head was chosen directly by the people. This change has meant an increase in the frequency of elections in Indonesia from once in five years to a maximum of seven times in five years (but it can be noted that provincial and district *Pilkada* can also require two rounds). It is easy to imagine why there has been an extraordinary rise in the expenditure of political parties.

Although political costs have risen sharply, the funding of parties by the state has steadily decreased. Based on the 1999 Law on Political Parties and the Government Regulation concerning the Funding of Political Parties, which were issued by Presiden Abdurrahman Wahid in 2001, every political party received Rp 1,000 for each vote that it had obtained in the 1999 General Elections. This payment was given every year at the national level, and provincial and district governments were advised to use the same formula in the funding of regional branches. Based on this formula, the political

parties received a fairly satisfactory amount of state assistance between 2001 and 2005. In 2005, however, a new Government Regulation was issued that stated that every year political parties would receive only Rp 21,000,000 (twenty-one million rupiah) per seat that was held in the DPR. This change caused a dramatic fall in the income of political parties. In some cases the government subsidy received by the parties fell by almost 90 percent. This meant that at the time when political costs for the parties had more than doubled, income from the state subsidy almost disappeared. For example, PDI-P, which had been getting Rp 35 billion per year under the old regulation, has received approximately Rp 2 billion per year since 2005.

This presented a dilemma for Indonesia's political parties. On the one hand, they were expected to pay for their own political campaigns during elections for the legislature and the presidency and during *Pilkada*, and also help "small people" with donations and social services. On the other hand, the NGOs, mass media and community figures were generally very critical of the provision of a government subsidy to the political parties, while many activists rejected the right of political parties to accept donations from companies. The result was that many party functionaries said that they no longer knew where they could obtain funds legally and transparently because there were no fees from members, the government subsidy had been reduced, and contributions by business people were criticized as political collusion. Hence a special discussion about the funding of political parties in Indonesia was needed to develop a concept of party finding that would be rational, transparent and effective while upholding the principle of accountability.

a. *The political party subsidy from the government*

In reality, no less than 75 percent of all democratic countries in the world at the present time provide a subsidy for political parties from public funds. This development is the reaction of those nations to the decline in the number of party members and the rise in attempts by businessmen to influence party policies through the contributions that they made. The size of the state subsidy for political parties shows wide variations: in Europe, for example, the government subsidy can represent more than 50 percent of a party's total income, whereas in Australia the figure is only 12 percent. We need to think about a policy specifically for Indonesia. The giving of a government subsidy to political parties can safeguard the independence of parties and prevent them from having to rely on external economic interests. Yet many people are of the opinion that

the government should not give funds for political parties and that this money would be better used to repair school buildings, hospitals or village roads. Nevertheless, without the government subsidy, political parties would be forced to engage in efforts to raise funds from the community and so would be unable to concentrate on their main task, which is to struggle for the interests of the people.

In this context it is fitting for us to welcome the alteration in the mechanism for payment of the political party subsidy. It was introduced through the Political Party Law, which was ratified by the DPR at the end of 2007. With this change political parties will again receive a subsidy that is based on the number of votes obtained in a General Election and not on the number of seats that the party holds in the DPR. This alteration does not have any strength at all unless it is accompanied by a Government Regulation that stipulates the amount of the subsidy to be given per vote. The government must therefore communicate with political party representatives before the figure is fixed. The re-introduction of the figure of Rp 1,000 per vote, as in the 2001-2005 period, would very much assist the funding of political parties in Indonesia. There are also many party functionaries who say that, in view of the recent rises in political expenses, the government should increase the subsidy to Rp 5,000 per vote. In their opinion, even this amount is not sufficient to cover all the administration, campaign and social activity costs of a political party. The final decision about the amount remains in the hands of the government. Hopefully, the subsidy to be given by the government will be able to help the political parties to carry out their mission in a professional way.

The giving of state money to political parties must involve an accountability mechanism that is based on two principles at one and the same time: transparency and flexibility. On the one hand, the community has the right to receive clarification about public funds given to political parties by the government. It must be admitted that there is still a lot of deviation in the use of this subsidy and for that reason supervision must be maintained. For example, there are political party functionaries who buy automobiles for private use with party funds. At the branch level many conflicts occur over the misuse of funds. Therefore political parties must be accountable honestly and transparently for the use of public funds. In this context political parties need to be audited regularly and comprehensively and they must explain to the public the general objectives of their use of this subsidy. Only by open accountability of the funds that they receive can political parties avoid the emergence of suspicions on the part of the

mass media, NGO figures and the general community about the distribution of this subsidy.

Both the government and the community need to understand that the activities of political parties are very different from those of a state or private project, and for that reason different standards of accountability should be used. In the view of many party treasurers and other functionaries, the stipulations set by the government in connection with responsibility for the financial subsidy for political parties are intricate and complicated. Between 2001 and 2005 the procedure by which political parties accounted to the Department of Home Affairs for these funds was fairly easy and flexible. But since the introduction of the new regulation, which was ratified in 2005, political parties have been obliged to account for all items in their budgets in detail and in great depth. For example, the Department of Home Affairs once questioned the fact that a functionary had travelled by Lion Air and not by Garuda Airlines, as was stated in the original budget. Furthermore, political parties also undertake a lot of activities at village level, where difficulties arise in collecting written proof for expenditure. For example, in the case of political programs conducted in religious schools (*pesantren*), it would be extremely improper to ask the teachers (*kiai*) for proof of payment for food and accommodation. In situations of this kind, the political parties should be given room to manage the funds given to them as a subsidy.

Based on this suggestion, most of the political parties have been fighting for the removal of the clauses in the Law on Political Parties that oblige them to submit an audited annual report to the General Election Commission (Komisi Pemilihan Umum, KPU). According to Law No. 31/2002 on Political Parties, parties must submit an accountability report to the Department of Home Affairs concerning their use of the government subsidy. The report is then audited by the Financial Audit Board (Badan Pemeriksa Keuangan, BPK). Besides that, the parties are also obliged to give KPU a financial report that has already been audited by a public accountant. This means that there is a double auditing process, which takes up a lot of the energy of both the supervisory institutions and political party functionaries. For that reason under the Law on Political Parties, recently approved by the DPR, political parties are no longer obliged to submit their financial report to KPU and the report no longer has to be audited by a public accountant. Under this new legislation it is sufficient for political parties to announce their internal financial report to the community (including NGOs and research institutes). The use of the government subsidy, however, must still

be accounted for to the Department of Home Affairs and BPK. Thus the auditing mechanism has been simplified and there is no longer a double check. A number of political parties and NGO activists do not agree with the alteration in the legislation, but their rejection could increasingly strengthen the commitment of the parties to proving that this new regulation does not reduce the principle of accountability in the system of party funding.

b. External contributions

Apart from the government subsidy for political parties, contributions from entrepreneurs and other supporters have also been questioned by people from many circles. The assumption that business people have certain specific interests gives rise to the fear that the political parties will fight for the interests of those people once they occupy strategic positions in the government and legislative institutions. This is a well-founded fear because there are many examples of the "collusion" that occurred in the past between business people and politicians. Yet because of the small income derived from membership fees and the state subsidy, most political parties throughout the world still depend very largely on donations from external sources. In the United States, for example, almost all of the costs of candidates for the presidency are covered by contributions from supporters rather than by the public subsidy or by fees collected by the party. At the beginning of 2008, presidential candidates from the Democrat Party and the Republican Party, who were campaigning to win the nomination from their respective parties, spent more than 50 million dollars just to win pre-selection in the state of Iowa. This means that they spent 200 dollars for every voter who participated in the agenda known as the caucus. All of this money was contributed by outsiders, including large companies, financial consultants, legal offices and associations of special interest groups that have offices in Washington or other big cities.

In view of the danger of collusion between the business world and political parties, many countries have attempted to introduce a tight system of accountability that is based on two major principles: restrictions on the size of contributions and regulations about reporting contributions. Many countries limit the amount of money that can be donated annually to political parties or to candidates per campaign. In the United States, the maximum amount that can be contributed by a supporter is \$2,300 per candidate in a presidential election, \$28,500 per party, and \$108,200

overall within a period of two years. Many candidates and parties, however, have found ways in which to get around this regulation. For example, a sponsor can donate his money not to a candidate or a party but to another organization that has no official connection with either. Hence the regulation limiting donations does not function and supporters can give contributions freely. In the same way, donors also frequently succeed in avoiding the regulation about reporting contributions. Although political parties and candidates are obliged to announce their list of sponsors, this rule does not apply to non-profit institutions which are protected by legislation. The result is that at the present time many candidates in America more often use non-profit institutions instead of their own party to run their campaigns. In other countries there are also various ways of bypassing reporting requirements. There is, for example, the obligation to report contributions greater than ten thousand dollars. Big contributors split their contributions into a number of small payments that do not have to be reported. In Indonesia, too, the system of limiting and reporting contributions is often questioned. Law No. 31/2002 on Political Parties states that political parties have the right to receive Rp 200,000,000 per year from individual donors and Rp 800,000,000 from companies.¹ In the new Political Party Law, however, these amounts have been increased to Rp 1,000,000,000 per year from individual donors and Rp 4,000,000,000 from companies or businesses.² The changes have been criticized by a number of political observers and NGO activists as an attempt by political parties to enrich themselves and serve the economic interests of their sponsors. We are, however, still awaiting inputs from observers and activists about alternative sources of income. The political parties should be open to other funding options. For example, in the recent discussion of the Political Party Law, many political parties proposed that they be allowed to establish business undertakings as the property of the political party. Nevertheless, most factions are worried that this step could increase the danger of corruption and collusion in the sphere of party politics. In this matter, legislation

1 Clause 18 paragraph (1) of Law No. 31/2002 on Political Parties states that the maximum amount of contributions from members and non-members, as intended in Clause 17 paragraph (1) b, is Rp 200,000,000 (Two hundred million rupiah) within one year. Paragraph (2) states that contributions from a company and/or a business entity, as intended in Clause 17 paragraph (1) b, may be no more than Rp 800,000,000 (Eight hundred million rupiah) within one year.

2 The new legislation about political parties, which was ratified by the DPR on 4 December 2007, is the result of an amendment of Law No.31/2002.

concerning corporations in Indonesia does not allow for political parties to be legal entities connected with business. In the end the suggestion was rejected by the majority of political parties and in its place the maximum limit on donations was finally increased.

In connection with our rejection of the idea of political parties carrying out business, we recommended that the maximum limit on contributions for general elections be raised significantly. In Law No. 12/2003 on the Election of Members of the DPR, DPD and DPRD, the limit on donations that may be given to parties participating in the elections has been set at Rp 100,000,000 for individual donors and Rp 750,000,000 for businesses or private legal bodies.³ Bearing in mind the fact that political expenses have risen sharply, we suggest that in the new General Elections Bill, which is now under discussion in the DPR, the maximum amount be increased proportionally. This proposal may perhaps not be popular among political activists and the mass media, but the request is an urgent one. Without this increase, it is hard to imagine where the political parties can obtain the funds to finance their media and field campaigns, which are becoming increasingly expensive. To ensure that financial donations to campaigns are used in an accountable fashion, we are committed to revealing the list of donors to the public so that the community can evaluate the sources of income of each party. It is also suggested that action be taken against parties that are not accountable for funds, in accordance with the regulations that are currently in effect.

c. The financial accountability of political parties

The community's demand that political parties handle their financial affairs in an open, professional and honest way is understandable. Hopefully, the legal regulations that deal with the question of finances will not obstruct the capacity of political parties to carry out their activities effectively. In the former regulations, a financial report had to be submitted to several agencies at the same time: KPU, the Department of Home Affairs and BPK. With a reporting procedure of this kind, a lot of energy and time was wasted

3 Law No. 12/2003 concerning General Elections states in Clause 78, paragraph (2) that: "Donations to campaign funds for General Elections, as intended in paragraph (1), from individuals may not exceed Rp 100,000,000 (One hundred million rupiah) and from private legal entities donations may not exceed Rp 750,000,000 (Seven hundred and fifty million rupiah)". While these discussions and seminars were being held, the DPR was discussing the amendment to this Law; it will be used in regulating the 2009 General Elections.

unnecessarily on the part of both the political parties and the supervisory institutions themselves. As a follow-up to the changes that have been and will be made to the political legislation in 2007 and 2008, the system of accountability will be simplified. Use of the government subsidy will still have to be reported to the Department of Home Affairs and BPK, while the financial report on the election campaign will most probably still be submitted to the KPU. Even so, the annual financial reports of the political parties will not need to be presented to KPU as previously, but they will be open to the public for checking and criticism. This new system of reporting and accountability does not necessarily reduce the quality of control. On the contrary, this regulation can increase the flexibility and effectiveness of the political parties as one of the major components of democratic life.

In the series of discussions and seminars held last year, several political party functionaries were of the opinion that the strongest indicator of accountability is the trust of the people. In their view, the money given to the political parties by the state or by other donors should be used to build good, efficient relationships with constituents. In other words, the quality of the way in which these funds are used can be measured by the extent of the community's satisfaction with the performance and services of the political parties. If a party does not use the money to establish good relations with voters, that party will receive no further support in the next elections. A drop in the number of votes obtained by a party is a statement of loss of trust on the part of the people towards that political party and its financial affairs. By contrast, if political parties use the funds that they receive to explain clearly what they were doing for the community while they were in government or sitting in legislative institutions, it is certain that their share of the vote will rise in the next General Elections. Although this argument is generally acceptable, most of the participants in our discussion believed that a rise or fall in votes in General Elections does not necessarily reflect responsible use of a political party's money. Hence, accountability in the form of supervision and auditing is still needed.

On that basis, the community and the government should weigh up some measures that could increase the accountability of political party finances in the long term. First of all, many countries see the question of such finances not only from the point of view of receipt or in-flow but also from the point of view of expenditure or out-flow. For example, they apply a certain limit for financial expenditure by nominated candidates during the campaign, particularly in the field of advertising.

This regulation is strictly enforced and there are clear sanctions for political parties that violate it. In compensation, those countries tend to be less strict in supervising the funds received by political parties. Since many contributions below a certain amount do not have to be reported, this flexibility leads to a rise in the party's income and at the same time a simplification of the reporting system. In view of this positive experience in a number of countries, Indonesia should consider introducing a similar system. A mechanism that is focused on expenditure regulations can be more efficient and transparent than a system that focuses only on the aspect of receipt of money. To safeguard the principle of justice, it is worth considering whether the maximum limit should apply not only to the receipt of contributions by a political party but also to the expenditure that the party has to finance.

Secondly, many democratic countries use taxation legislation as an instrument for watching over the financial affairs of political parties. This approach has advantages for tax-payers, political parties and supervisory institutions alike. For example, tax-payers can claim their donations to political parties as tax-deductible expenditure. Political parties can increase their income in a regular, transparent way because many people feel that their donations do not make things difficult for them personally. In addition, the supervisory institutions can control a party's finances more effectively because they can check the data provided by the taxation office against the list of donors submitted by the party's treasurer. Therefore, it is fitting that a tax reduction be given to those who make contributions to political parties in Indonesia. Our taxation system still has to be improved before a new regulation of this kind can be put into effect, but even so, now is the time to think about and plan such a regulation so that it can be introduced in future years.

d. Recommendations

The series of discussions and seminars on the topic of funding for political parties produced a number of recommendations. First, the government still needs to provide a proportional subsidy for political parties. Even though a number of NGOs and community figures are of the opinion that political parties should finance themselves from membership fees, there are virtually no political parties in any democratic countries that can survive from such fees. As a consequence, the majority of developed countries provide a subsidy for their political parties in order to reduce the parties' dependence on entrepreneurs and business interests. The government should therefore

give attention to the needs of the political parties at the time when the Department of Home Affairs is preparing the new Government Regulation concerning financial assistance for political parties. A commitment to this Government Regulation was made in the recently ratified Law on Political Parties and the Regulation should be issued as soon as possible.

Second, the system of reporting and supervising external contributions must be based on principles of efficiency and openness. The new Law on Political Parties should be welcomed in that political parties are no longer obliged to submit financial reports to several state institutions simultaneously. Even so, the reporting mechanism must be simplified further in the interests of improvements in the supervisory institutions, the community and the political parties.

Political observers and the general public should take part in discussions about long-term changes in the system of supervision of political funding. It is worth considering changes in the supervision paradigm from a system that is income-focused to one that is spending-focused. This means that our system of control would no longer just give attention to the money received by the political parties but would be directed more towards the funds that they spend. **Many countries have had good experiences with a system of this kind.** It has been suggested that taxation regulations be made one component in the supervision of the financial affairs of political parties. By giving a taxation reduction to donors of funds, the government could use its own taxation records to re-examine the data submitted by political parties. Furthermore, the provision of a tax incentive to those who donate funds would increase the regular income of the political parties. In the long term an increase of this kind would make the political parties more independent, modern, transparent and professional.

One matter that frequently arose in our discussions was the question of sanctions for political parties that break the regulations about reporting. In the past political parties that received contributions exceeding the amount of money stipulated in the legislation, or that submitted reports which were not in accordance with facts in the field, were never given any clear sanctions. This is related to the inability of KPU or the Election Supervisory Board (Badan Pengawasan Pemilu, Banwaslu) to process community complaints into a more concrete legal format. This problem occurs not only in Indonesia but is also found in other democratic countries. In the Philippines, for example, legislation and regulations about election contributions are very strict. But because of the weakness of the election commission COMELEC,

those who ignore the regulations are very rarely taken to court, let alone punished. We realize that firmness in law enforcement is one of the most important factors in the application of a system for the supervision of political funding. For that reason most of the political party functionaries were of the opinion that simplification of regulations about supervision must be accompanied by the empowerment of control institutions like KPU, BPK and Banwaslu. These institutions must be given authority to follow up the transgressions that still occur frequently.

5

The Direct Election of Regional Heads and Local Democracy

Since July 2005 all regional heads, that is, provincial governors, district heads and city mayors, throughout Indonesia have been elected directly by the people. Before that time these regional officials were chosen by the DPRD in the region concerned. The change in the selection mechanism has had a great impact on the role of political parties, the stability of political institutions, and the process of democratization in general. During the last two and a half years, more than 320 regional elections have been held, and many political observers, media, NGOs and politicians have expressed their views about this new system. It therefore seemed appropriate to hold a special discussion about the effects of these direct regional elections (*Pilkada*) on the map and dynamics of political parties in Indonesia. Major attention focused on three aspects that have been greatly influenced by the application of the direct election mechanism in the regions. The first is the role of political parties in local politics since 2005. The second is the impact of the *Pilkada* on political expenditure. The third is the implications of the election of regional heads for the quality of representative democracy at the local level. In the discussion of these three aspects, positive and negative effects were put forward in a balanced, honest and objective manner, making it possible to avoid a discussion that could have been emotional and populist in nature.

a. The role of political parties in Pilkada

Before direct *Pilkada* were introduced in 2005, the role of the political parties in the

election of a regional head was quite large. Candidates for the positions of governor, district head and city mayor were decided by the leaders of the political parties in the regions and at central level, while selection was carried out by the DPRD, which, it should be noted, were an extension of the hands of the political parties. Because the popularity of a candidate was not the main priority, the political parties were relatively free to appoint their representatives to strategic positions in the local government. Even though the political parties often nominated an independent figure (such as a bureaucrat or a businessman) in the election for a regional head, that person was dependent on the protection of the political party both in the nomination process and in governmental activities after he had been elected. If an incumbent wanted to break his connection with the political party that had nominated him, the party could use the DPRD to cause a stir in the local government. Thus the political parties had several methods by which they played a significant role in local politics. It can be said that, apart from the regional head himself, the political parties were the main actors in deciding the policies of a region in the social, economic and religious fields.

The situation has changed dramatically since 2005. Because the regional head is elected directly, the political parties merely provide a vehicle for a community figure to nominate himself. After his nomination has been agreed upon with the leaders of a political party, the candidate forms his own campaign team. Party cadres often have only a limited role to play. The same thing occurs if the candidate wins and, as regional head, forms his government. The elected official generally fills his administration with people close to him or with experienced bureaucrats rather than with members of the party that nominated him. In fact, many governors, district heads and city mayors admit quite frankly that they do not feel any obligation whatsoever to the party that nominated them because it has been paid on the spot. Unlike the procedure in the old system, political parties no longer have the power to shake the regional head with a motion of no confidence in him in the DPRD. Under Law No. 32/2004 concerning Regional Government, the DPRD can dismiss a regional head only if there is proof that the person concerned carried out a serious breach of the law. Even when such a person has been dismissed by the DPRD, this step still has to be confirmed by the Minister for Home Affairs. In other words, the political parties have lost their role as the dominant element in the regional political map.

Although there are still a few regions that are headed by political party cadres, the introduction of direct *Pilkada* is weakening the political parties gradually yet

substantially. In this context there have been several worrying developments. First, a kind of political de-ideologization that is confusing for the electorate has occurred. In general, the formation of coalitions in the *Pilkada* is driven by individual figures who select political partners merely to meet candidature requirements. The consequence is that the community is often startled by the establishment of a coalition between two ideologically opposed political parties. For example, on one occasion there was a coalition between PPP (which is an Islamic party) and PDS (the majority of whose supporters are Christians). When coalitions of this kind appear, the ties binding voters to their favorite party start to loosen until ultimately the community loses confidence in the political party system as a whole. Second, the direct election of local office-holders can have an impact on a political party's finances. It must be admitted that many candidates pay a kind of "fee" to political parties and other regional elements in order to be nominated. On the other hand, political donors at the present time tend to give their contributions direct to a candidate and not to the party's treasurer. For that reason the direct *Pilkada* have exacerbated the financial crisis experienced by political parties and at the same time have weakened their institutional strength.

In addition, the direct choice of a regional head by the people has encouraged the establishment of survey institutes and political marketing groups as a new electoral strength. Under the old system, political parties carried out their campaigns by building networks at the local level and mobilizing supporters. Party functionaries played the most important role in these campaigns. Unlike the old system, however, the new system focuses more on the image of candidates than on the strength of the networks developed by the political parties. For that reason candidates (and the parties that support them) have decided to work together with political marketing agencies. These institutes undertake research concerning the popularity of each of the candidates and recommend strategies to increase their popularity. In recent times they have taken over a large part of the planning activities and campaigning of *Pilkada* candidates. From the design of billboards and the placing of advertisements in the media to the writing of speeches for candidates, all is done by professional staff employed by the marketing institutes and no longer by party cadres, a change that in itself increases operational costs for the political parties. This means that an improvement in caderization on the part of political parties would increase the efficiency of their work by, among other things, reducing operational costs. This development lowers the relevance of the political parties in political interaction and at the same time causes a huge jump in

political costs for participants in the election of regional heads.

The emergence of the practice of image making also gives rise to internal conflicts within political parties. Many party functionaries who have carried out party tasks at the local level year after year feel that they have the greatest right to stand as the party's candidate in a *Pilkada*. Nevertheless, the Central Leadership Board (Dewan Pimpinan Pusat, DPP) often gives priority to a non-party figure who, according to the predictions of a survey institute, is likely to be successful in the *Pilkada*. Hence a conflict of interests occurs between local-level party cadres who want to stand in the election and national-level party leaders, who are looking towards a wider agenda. The result is that many functionaries who do not get to be nominated in the *Pilkada* finally become disappointed with the party and are no longer prepared to work hard in its political activities. In the long term, therefore, the central leadership boards of Indonesia's political parties will experience a problem of considerable significance in their efforts to recruit new cadres in the regions. New cadres will want to join a political party only if there is a possibility of them becoming candidates in a general election in future days. The greater the number of *Pilkada* candidature opportunities given to non-party figures, the smaller the incentive for political activists to join a political party in their region.

In view of the above developments, the conclusion can be drawn that the direct election of regional heads has reduced the capacity of political parties to carry out their institutional function. At the present time many regional heads are not party cadres, and for that reason the community is unable to link the performance of a governor, district head or city mayor to the party that nominated him. Thus the principle of representation in the election of political leaders is not being met. This weakness is also due to shortcomings in the political parties themselves, such as the fact that the political machine does not function at the local level. The failure to produce cadres who are popular and of high quality to stand in *Pilkada* constitutes a great challenge. It should be pointed out here that criticisms of the implementation of *Pilkada* do not have to imply a rejection of this electoral system. On the contrary, the community and the political elite should endeavor to improve the mechanism so that a regional head can be elected directly without reducing the role of political parties in our democratic life. As has been stated above, political parties are the main pillars of a modern democratic state and we must therefore endeavor to maintain their stability.

Besides reducing the role of the political parties at the local level, the

direct election of regional heads also causes a rise in political costs. This increase has occurred in the administration of vote collection, campaign costs and fees for political consultants. First, the implementation of direct elections consumes far more government funds than the election of a regional head by the DPRD. For example, the *Pilkada* budget for the election of the governor of East Java, which will be held this year, is approximately Rp 800,000,000,000. For a smaller province like East Nusa Tenggara, the *Pilkada* budget is between Rp 80,000,000,000 and Rp 100,000,000,000,¹ while at district and city level costs vary greatly. Some regions require Rp 5,000,000,000 but there are others, like the city of Surabaya in 2005, that need as much as Rp 30,000,000,000. Since there are 33 provinces and more than 470 districts and cities, it is easy to imagine how expensive implementation of these *Pilkada* must be for the government and tax-payers, especially since many of the regions where *Pilkada* are held are classed as poor and in reality do not have the funds for political matters. These regions in the end have to cut money for election funds from the development and poverty eradication budgets. This means that the cost of *Pilkada* is not just a heavy burden on the local government budget but also has an impact on the small people in the community who still need subsidies from the state.

The direct election of governors, district heads and city mayors requires a considerable outlay of money on the part of candidates for those positions. Prior to 2005, candidates generally had to give a kind of donation to the political party that had nominated them. But if a candidate was a cadre of the party that nominated him, he did not have to pay anything for the election. Since 2005, however, candidates have not only had to campaign in party branches to win pre-selection but they have also had to obtain support from millions of voters, which has caused a steep rise in campaign costs. One of the largest components in a candidate's campaign budget is the money that has to be paid for the services of witnesses at the electoral booths (TPS). Many candidates are afraid that, without the presence of these witnesses, they would be tricked by their opponents, especially if one of the latter is an incumbent. In many *Pilkada* there are thousands of booths, which means that candidates have to spend billions of rupiah just to pay the witnesses. This is why candidates at district and city level often spend between Rp 5,000,000,000 and Rp 50,000,000,000 on their campaigns, while candidates for the position of governor pay hundreds of millions to

1 The source of these funds is the regional budget (APBD).

get themselves elected. In this context, the most worrying thing is that a candidate has to get back this financial investment after winning the desired position. Since much of the campaign funding comes from businessmen, the new regional head has to give priority to his sponsors in sharing out projects and in other business matters. In other words, direct elections have also made political corruption in our country worse.

As pointed out above, direct *Pilkada* have led to the appearance of various kinds of political consultants, survey institutes and image marketing offices. These consultants and professional advisors have not just shifted the role of the political parties from the local political arena but have also caused an increase in costs for candidates. In many regions *Pilkada* candidates spend billions of rupiah just to obtain inputs from their consultants. Estimates made by political researchers indicate that at the present time more than 30 percent of total campaign expenditure consists of the cost of political marketing. To cover these costs, candidates must seek funds from entrepreneurs and other donors, the consequence being that, when they take over government, they already have large debts to their sponsors. Sometimes candidates are even sponsored by their own political consultants' institute, which asks to have its investment returned if the candidate is elected. Although the institutes are generally very useful in identifying the political aspirations of voters as part of the efforts of candidates and political parties, in our judgement the subsequent increase in campaign costs can threaten transparency and "clean" behavior in the regional political process. For that reason some of our parties have begun forming their own consultants' institute. In this way the political costs of the *Pilkada* can be reduced and the pressure on candidates to repay the investments of supporters is also less.

As representatives of Indonesian political parties, we are very much concerned about the increase that has occurred in political costs in the last few years.² It is our opinion that tax-payers' money could be better spent on improving the people's welfare – for example, by providing jobs, schools, hospitals and satisfactory infrastructure. Nevertheless, democratic life requires considerable funds. The empowerment of political institutions in a modern, democratic state cannot continue without the provision of adequate facilities for those institutions. The success of the democratic process cannot be measured only in financial figures but has also to be judged by non-

2 The term "political costs" here refers to the funds spent from the budget (APBD) for the election of a regional head, the party's operational costs in the form of state subsidies (from both the APBN and the APBD) and the contributions of constituents and sympathizers, as well as campaign funds spent by the candidate himself (both executive and legislative) or obtained from financial supporters.

material considerations. For example, if high political costs can produce a political system that is open, strong and representative, the money expended to achieve this objective can be accepted and accounted for. The next sub-section discusses the effects of the introduction of *Pilkada* on political accountability in general and on the relationship between voters and public officials specifically.

b. Public accountability in Pilkada

Although the *Pilkada* have weakened the position of political parties in political competition at the regional level, it would appear that the mechanism of direct elections has succeeded in increasing the accountability of government officials to the community. Before the introduction of direct *Pilkada* in 2005, voters were given no opportunity to decide on their regional head. At the time of legislature elections, the political parties had not yet announced their candidates for positions in the local government, even though this had become a tradition in other democratic countries. Hence the community did not know who would later be chosen by the political parties to occupy the positions of governor, district head and city mayor. Since regional heads were appointed by the DPRD members, the former gave higher priority to political lobbying with the region's political elite than to the implementation of development programs that were generally supported by the community. The consequence was that the level of accountability of regional government leaders to the electorate was very low. Members of the community who were not satisfied with the performance of the local government (*pemda*) had no opportunity to express their disappointment. Although voters may have chosen a different political party in the next election, unpopular officials could still be nominated as candidates and elected again by different political parties.

With the introduction of the direct election mechanism, the accountability of regional heads to the people has improved dramatically. In a democratic system that upholds the principle of accountability, voters must possess institutional channels to evaluate a government official and to replace him if he does not meet their expectations. On the contrary, if in the community's opinion the official in question has carried out his duties well, the people can choose him again so that he can continue his work. In other words, the right to evaluate the performance of a public official lies in the hands of voters and is not the domain of the political elite. The strongest indicator of the effectiveness of the system is the frequency with which there is a change of

government. In a democratic state that functions properly, voters change a government that they regard as not worth retaining. Reasons for replacing a government vary from failure in the economic field and a decline in its leader's popularity to a financial scandal or community boredom with a government that has been in power too long. In Indonesia's *Pilkada* the level of participation of voters is quite high in assessing and "punishing" their regional leaders.³ Nearly 40 percent of all incumbents who nominated themselves in *Pilkada* were finally defeated and replaced by other persons. Whatever the reasons might be in each individual case, the community applied the principle of accountability strictly yet democratically.

The effectiveness of the *Pilkada* mechanism in applying the principle of accountability is also reflected in the priorities of Indonesian voters when they judge the performance of the regional head. In most cases where incumbents have been defeated since June 2005, the community removed them because they failed to provide satisfactory public service facilities. Under their leadership the government budget was generally not used to improve socio-economic infrastructure in the region. This is evident in the imbalance in the proportion used for the routine budget, which is large, and the proportion used for the development budget, which is small.

On the other hand, if an incumbent gives priority to empowerment of the regional economy and constructs roads, community health centers and schools, which would obviously benefit the community, that person would have a big chance of being re-elected. Thus incumbents who were elected through a direct *Pilkada* really feel that, if they do not carry out programs that meet the hopes and demands of the people, they are likely to be defeated in the next elections. It is this pressure that constitutes the most important factor in efforts to force government officials to give attention to the interests of the people. The removal of many incumbents whose performance has been poor is proof that this pressure is a very effective means by which to increase the accountability of government officials in coming years.

Even so, the principle of accountability in *Pilkada* has already been influenced negatively by a number of factors. The first is the fact that there are still voters in Indonesia who support a candidate not because of his performance but rather because

³ The level of participation in a number of *Pilkada* has averaged 50%, as can be seen in the case of Banten where participation was 60.87%, of Depok 58.07% and of Bekasi 53.76% (www.pilkada.golkar.or.id, accessed on 25 February 2008). This is indeed lower than the participation rate in the General Elections for the legislature. Even so, by comparison with participation rates in local elections in other countries, the figures are relatively high.

of religious, ethnic or family ties. A candidate for the position of governor, district head or city mayor can cover up his shortcomings in the field of programs by bringing forward issues of a primordial nature. Although the influence of this primordialism has already declined in many regions, it still plays an important role in the *Pilkada* in a number of other provinces and districts. The second factor, which has been explained above, is the way in which candidates standing for regional head spend money to win the *Pilkada* and how they have to repay this investment after they have been elected. In the field many voters are affected by this game of money politics and quite often they vote for the candidate who gives the most money to the community, without considering the consequences for a clean, honest and effective political process. The third factor is the extent to which the decline in the role of political parties in *Pilkada* also has a negative impact on the application of the principle of accountability. Ideally, the performance of a regional head is linked to the party that nominated him. This is not possible, however, because of the loose relations between the head of a region and his political party.

c. Recommendations

It was apparent from the discussions and seminars that the process of electing regional heads directly has both benefits and shortcomings. On the one hand, there has been significant empowerment of voters in the regions. Today the community can decide the direction of political policies in their region, which represents an outstanding step forward. On the other hand, many worrying phenomena still appear. Among them are the widespread practice of money politics, the high cost of conducting an election, the use of primordial issues by candidates, and the decline in the relevance of political parties at the local level.⁴ For that reason, political science experts and other community figures should contribute their thoughts about how these problems can be overcome. Several people have recommended that *Pilkada* be held simultaneously throughout

4 The decline in the role of political parties at the local level is due to the fact that the *Pilkada* have made possible the emergence of candidates who have very tenuous relationships with the political parties. The parties are used by each candidate only as political vehicles, yet the parties themselves do not undertake active recruitment of candidates. "Overnight, Indonesia's system has gone from one in which the parties were seen to have a stronghold on politics to one in which, at least in the regions, they are significantly weakened or reduced to service providers for local power holders. The parties do not seem to have used what opportunities the regional elections did present them to improve their organizations. As one South Sulawesi interviewee pointed out, the parties 'just survive'." Michael Buehler and Paige Tan, "Party-Candidate Relationships in Indonesian Local Politics: A Case Study of the 2005 Regional Elections in Gowa, South Sulawesi Province", *Indonesia*, 84 (October 2007), pp. 25-26.

Indonesia rather than separately as at the present time. Although no consensus has been reached on this matter, the suggestion warrants serious consideration. With a change of this kind in the *Pilkada* schedule, many regions could save billions of rupiah, which could be used for the expansion of social infrastructure in the region concerned. Besides that, simplification of the *Pilkada* schedule would give regional government officials a chance to focus their attention on their administrative tasks for five years, without the disturbance of political campaigns at the local level.

Many people realize that the political parties are to some extent responsible for most of the shortcomings connected with the implementation of *Pilkada* in Indonesia. The political parties, for example, are not yet capable of producing sufficient high-quality cadres to occupy all public positions in regional governments. The consequence is that many bureaucrats and entrepreneurs make use of this weakness and manage to carry out transactions in the nomination of candidates for strategic positions. This does not have to happen. The political parties must be involved in efforts to stop the practice in the long term. For that to take place, the party structure in the regions must be strengthened, highly educated cadres must be recruited to join political parties, and the practice of money politics must be eliminated from the life of the parties. In this connection the community should assist attempts made by the political parties to become stronger, more open and more professional. Hopefully, political activists and the general public will understand that political parties are the property and responsibility of the whole Indonesian nation and not merely a means of gaining power on the part of the political elite. With the participation of the wider public, Indonesia's political parties can undergo reform and ultimately be able to meet the hopes and aspirations of us all.

6

Conclusions

A number of basic thoughts can be presented about the presence and performance of political parties in Indonesia. In the discussions that were conducted by KID, major attention was given to three important matters related to the existence and functions of political parties. The first was the ideal role that should be played by political parties in a democratic, modern political system. The second was the weaknesses and shortcomings in the performance of Indonesian political parties at the present time. The third was ideas and suggestions to overcome these problems in the future. In debates about these three matters, agreement was reached on several points that can be communicated to the community through this document.

First, it was agreed that political parties are the main pillars in a system of government that is democratic, modern and transparent. It is important to bring this point forward because recently a number of persons have sought to remove political parties from the Indonesian political arena. In fact, there are several groups in civil society organizations that have lost confidence in political parties. In this connection it is worth remembering that at the present time there is no democratic country in the world that does not have strong political parties. Political parties channel the community's aspirations through representatives who have been chosen by the people in elections for the legislature and executive. In large developed countries – which must give attention to the aspirations of tens of millions of voters – only the system of representatives can work with efficiency and justice. For that reason political parties are a part that cannot be separated from a democratic system, either in Indonesia or in other countries. Based on this consideration, political parties must be given adequate authority and resources. Without these two elements, political parties cannot carry out

their task properly. Without wide authority, political parties and their representatives in parliament are unable to place controls on the government and other state institutions, including the armed forces and the police. In addition to their function of control, the political parties are expected to be capable of undertaking political recruitment that makes possible the emergence of competent leaders at national and local levels. Adequate funds are therefore needed to build networks in the midst of the community, to provide social assistance, to give political education and to run other public services.

Second, the appearance of a number of ideas and developments that can weaken the role of political parties in Indonesia should be noted. For example, there are political and NGO activists who suggest that political parties should not be allowed to receive financial contributions from the state or from outside persons and agencies. From a comparative analysis of a number of other democratic countries, the conclusion was drawn that this demand is extremely unrealistic. Approximately 75 percent of all democratic nations in the world provide sufficient public funding for their political parties, and Indonesia should follow that model. Other developments that tend to reduce the strength of political parties have taken place at the local level. The Constitutional Court's decision, which has opened the way for independent candidates to stand in local elections for regional heads (*Pilkada*), is one example. Although this decision has to be accepted as a political fact, the government and the DPR would do well to remember that, in the process of revision of Law No. 32/2004, the political parties were still put in the position of the main actors in the local-level electoral process. In other words, the participation of non-party candidates in the election of regional heads must be seen as a political reality that can hopefully encourage a strengthening of the political parties without becoming an alternative to those parties. In addition, several people have also recommended that local parties be allowed to compete in general elections. This step could contain a number of risks, including the emergence of feelings of primordialism and the wish on the part of certain regions to separate from NKRI. For that reason we believe that, during this troubled transitional period, national parties are the political institution that offers the greatest scope for representation of local community aspirations on the one hand and the preservation, intact, of the unitary state on the other hand.

Nevertheless, it must be admitted that there have been many shortcomings and weaknesses in the performance of political parties since the fall of the previous

authoritarian regime in 1998. A number of surveys have shown that the political parties are regarded as not yet fulfilling the hopes and demands of the community in an optimum way. More specifically, many people judge that the political parties have failed in their attempt to improve the welfare of the people and to provide good public services in health, education and infrastructure. The political parties are considered to be too occupied with rivalry between parties and with serving the personal interests of their functionaries. One matter on which the mass media and NGO activists have focused extensively is the question of party finances, which indeed are not yet completely transparent and open. Apart from that, the occurrence of many cases of corruption involving political party cadres has worried the community and relegated the political parties to a place among the most unpopular political institutions in Indonesia. Indeed, the frequent criticisms of political parties among the Indonesian community must be accepted as important inputs. It must be admitted that the political parties have not yet produced enough high quality cadres. This shortcoming constitutes a challenge to improve the system by which new cadres are recruited and to offer more intensive political education for old cadres. Of no less importance is the need for an increase in the quality and frequency of communications between the central boards of political parties and their regional branches. If this is done, deviations that occur at the local level can be detected more quickly, while the aspirations of regional functionaries can be more easily channelled.

Third, several steps to surmount the above problems were agreed upon. In the sphere of political party funding, it was recommended that the state should continue to provide an adequate public subsidy. This is necessary in order to reduce the dependency of political parties on the economic and political interests of sponsors. The greater the state subsidy to the political parties, the smaller the pressure on party functionaries to look for funds from businessmen and other donors. To supervise the external contributions that would still be needed, it was recommended that a simple but tight and effective system of reporting and control be introduced. In future years this supervisory system would hopefully be focused more on the expenditure of political parties and not just on the money that they receive. Besides that, it is time for the services of our taxation regulations to be called upon to watch over and increase the income of political parties. Apart from the question of party funding, the political parties must work hard to channel the aspirations of the community in better ways. In this context, it is desirable for NGOs, the mass media and community figures to work

together in encouraging the political parties to become one of the most important actors in our system of democracy. Only with the help of all community components can the various problems faced by the political parties, like corruption, the arrogance of power and stagnation in political communications, be overcome gradually but totally, in the interests of a democratic life that can bring prosperity to the people and nation of Indonesia.

Members of the Community for Political Party Dialogue (KDPP):

1. A. Niam Salim (PKB)
2. Abd. Rohim Gazali (PAN)
3. Achyar Eldine (PKS)
4. Agung Mozin (PAN)
5. Anas Urbaningrum (PD)
6. Firman Soebagyo (Golkar)
7. Fitra Arsil (PKS)
8. Husnan Bey Fananie (PPP)
9. M. Romahurmuziy (PPP)
10. Yassona Hamonangan Laoly (PDI-P)

Other participants from Political Parties:

1. Amin Fakhruddin (PKS)
2. Budiman Sudjatmiko (PDI-P)
3. Darwin Zaedy Saleh (PD)
4. Firman Djaya Daeli (PDI-P)
5. Oheo Sinapoy (Golkar)
6. Rully Chairul Azwar (Golkar)
7. Sayuti Asyathri (PAN)

Resource persons in the series of discussions and seminars:

1. Airlangga Hartarto
2. Anies Baswedan
3. Daniel Budi Setiawan
4. Fajrul Falaakh
5. Gayus Lumbuun
6. Ichlasul Amal
7. Joel Rocamora
8. Kacung Marijan
9. Ketut Erawan
10. Machfud MD
11. Mohtar Mas' oed
12. Pramono Anung

13. Ramlan Surbakti
14. Satya Arinanto
15. Winfried Weck
16. Zulkieflimansyah

Participants from Indonesia Community for Democracy

1. Abdul Hakim Garuda Nusantara
2. Daniel Sparringa
3. Ignas Kleden
4. Kresnayana Yahya
5. Ratih Hardjono
6. Rustam Ibrahim