


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Commonwealth & Comparative Politics

Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information:

<http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/title~content=t713720447>

The Democratic Qualities of Competitive Elections: Participation, Competition and Legitimacy in Africa

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To cite this Article Lindberg, Staffan I.(2004) 'The Democratic Qualities of Competitive Elections: Participation, Competition and Legitimacy in Africa', *Commonwealth & Comparative Politics*, 42: 1, 61 – 105

To link to this Article: DOI: 10.1080/14662040408565569

URL: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14662040408565569>

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The Democratic Qualities of Competitive Elections: Participation, Competition and Legitimacy in Africa

STAFFAN I. LINDBERG

This article analyses the democratic qualities of core institutions of representative democracy: multiparty elections. Focusing on the three basic democratic values participation, competition and legitimacy, the empirical examination of Africa compares both over time and between founding, second, third and following elections. The results, based on 203 observations of presidential and parliamentary elections, show that there are significant improvements of democratic qualities in Africa and breakdowns typically occur only after founding elections. The core institutions of representative democracy may have a future in Africa. Hence, there is a continuing case for demo-optimism on the continent.

The literature on the 'third wave' of democracy¹ has produced an increasing number of comparative accounts over the last decade. From an initial focus on transitions and pathways to democracy, and on democratic consolidation, concerns over the quality of democracy have come to the fore. It has also been argued that democratic quality is more fruitfully analysed in terms of partial regimes, rather than in terms of ambiguous multidimensional concepts of democracy, or various inconclusive categorisations along the lines of semi-democracy and non-democratic regimes.² This article analyses the democratic qualities of a partial regime at the heart of representative democracy: competitive elections. Using 11 indicators of the three intrinsic democratic values of elections – participation, competition and legitimacy – the empirical analysis covers 203 cases of election in Africa³ from 1989 to 2001. Multiparty elections alone do not make a democracy, but the study of the democratic quality of competitive elections serves as one piece in the puzzle.

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Previous studies of competitive elections in Africa carried out by Bratton and colleagues⁴ have been pessimistic. Elections have helped some new regimes to survive but little more than that, and the frequency and quality of elections are on the decline. Late founding elections (held after 1995) as well as second elections in general were worse than earlier attempts, in terms of participation, competition and legitimacy. Finally, fewer turnovers resulted from second elections, and in this regard African politics is said to have returned to the 'normality' of dominant parties and personalities in the form of 'big man' politics. The results presented here challenge these earlier findings on several counts. There is no general negative trend in either frequency or the democratic quality of multiparty elections. Previous results were a consequence of these authors' choice of periodisation and the limited number of years included in the analysis. To the contrary, analysing trends over founding, second and third elections there is a significant improvement in democratic quality, in particular as countries hold third elections. Moreover, while the cited authors noted that turnovers were uncommon in second elections, current evidence shows that alternations in power have been as common among third elections as in founding ones.⁵ In conclusion, it seems that there is a case for demo-optimism⁶ with regard to the increasing democratic qualities of elections in Africa.

ELECTIONS AND DEMOCRACY

This article does not aim to enter the debate on substantive versus procedural conceptualisations of democracy, or the dispute as to whether the non-democracy and democracy divide is better understood as a dichotomous or a graded phenomenon.⁷ Suffice it to say that I agree with Dahl that even the narrowest procedural definition of democracy entails integral substantive rights and freedoms. Hence, the distinction between procedural and substantive definitions of democracy collapses. The right to self-government, as Dahl reminds us, is neither a trivial nor merely a procedural right.⁸ Thus, at democracy's very core the electoral process enacts an important kind of distributive justice with regard to power and authority. In order to rule, the people must have some way of ruling, some procedure for making decisions that are binding for the members of the political community. To this effect, every modern vision of representative democracy regardless of definition entails the notion of elections as the primary means of selection of political decision-makers. As such, elections are a crucial procedure providing for substantive values. In any election of high democratic quality the right to self-government, for example, has *de facto* been effectively enforced. Hence, the centrality of studying elections, even if not to measure democracy writ large but as a partial regime. Yet an

approach that sets out to measure the democratic quality of elections at the minimum must specify how such democratic qualities are defined. Accordingly, the specific justification for the focus on participation, competition and legitimacy of elections is discussed further below.

There are at least two additional reasons to study the democratic quality of elections. First, authoritarian regimes dominated the political landscape of Africa until the end of the 1980s. At the outset of the political changes in the early 1990s, most Africanist political scientists were bolstering demoptimism. For many observers, however, political liberalisation lost its sheen within a few years. A new demo-pessimism developed among authors who, like Joseph, saw 'virtual democracies' rather than true democratisation.⁹ Other scholars argued that things quickly returned to normal 'big man', neopatrimonial, clientelist, informalised and disordered politics of the continent.¹⁰ A few dissenting voices, like Wiseman, have taken accounts such as these to task for being excessively pessimistic.¹¹ The debate on democratisation in Africa came to resemble a 'dialogue of the deaf'.¹² Consequently, the literature has been flooded with contradictory hypotheses based on disparate approaches using various conceptualisations of democracy. Political scientists working on Africa have indeed paid too little attention to careful conceptualisation of the dependent variable(s), clear delimitation of hypotheses about the relationships between causes and effects, and rigorous measurement and compilation of comparable data. The outcome is that not enough cumulative work has been done.¹³ One strategy to address this state of affairs is to begin to conceptualise, and collect comparative data, on partial regimes rather than the 'bundled wholes'¹⁴ of overarching concepts like democracy and neopatrimonialism. Competitive elections constitute one such partial regime. An election is a phenomenon that can be conceptualised and measured in relatively unambiguous terms, indicators are of high validity, and data are available to formulate comparative indices. Its theoretical significance feeds into many areas of application. In sum, the study of the characteristics of African multiparty elections as a partial regime serves a necessary data-gathering, variable-creating and puzzle-solving function in our field. This article seeks to provide a further step in this regard.

Finally, the comparative study of elections and democratisation in Africa is a subject where the pioneering work was done in the 1990s by Michael Bratton and colleagues.¹⁵ This article seeks to extend the scope of this research and take our understanding further. Tables 1–4 make the extension and re-evaluation of earlier research possible. The article builds on Bratton and colleagues' data, and additional sources have been consulted to fill in missing values, correct errors and in order to include more recent elections. There are sufficient data on every national multiparty election held in Africa

from 1989 to end-2001. In addition, data are included on competitive elections held in those states that had inaugurated the practice prior to 1990. Thus, this article presents results based on an additional 83 cases. Second, the present article controls for free and fair elections by measuring the variables in order to eliminate distortions caused by partially manufactured election results. Finally, it introduces the use of panel-group comparison in studies of African multiparty elections, in order to eliminate selection bias in assessments of the quality of elections. In short, the results presented here should be less biased and more reliable conclusions about the frequency and democratic qualities of elections in Africa.

This article contains four main sections. First, there is a brief historical overview on the history of elections in Africa. Second, the guiding concepts, the indicators, and the data set are introduced. The third section contains the empirical analysis, which is presented in three steps: the general picture, a comparison over time and a comparison over electoral cycles. The latter analysis is also recast as a panel comparison to control for possible bias induced by the sample. In the last section (of necessity preliminary) conclusions are drawn as a point of departure for some further reflections on the political development of Africa.

PREVIOUS EXPERIENCES WITH ELECTIONS IN AFRICA

It is important to acknowledge that Africa had its first wave of democracy in the late 1950s as countries engaged in a struggle for national independence.¹⁶ Elections initially suffered from restrictions such as a limited electoral roll in Francophone countries, and the confinement of elections to local government in Anglophone areas. Yet these elections were mostly peaceful, free and fair, and outcomes were accepted by the participating parties. The first post-independence leaders in Africa, by and large, could claim the legitimacy of having been elected in competitive, participatory multiparty elections. This era of democratic elections, however, was to be short-lived. The new leaders called not only for national unity, but also for national uniformity, and a reversion to various forms of authoritarianism swept across the continent during a period spanning from the early 1960s to the late 1980s. Mainstream concepts in the literature on African politics, such as 'clientelism', 'neo-patrimonialism', 'prebendalism' and 'rentier state',¹⁷ came into use during these years. Many countries in Africa ended up with what some have articulated as the 'instrumentalisation of disorder'.¹⁸ There was, however, also some interesting experimentation during this period over how electoral competition could be combined with the need for national unity under a single party system. Tanzania and its president, Julius Nyerere, took the lead

in this effort. The semi-competitive approach to parliamentary elections was later introduced in other African countries: Kenya (1969), Zambia (1973), Sudan (1974), Zaire (1977 and again in 1987), Malawi (1978), Mali (1979), Ivory Coast (1980), Sierra Leone (1982), Togo (1985), Ethiopia (1987), Central African Republic (1987), Comoros (1987) and Cameroon (1987). It was not always, or not everywhere, simply an elite formula for staying in power. It seems that it also gave the local electorate occasional opportunities to oust leaders that had breached their trust or failed to deliver 'pork' to their constituents.¹⁹

The clientelistic approach to competitive elections may not have changed with the return of multiparty elections in the 1990s. Voters seem to continue to choose representatives based on how good they are as 'patrons' of their respective community or constituency.²⁰ The prevailing political culture induces emphasis on person rather than party. This is a probable explanation as to why so many autocrats have managed to stay in power as elected leaders in the 1990s.²¹ In sum, we have reasons to be sceptical about the credentials of multiparty elections in the contemporary African context. Yet we also need to critically examine the empirical realities of these elections before we can accurately assess their democratic qualities. We should do so within the established tradition of comparative politics. From that vantage-point, the empirical analysis of elections in Africa also offers a set of new and interesting cases on which students of comparative politics can bring to bear the general wisdom of the field.

CONCEPTS AND MEASURES

The comparative study of competitive elections has always been at the heart of political science. The field ranges from structural issues of constitutional design and institutional path dependencies, over party systems, resource mobilisation and gender dimensions to actor strategies on the micro-level such as voting behaviour and leadership studies. While these are all interesting and valid research interests, the concern here is with the degree to which democratic qualities are present in African elections. In particular, three dimensions of competitive elections, *pace* democracy, have been considered central to translate the mere formal political rights to substantive qualities: participation, competition and legitimacy. Similar to Dahl's treatment of polyarchy,²² we are not concerned with the mere existence of formal judicial regulations such as universal suffrage or the right to contest for office, but are interested in measuring the degree to which those formal rights are realised. In no country across the world are they actualised in full.²³ In other words, participation, competition and legitimacy are dimensions that are expected to vary in levels of attainment. Secondly, each

dimension has several aspects to it. Some of the aspects measured and analysed in this article are specific to newly democratising countries; others apply to elections in all kinds of contexts. Taken together, these three dimensions comprise the essential democratic quality of the electoral process and can be measured using easily identifiable empirical indicators.

OPERATIONALISATION

The choice of indicators is partly motivated by the possibility to build cumulatively on previous research in the field by Bratton and his colleagues: the same 11 indicators that measure participation, competition and legitimacy of the electoral process are used. Taken together, they range from the pre-election campaign period to the post-election situation. The theoretical justification for each indicator is discussed below. In addition to these 11 indicators, the date of the election and its sequential number are provided.

Dimension I: Participation

Participation is considered a *sine qua non* of any kind of democracy. Rule by the people of logical necessity involves participation. In a representative system, popular participation is primarily exercised through voting in elections, yet there also needs to be a range of candidates and parties participating. Three indicators are used to assess the important aspects of this dimension:

1. *Voter turnout.* This is the classical indicator of popular participation and is generally understood to be an important dimension of the quality of democracy.²⁴ It has also been used as an indirect measure of popular legitimacy.²⁵ Although context is likely to make a difference, a higher turnout is preferable to a low one from the vantage-point of democratic quality. Voter turnout is measured as percentage of registered voters.

2. *Opposition participation.* Are the opposition parties participating or do we see a partial or total boycott? In established democracies participation by all political parties is a given, in less than full democracies it is not. Yet it is self-evident that full participation of parties makes elections of higher democratic quality than if some, or all, parties boycott. Opposition parties may, of course, participate even when elections stand no chance of being even remotely free and fair or legitimate. Occasionally boycotts are staged even in elections of relatively high democratic quality with the aim of discrediting the ruling regime when opposition parties stand no chance of winning the race. In any case, such behaviour degrades democratic quality.

Hence, full opposition participation is taken to indicate the presence of democratic quality.²⁶ The indicator records primarily the pre-election period but also extends over election day itself.

3. *Authoritarian 'old guard' presence.* Positive indicators of democratic quality of elections are not enough in this context. A particular problem in Africa has been the apparent transformation of previously highly authoritarian rulers into 'democrats'. In an important article, Baker noted that in 20 states former authoritarian rulers were still in office as of 1997.²⁷ Can the leopard ever change its spots? Perhaps so, but until proven otherwise it seems reasonable to assume that those who fought to prevent political liberalisation will not willingly further it. If the current leaders of political parties previously assumed leading positions in authoritarian regimes that placed them above the law,²⁸ this can be taken as a factor that degrades the democratic quality of the electoral process.²⁹

Dimension II: Competition

A decent level of *competitiveness* of elections is central to the democratic values of self-government, accountability and responsiveness of elected representatives. *De facto* competition is also likely to be low, or non-existent, and alternations in power hence virtually absent, in non-democratic countries operating elections.³⁰ Four supplementary indicators are used to capture this dimension:

4. *Winner's share of the votes.* This variable taps the level of competition in presidential elections. In an important departure from Bratton's measure, figures are taken from the first round of elections rather than from the runoff. The modification is motivated by a concern with validity. Since the runoff is typically between the two most successful candidates, winning shares tend to be inflated while the figures from the first round are more representative of the actual level of competition. One could perhaps question if the closeness of the outcome is a valid measure of the level of competition of the electoral campaign, not the least since the former has been found in the established democracies to be mediated by the choice of electoral system. The most important effect in this regard is that proportional representation (PR) systems tend to produce multiparty systems, as opposed to two-party systems, and tend to decrease the winner's relative share of votes and seats.³¹ First, this objection does not apply to presidential elections, and there are only five parliamentary systems³² among the 48 states in Africa. Second, in all but one of the countries in Africa that in their parliamentary elections operate PR-systems with large multi-member constituencies or pure PR,³³ historical cleavages predisposed

the electorate to support two main parties, thus nullifying the presumed effect of PR. An indicator of the level of competition can never represent competition itself in full, of course. Nevertheless, the closeness of the outcome, which is one of the most widely used indicators of the level of competition, arguably comes quite close.³⁴

5. *Winning party's share of the seats.* This is a supplementary variable to number four, which covers only parliamentary elections. A two-thirds majority in parliament typically gives the ruling party a free hand to introduce unilateral changes in the constitution. No agreement on the rules of the game is needed and incumbents in Africa have proven likely to exploit this. Although the well-known phenomenon of democratic dominant-party systems exists in Africa (e.g. Botswana, South Africa), in general a low level of competition is taken as a sign of low democratic quality.³⁵ As mentioned above, electoral systems are designed to mediate the proportionality between votes and seats. Yet in Africa there are few PR system with large MMCs or pure PR, and those tend to coexist with two-party systems due to historical reasons. Hence, the distortion of results by electoral systems should be insignificant. On the other hand, we expect the disproportionality of the other electoral systems to produce inflated legislative majorities and therefore display lower than real levels of competition.

6. *Second party's share of the seats.* This is an alternative indicator of competition in parliamentary elections. The isolated measure of the relative seat share of the winning party has been criticised for not showing the strength of the opposition in situations when the opposition is split between a number of parties. This indicator measures the second largest party's share of total seats in parliament.

7. *Turnover of power.* In Huntington's classical formulation, the 'two-turnover-test' has been used to infer consolidation of democracy after the first and founding election has been held. Whether the criterion is a single or more turnovers, it is problematic if used in isolation from other indicators, because it is not sensitive to differences in electoral or party systems.³⁶ Moreover, as the empirical realities in Africa attest, alternations in power (whether executive or legislative) may occur even in fraudulent elections. Electoral manipulation may often, but not necessarily always, be sufficient to alter the outcome. Yet alternation in power, as the manifest outcome of institutionalised uncertainty,³⁷ remains an important indicator of the democratic quality of elections. Alternations occurring in a peaceful manner remains a sign of the distributive authority of the people inherent in the expression 'rule by the people'.³⁸

Dimension III: Legitimacy

Legitimacy is perhaps the most obvious cut-off point between elections in democracies, non-democracies and hybrid-regimes. Whether political parties accept the outcome of the electoral contest in a peaceful and open manner is an important indicator of legitimacy. Legitimacy itself is an intrinsic democratic quality. Three indicators are used to measure the different aspects of this third dimension:

8. *Losers' acceptance.* Whether the losers accepted the results indicates the extent to which political elites view the elections as legitimate. Yet losing parties may challenge the results at first in order to gain political advantage, for example, from the international community. This can also be a strategy for 'bad losers' seeking to undermine the political rule of their rivals. Such posturing is likely to happen in countries undergoing transition when things are still in flux, as in Africa. In other words, a challenge to the official results cannot be taken at face value as substantiating allegations of irregularities. Rather, the relationship between freedom and fairness in elections and the losing parties' acceptance of defeat remains an empirically open question. Nevertheless, losers' peaceful acceptance is the critical test of the system's legitimacy.³⁹

9. *Peacefulness.* Does politically related violence occur during the campaign and/or on election day? Relative peacefulness during the campaign and polling measures the legitimacy of the electoral contest as a peaceful means of allocating political power. Use of violence is a core symptom of failed institutionalisation.⁴⁰ In other words, the presence of politically motivated violence indicates that the democratic quality of elections is still limited.⁴¹

10. *Breakdown.* A necessary element in an assessment of democratic quality is, of course, that electoral cycles are not aborted. This is the ultimate indicator of legitimacy. Outright coups, or civil wars following elections, as in Sierra Leone and Congo-Brazzaville, are all proof that the cycle of holding regular elections has broken down. The data set provides the date of the breakdowns.

Freedom and Fairness

11. *Free and fair?* To what extent the elections are free and fair according to judgements by international and domestic election observers is an indicator that creates a fundamental distinction between democratically acceptable and unacceptable electoral processes, and is highly likely to

condition all the other variables. In particular, the freedom and fairness of elections could have been included as an indicator of competition since it might seem contra-intuitive that unfair elections can be competitive at all. As a matter of fact, they can. There are a couple of instances in Africa where genuinely unfair elections have nonetheless effectuated an opposition win against a long-term incumbent and previously authoritarian ruler.⁴² The 'menu of manipulation' is wide,⁴³ but trying to cheat is one thing, doing it with success is sometimes quite another. Luckily, we are not theoretically obliged to include freedom and fairness as a necessary condition for competition to occur. Rather, we are well advised to treat free and fairness of elections as (1) a crucial indicator of basic democratic quality in and of itself, and (2) as a control-variable when measuring the other indicators since the values many of them take will be dependent on whether the elections were free and fair or not. While there is no such thing as an entirely clean election due to human and technical errors that can occur in any situation, flaws must not alter or predetermine the outcome. If irregularities affected the results then figures on, for example, turnouts or seat shares are no longer valid indicators.

THE SAMPLE

There are 87 presidential and 116 parliamentary elections in the data set, of which 24 were held before 1990,⁴⁴ 82 were held during the early period 1990 to 1995, and 97 polls were conducted between 1996 and 2001. The cut-off point between the two latter periods, midnight on 31 December 1995, has been chosen simply because it divides the period into two equal periods of six years. In total, it covers 203 cases of multiparty elections in 44 countries in Africa.⁴⁵ Processing was done in SPSS 10.0. The reader should note, however, that elections, rather than countries, constitute the unit of analysis. An overview of the data set is provided in Appendix I.

In this kind of research, the two principal threats to reliability are biases in the sources consulted and subjectivity in the coders' scoring. Contamination has been minimised by the use of multiple sources of information whenever possible. For less than five per cent of the 203 cases of elections, there was only one source. For most of the others, three or more sources were consulted. The net effect of the filtering should therefore be minimised. Fewer sources are typical of elections in the pre-1990 elections category for obvious reasons. Yet these elections tend also to be less problematic to code, and news agencies' archives have been very helpful in this regard. The effect of eventual errors has also been lessened by the use of ordinal rather than binary categories for each indicator. Non-subjective indicators, besides party composition and voter turnout, are indeed rare.⁴⁶

The procedure was to pool the information obtained from all of the sources before making a judgement. Where sources disagreed, personal judgement was used to discriminate, sometimes after consulting additional sources. This is a practice virtually inevitable in empirical research, including research based on case studies.⁴⁷ In line with the norms of social science data collection⁴⁸ the data set, coder's translation and detailed background data files with full references to sources have been made freely available for inspection.⁴⁹ In narrative form, the data set is also included as Appendix I to this article.

DISAGGREGATING ELECTIONS IN AFRICA

The first logical step in a disaggregation of the democratic quality of elections in Africa is to look at the distribution of cases over time (Table 1). It might seem redundant but since the demo-pessimists have continued to reference Bratton and colleagues' suggestion that the frequency of elections peaked in the 1992–95 period, a corrective is appropriate.

There is no general decline in the frequency of elections in Africa. What we see are fluctuations, not a trend. The foregoing conclusion was simply produced by the limited time frame available to the authors at that time. In retrospect, we can note that 1994 and 1995 were years of very low electoral activity. Many transitional elections took off in Africa during a few years in the early 1990s and the normal length of electoral cycles tend to crowd some countries together over the coming period so as to create waves of elections.

The General Picture

Looking at the bottom of Table 2, it can be seen that, on average, almost 60 per cent of the elections in Africa have been free and fair. It seems to me that if we are to take freedom and fairness seriously, this figure alone represents a hard nut for afro-pessimists to crack. At the very least, it represents a huge advance in democratic quality in comparison to the politically closed situation in most countries prior to 1990. The overall level of participation is also impressive. Given the extremely low levels of

TABLE 1
THE ANNUAL DISTRIBUTION OF MULTIPARTY ELECTIONS IN AFRICA,
1989–2001

Year	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total
Presidential	6	3	5	9	11	4	2	14	6	5	7	6	9	87
Parliamentary	18	3	5	12	11	8	9	9	9	8	11	7	6	116
Total	24	6	10	21	22	12	11	23	15	13	18	13	15	203

TABLE 2
TRENDS FOR ELECTIONS IN AFRICA OVER TIME

Period	Type	Total N Countries	Total N Elections	Free and Fair ¹	Participation			Competition			Legitimacy			
					Free and Fair ¹	Turnout ² (Geo.Mean)	Opposition participat ³ Guard Gone ⁴	Authoritarian	Winner's Share of Votes ⁵ (Geo.Mean)	Winning Party's Share of Seats (Geo.Mean)	2nd Party's Share of Seats (Geo.Mean)	Turnover of Power ⁶	Losers Accept ⁷	Peaceful ⁸
Pre-1990	All			46%	68% (.159)	92%	21%	71% (10.5)	76% (14.1)	12% (11.2)	13%	42%	29%	0%
	Free and Fair	6	24	11	24 68% (.197)	22 100%	5 46%	5 -	18 74% (13.8)	18 13% (10.9)	3 27%	10 91%	7 45%	0 0%
1990-1995	All			62%	59% (.193)	71%	15%	0 (18.8)	58% (22.8)	12% (12.3)	26%	33%	16%	27%
	Free and Fair	39	82	51	82 63% (.201)	58 90%	12 18%	33 54% (16.6)	47 56% (21.8)	46 16% (10.5)	21 39%	27 53%	13 25%	22 27%
1996-2001	All			57%	59% (.175)	71%	19%	21 (19.4)	30 (20.3)	29 11% (13.2)	20 19%	27 34%	13 27%	14 7%
	Free and Fair	41	97	55	97 65% (.153)	69 91%	18 20%	47 52% (18.5)	47 60% (19.7)	44 13% (12.7)	18 27%	33 60%	26 36%	7 5%
Total	All			58%	60% (.182)	73%	17%	25 (18.9)	30 (20.9)	28 11% (12.5)	15 21%	33 34%	20 22%	3 14%
	Free and Fair	43	203	117	203 64% (.179)	149 91%	35 21%	85 53% (17.5)	112 60% (20.2)	108 14% (11.5)	42 32%	70 60%	46 32%	29 15%
	Fair	30	117	n/a	117	107	25	46	71	68	38	70	38	17

TABLE 2 cont.
TRENDS FOR ELECTIONS IN AFRICA OVER TIME

- Notes:*
- 1 The 'Free and Fair' denomination is based on judgements reported by international and domestic election observers. In the data set there are four categories: 'no'; 'somewhat but irregularities affected the result'; 'yes, irregularities were not significant for the result'; and 'yes, entirely'. The figures above conflate the two latter categories.
 - 2 Voter turnout is measured as percentage of registered voters whenever possible. In cases where official figures are obviously inflated, such as, for example, the official turnout at Mauritania's presidential election on 12 December 1997, observers' reported estimates are used as proxies. The central tendency is calculated using geometric rather than arithmetic means. The geometric mean is a more suitable equation when standard deviations are high due to a few extreme values on condition that none of the values are negative or equals zero.
 - 3 The figures represent only those cases when *all* major opposition groups participate. Hence, partial boycotts are treated as boycotts.
 - 4 Figures represent only cases when previous authoritarian rulers and their close associates are no longer participating in the contest. Hence, cases where, for example, a previous minister under the authoritarian regime vies for the presidency, are not included.
 - 5 Winner's Share of Votes refers to presidential elections.
 - 6 Turnover of power refers to electoral turnover of the chief political executive in presidential elections and a changed majority in parliamentary elections. In systems with proportional representation and shifting coalition partners, a turnover is sometimes 'half' in the sense that one or more parties leave the majority and new parties enter. Such cases are not included in these figures, however.
 - 7 Looser acceptance is established when none of the major players challenges the results in court or mounts other serious protests following the polls. This is a stricter application than Bratton (1998) used, since even cases where the opposition protested at first but then later decided to accept parliamentary seats are coded as 'not accepted'.
 - 8 Figures represent only cases where there have been no reports of any serious election-related violence during the campaign or polls. Cases with only sporadic occurrences of violence are not included.
 - 9 These are cases when a multiparty election has been followed by a coup, civil war or similar that has in effect aborted the democratisation process.

Sources: Dieter Nohlen, Michael Krennerich and Bernhard Thibaut, *Elections in Africa* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999); Keesing's Record of World Events sourced from <http://keesings.gvpi.net/keesings/spext.dll?f=templates&f=main-h.htm&2.0>; Michael Bratton and Nicholas van de Walle, *Democratic Experiments in Africa: Regime Transitions in Comparative Perspective* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997); Michael Bratton, 'Second Elections in Africa', *Journal of Democracy*, 9/3 (1998); Reph Uwechue (ed.), *Africa Today* (London: Africa Books, 3rd edn 1996); John F. Clark and David E. Gardiner, *Political Reform in Francophone Africa* (Boulder CO: Westview Press, 1997); Adebayo Olukoshi (ed.), *The Politics of Opposition in Contemporary Africa* (Uppsala: Nordic Africa Institute, 1998); *UN IRIN News Reports*, various dates, www.irinnews.org; Election Watch, No.1-12, *Journal of Democracy*, various years 1990-2001; *IPU Chronicle of Parliamentary Elections*, No.25-33 (Geneva: IPU 1992-2000); *IPU Parlaine*, www.ipu.org/parlaine; *IFES Elections Statistics*, www.ifes.org/eguide; *Elections Around the World*, www.agora.stm.it/elections; *NDI Elections observation reports*, various issues; *Independent Election Commission*; various countries, *BBC News OnLine*; various dates; *BBC World News*; various dates.

education, high levels of poverty, poor infrastructure and other mitigating factors it seems almost miraculous that on average 64 per cent of the voters go to free and fair polls. Voters in Africa seem to know a fake election when it is coming: average turnout for all of the elections has been noticeably lower. Given (in addition to the factors mentioned above) the relatively high levels of violence and limited chance for the opposition to win in many countries, it is equally encouraging that main opposition parties have participated in over 70 per cent of all elections. Yet old authoritarian rulers still compete for power in four out of five elections. Perhaps the leopard can get rid of his spots after all? This is an issue we shall return to later in this article.

The level of competition in African elections seems to convey slightly less impressive indications of democratic quality than does participation. Legislative majorities are generally overwhelming, with an average of 60 per cent of the seats, even after free and fair elections, while the main opposition parties typically acquire only a fraction of the seats. Despite this, alternations in power have occurred in every fifth election. Anticipating a point here, the incidence of turnovers is related to both freedom and fairness (since it is more unlikely the opposition will win a fraudulent election), to opposition participation (since the opposition cannot win if it does not run, and unless they unite to present a viable challenge), and to electoral cycles. This issue will be discussed in more detail below. Presidential elections are, on average, much more competitive than legislative elections. A vast majority of African countries are presidential regimes where elections to the executive typically take political priority in electoral campaigns. It is therefore natural to expect these contests to be more competitive than legislative elections. This is encouraging from the vantage point of improved democratic quality since increasing competition in the elections to the executive is obviously of primary importance. Finally, as discussed above, for parliamentary elections a vast majority of countries operate majoritarian, mixed or PR electoral systems with small constituencies. These systems induce by design a relatively severe disproportionality between votes and seats in favour of a few larger parties. Hence, in comparison to presidential elections, which in Africa are all in principle proportional, it should come as no surprise that a lower degree of competition is recorded in the indicator for legislative elections. For these reasons, presidential elections provide a more valid measure of political competition in Africa.


Indicators of the legitimacy of African elections are closer to the afro-pessimist view. Less than one-third of election results were accepted immediately by all parties, while roughly 20 per cent of election processes qualify for the epithet 'peaceful'. The reader should note, however, that the

criterion for peacefulness is very strict. Even cases with only a few reports of non-systematic election-related violence were not coded as peaceful but rather placed in the intermediate category of ‘low intensity of violence’. An interesting observation is that the incidence of complete breakdowns (about 15 per cent of cases) are totally unrelated to the freedom and fairness of elections. One would perhaps have expected that breakdowns would follow more often after fake elections led to frustration, with parties reconsidering violent overthrows, and that free and fair elections would pave the way for stability. This does not seem to be the case. There are obviously other factors at play here. In other words, the holding of free and fair elections is no guarantee of stability.

FIRST LENS: CONTINUITY OVER TIME

With the overview above in mind, we need to look at the disaggregated figures. First, a year-by-year view is appropriate, which is presented in Figure 1 for selected indicators. The most important conclusion is that the downward trend in the democratic quality of elections in Africa over time reported by Bratton and colleges has not been sustained. The reported negative trend seems to be a product of periodisation, in relation specifically to early (1989 to 1994) and late (1995 to 1997) elections. Scrutinising the figures reported here on a year-by-year basis shows that 1994 was an exceptionally good year in terms of a high number of free and fair elections, turnovers, losers’ acceptance and opposition participation. Conversely,

FIGURE 1
NUMBER OF ELECTIONS AND KEY CHARACTERISTICS



1996, for example, was a lost year. In Figure 1, annual fluctuations can be traced demonstrating that there is little evidence of a genuine trend. If anything, there is a slight improvement over time as the regressed lines for selected variables indicate.

The periodised figures in Tables 2 and 3 confirm that the most striking feature is relative stability over a significant period of time. From the perspective of developments over time in Africa, the relative levels of participation, political competition and legitimacy seem to be reproduced over an increasing number of countries, although the overall level of democratic quality is not improving. Anticipating a point from the next section, there are two separate trends behind these figures. On the one hand, as Bratton noted, more 'bad apples' started to hold multiparty elections later in this period.⁵⁰ Countries like Chad, Liberia, Sierra Leone and Sudan held founding elections later than 1995, which brought down the general level of democratic quality. On the other hand, the early birds from the dawn of political liberalisation in the early 1990s have moved on and improved the democratic quality of their elections, as they gain more experience, learn how to operate the new dispensation and become accustomed to the new rules of the game. Benin, Ghana, Sao Tome and Namibia are examples of that positive trend. Presenting evidence for such a trend requires another type of analysis, however, one that will be pursued below. First let us note a few details beyond the overall picture of stability.

One puzzle is the levels of turnout in the 1990s. Turnout was higher, on average, in the elections preceding 1990. It has stabilised at a significantly lower level throughout the 1990s. Why did it go down when the tide of democratisation finally reached Africa in the early 1990s? Perhaps we can find a partial answer looking at the type of countries to which these data relate. It has already been mentioned that increasing numbers of previously repressive regimes held multiparty elections in the 1990s than in the previous period, when countries like Botswana, Mauritius and Senegal were the only ones to hold such elections. Hence, on average most voters have had a reason to feel reluctant about participation in the elections in the 1990s, knowing that such behaviour might be punished retroactively if the tide turns again. Moreover, with greater international involvement in electoral administration it has become harder for incumbents to manipulate turnout figures. The strategy of inflating the voters' register and then having supporters of the incumbent regime vote twice or more, or simply stuffing ballot boxes, are practices that seem to have decreased significantly in the 1990s.⁵¹ I believe this to be a large part of the explanation. What is encouraging, however, is that the frequency of free and fair elections has increased in the 1990s as a whole even if the score of the later period is slightly lower than for the early 1990s.

TABLE 3
TRENDS FOR FIRST, SECOND AND THIRD ELECTIONS IN AFRICA

No. of Poll	Type	Total N Countries	Total N Elections	Participation			Competition			Legitimacy				
				Free and Fair	Voter Turnout (Geo.Mean)	Opposition Authoritarian Guard participate	Winner's Share of Votes (Geo.Mean)	Winning Party's Share of Seats (Geo.Mean)	2nd Party's Share of Seats (Geo.Mean)	Turnover of Power	Losers Accept	Peaceful Breakdown		
1st	All			55%	59% (.193)	64%	7%	54% (19.6)	59% (21.5)	13% (12.6)	29%	24%	11%	22%
	Free and Fair	44	99	54	63% (.202)	85%	7	44 (19.2)	51 (21.0)	15% (10.3)	29	24	11	22
	Fair	30	54	n/a	54	46	6	24 (10.3)	30	29	25	24	9	14
2nd	All			52%	61% (.185)	77%	13%	65% (17.5)	67% (21.6)	9% (11.6)	5%	28%	30%	8%
	Free and Fair	36	64	33	64 (18.1)	49	8	29 (16.7)	33 (21.8)	12% (12.6)	3	18	19	5
	Fair	21	33	n/a	33	31	4	14 (12.6)	19	18	3	18	16	1
3rd	All			71%	57% (.147)	92%	38%	48% (09.4)	62% (19.6)	14% (14.5)	29%	67%	38%	8%
	Free and Fair	15	24	17	24 (0.99)	22	9	9 (06.1)	15 (18.1)	17% (14.9)	7	16	9	2
	Fair	11	17	n/a	17	17	5	6 (06.1)	11	10	7	16	6	2
4th+	All			81%	67% (.130)	94%	69%	41% (04.6)	74% (15.3)	12% (11.8)	19%	75%	44%	0%
	Free and Fair	5	16	13	16 (1.33)	15	11	3 (02.8)	13 (14.5)	12% (09.8)	3	12	7	0
	Fair	4	13	n/a	13	13	10	2 (02.8)	11	11	3	12	7	0
Total	All			57%	60% (.182)	73%	17%	57% (18.9)	64% (21.0)	11% (12.5)	21%	34%	23%	14%
	Free and Fair	44	203	117	203 (1.79)	149	35	85 (17.5)	112 (20.2)	14% (11.5)	42	70	46	29
	Fair	30	117	n/a	117	107	25	46 (17.5)	71	68	38	70	38	17

Note: For notes on the categories, see Table 2 above

Yet the prevalence of old autocratic rulers or their close associates as presidential candidates remains a problem. These leaders have proven to be anti-democratic and fully willing to run the country by the use of force in violation of fundamental human rights. Even in Ghana, the new President John A. Kufour, who beat former authoritarian ruler Jerry J. Rawlings' chosen successor, Dr. John Atta-Mills, in the December 2000 elections, was once a minister in (then) Chairman Jerry Rawlings' military-cum-civilian regime. In Togo, President G. Eyadema continues to rule the country and in Nigeria an old military ruler, General O. Obasanjo is president (and was re-elected in the 2003 presidential elections facing two other old military rulers as the main contestants). The list could be made much longer. In only a minority of countries are the old guard completely gone. It takes time for a new generation to emerge and the presence of authoritarian-minded individuals in political leaderships remains one of the greatest worries across many states in Africa.

SECOND LENS: THIRD ELECTIONS AS A MOMENT OF CHANGE

In the following section, the democratic quality of founding, second and third elections is compared. If the outlook over time was most of all a tale of continuity, the perspective offered here is one of change. Overall, the question is: does the democratic quality of elections in different countries improve with increased experience?

While 44 of the African states have conducted so-called founding elections, 37 countries have also conducted second elections and as many as 15 of these have managed to conclude a third round of polls in an uninterrupted sequence by late 2001. At this point, the group of countries with a record of accomplishing at least four polls in a row amounts to five (see Appendix I). A few, of course, are rather discouraging, for instance Chad under President Idriss Déby (in power since 1990), Togo under President Etienne Eyadema (in power since 1967) and Sudan, headed by President Omar Hassan al-Bashir (in power since 1989). Nevertheless, a qualified majority of countries in Africa have been governed by civilian regimes over the period. This, in itself, represents an important watershed in the political history of Africa.

Overall, it seems from the empirical analysis of developments over several cycles of elections in Africa; that a learning-by-doing experience is taking place. The democratic quality of elections tends to improve dramatically with practice. Many more of third, fourth and later elections are free and fair than were founding and second elections. Electoral participation and competition increases significantly and the old authoritarian rulers leave the scene. Slowly, but noticeably, the signs of democratic legitimacy are

gaining ground. In other words, it is not necessary, as some argue, to start off with a perfect world of democratic elections. To the contrary, for decent democratic wine to be produced, it has to mature in the bottle. On a methodological point, this comparison also shows that using years and time periods as the means of identifying the unit of analysis can be highly misleading.

Participation and Competition

With the new data on a greater number of cases there are no general indications that participation in second elections are worse in quality than in founding elections. To the contrary, opposition parties' participation increases from an average of 64 per cent in first elections to 92 per cent in all third and following elections. Furthermore, the old authoritarian guard leaves the stage in increasing numbers as more elections follow. Popular participation dips slightly with third elections, but the general trend is an increasing level of participation irrespective of whether we consider all cases or just the free and fair elections.

Competition, the second main indicator of the democratic quality of elections, also improves significantly with third elections. For validity reasons mentioned above, only figures from free and fair elections are taken as reliable in this regard. Compared to second elections, the winning presidential candidate's share of votes decreased from an average of 61 per cent in the founding elections to 51 per cent in the third elections and even further in the fourth and following elections.⁵² However, oppositions remain split in many countries, which is reflected in the relatively low average seat share for the second largest party in parliament. It is generally only when the opposition has been able to unite in electoral or post-electoral coalitions that it has managed to assume power.

Turnovers were an endangered species among second elections in Africa. While close to half of the founding elections led to alternations in power less than ten per cent of second elections did the same. Yet in third elections the frequency picks up and hits 40 per cent of all polls. This is not merely a result of electoral term limits since the measure of turnovers accounts for that. The data rather seem to reflect two main developments that converge with the holding of third elections: In countries where the opposition gained power in the founding elections, as in Cape Verde, Malawi, Mali, Sao Tome and South Africa, voters tended to entrust them with a second term in power, seemingly afraid to let go of the new beginning. With third elections, voters have been more willing to let go of the new leaders. In the other main group, incumbent authoritarian rulers managed to stay in power under the new democratic dispensation. With time and a more experienced opposition as well as more international pressure,

many of these rulers have been forced to accept a more level playing field, leading the way to an opposition takeover in the third election. That is also often the point at which the incumbent ruler is constitutionally obliged to relinquish power and designated successors tend to lack the charisma and force of the old ruler. Recently, one more long-time authoritarian ruler and twice re-elected president, D.A. Moi of Kenya, chose to follow suit after the elections in December 2002. He was constitutionally required to step down and his selected successor lost the race, an outcome which Moi accepted immediately. To accept competition is only the first step. To accept the consequences of competition is quite another. Yet it seems that accepting the burden of defeat is perhaps becoming a new trend in African politics.

Despite these positive signs, turnovers have always been tricky and, more often than not, a violent business in Africa. In 22 countries elections led to opposition triumphs and turnovers. Half of all the turnovers have not had a very happy end. The alternation in power was quickly followed by a breakdown of the political process in Burundi, Comoros, Sierra Leone and Congo Brazzaville. In Zambia, the new regime adopted autocratic behaviour leading to significant erosion of the infant democracy. So far, only one country has clearly passed Huntington's famous 'two-turnover-of-the-executive-test': Madagascar.⁵³ Cape Verde has experienced two alternations in power, but the first one was at the time of the founding election, which according to the criteria does not count. In Benin, there have also been two alternations in power, following the presidential elections of 1991 and 1996 respectively. The first alternation came after founding elections and Nicéphore Soglo, who took over after these elections, had been the Prime Minister in incumbent President Mathieu Kérékou's (whom Soglo beat) authoritarian government. The next and first 'real' alternation in power was from President Soglo back to the old autocrat Mathieu Kérékou. Such semi-turnovers are not exactly what Huntington had in mind. Djibouti, Malawi and Sao Tome are countries that have similar stories to tell.

Legitimacy

Even if second elections show signs of increasing legitimacy, it seems, on this dimension too, that third elections represent the crucial break-off point with the past. The average legitimacy of the elections increased dramatically and the losers accepted the outcome in almost all these elections even if the incidence of violence does not reduce at the same rate. The general argument that democratic quality tends to improve with repetition of multiparty electoral cycles is reinforced by these measures of legitimacy, but in particular by the indicator for breakdowns.

Breakdown of the cycle of multiparty elections followed 29 cases of elections in 13 countries. Three-quarters of all cases of breakdown occurred

after founding elections. In most cases, those states in which the first founding election was followed by a breakdown tried again with a 'second founding' election. Three countries have experienced more than one coup or the outbreak of a civil war following two attempts with founding elections: Comoros, Nigeria and Niger. The latter holds a less than flattering record, with three founding elections during the 1990s.

Only five cases of breakdowns (17 per cent) occurred after second elections had been held. Out of these five, three came after premature elections. Comoros' premature second election, on 26 December 1993, was followed by a coup in September 1995. It has since experienced two coups d'état and one serious coup attempt, the latter in December 2001. Similarly, founding elections were held on 21 July 1992 in Congo-Brazzaville and premature second elections were held on 6 October 1993 after President Pascal Lissouba lost a vote of censure followed by the dissolution of parliament. Civil war later resumed and ended with a victory by the old authoritarian ruler President Denis Sassou-Nguesso in 1997. Later (2002) President Sassou-Nguesso staged new facade 'second founding' elections in Congo-Brazzaville. Niger also managed to squeeze in a second legislative election after the premature dissolution of parliament in 1995, but that soon also ended with a coup. Thus there are only two cases of genuine breakdown after the conclusion of a full first electoral cycle and ensuing full-term second elections.

None of the second elections taking place after 1995 has led to a breakdown. All of them have survived, even if a couple are rather discouraging cases. In Equatorial Guinea, second parliamentary elections that were neither free nor fair, nor resulted in a turnover, were held on 7 March 1999 amidst widespread violence and intimidation. The old authoritarian ruler President Teodoro O. Nguema and his once single party, PDGE, are still in power and continue to play the game in much the same way as before the introduction of multiparty elections. Likewise, the old authoritarian incumbent in Guinea, President Lasana Conté, who came to power in a coup in 1984, won both the founding and second ballot – the latter on 14 December 1998 – under very controversial circumstances. The second parliamentary elections, scheduled for 2001, were postponed. These are clearly cases of 'electoral authoritarianism'.⁵⁴

In only one country has a coup unseated a civilian government after third elections had been held. That was in Gambia in July 1994, sparked by protests among soldiers over back pay owed for service in the peacekeeping operations in Liberia, which led Lt. Yaya Jammeh into power. President Jammeh has since stood for elections twice. In the controversial 1996 elections no parties were allowed to campaign but three opposition candidates stood against Lt. Jammeh. The presidential elections in

November 2001 were of a less dubious quality; nevertheless widespread violence tainted the campaign, although the Commonwealth Observation Mission declared the elections satisfactorily conducted. The electoral process has slowly resumed along similar lines in another six of the 12 countries where the process had broken down: Central African Republic, Ivory Coast, Guinea Bissau, Lesotho, Niger and Nigeria. In sum, violent breakdowns seem most likely after founding elections. With only one exception, all countries that have managed to muddle through to third elections have stayed on track.

Freedom and Fairness of Elections

It seems that third elections represent a break-off point with the past as the average quality of the elections increased dramatically. The share of free elections has increased from roughly half of all first and second elections to reach over 70 per cent in the case of third elections. The trend continues among fourth and later elections: 80 per cent of these have met the basic threshold criteria for democratic quality. Can observers start to relax then with third elections concluded? Unfortunately, the answer is 'no'. The most discouraging examples of trends in quality of elections are perhaps the two black sheep of third and fourth-plus elections: Zambia and Zimbabwe. Zambia's best-in-class' founding election of 1991 was followed by a sharp decline in the quality of the second elections in November 1996. The third elections, held on 27 December 2001, conveyed no substantial improvement, despite the fact that incumbent President Frederick Chiluba in the end decided to adhere to the constitutional limit of two terms and stepped down. The current situation is still viewed with a good dose of caution by most observers. Zimbabwe's fifth parliamentary election in June 2002 was marked by irregularities, violence and opposition outcry at the results. The campaign for the third presidential elections in March 2002 turned into a sham, littered with censure, violence, intimidation, presumed vote rigging and refusal to accept international observers. These are the deviant cases, however. More typical are countries such as Ghana and Mauritania. Ghana's 1992 founding elections were partly flawed and highly contested. All opposition parties boycotted the parliamentary election and refused to accept the results. Turnout was only 29 per cent. Second elections in 1996 were irregular but not to the extent of affecting the outcome. All parties participated bringing the turnout up to 77 per cent, and the outcome was eventually accepted by all major actors. The third consecutive elections, held in 2000, took place under a new inter-party agreement with party agents represented at each polling station. They were essentially free and fair, monitored primarily by 15,000 domestic election observers, and all parties accepted the outcome immediately. Among these, the old

authoritarian ruler President J.J. Rawlings, who graciously stepped down from the highest office and conceded that his successor in the National Democratic Congress (NDC), Dr. J.A. Mills had been defeated by an opposition united behind NPP's J.A. Kufour in the second round.

Another typical story of a more protracted kind comes from Mauritania. Colonel O.S.M. Taya, who assumed power in a bloodless coup in 1984, also agreed to hold founding multiparty elections in 1992. As in Ghana, the incumbent ruler won the first elections by partly unfair means. Opposition parties boycotted the parliamentary poll, and voter turnout was only 38 per cent. None of the opposition groups accepted the results. A similar scenario repeated itself with the parliamentary elections in 1996 and a presidential poll in 1997, both plagued by political violence, arbitrary arrests and frequent irregularities. The third parliamentary election held in 2001 was significantly different, however. All parties contested this election and the irregularities that still occurred did not alter the outcome. Although the incumbent dominant party in parliament reclaimed a qualified majority of the seats, all the other contesting parties immediately accepted the results and assumed the role of a peaceful opposition. These few examples illustrate what seems to be happening increasingly widely in Africa today: get started with holding multiparty elections, and even if these are miserable, go ahead, keep on track and things will improve as processes of learning develop into an independent force of change.

A PANEL-GROUP COMPARISON

We need to test the robustness of these findings. There is a significant selection bias in the way the sample has been analysed so far. Founding election cases are a mix of virtually all countries. The analysis of subsequent elections includes a 'natural' selection of cases included by virtue of having conducted such elections. In other words, we need to control for country type in the analysis. This article does so by presenting two panels of countries (Table 4): one panel consists of the group of countries that are now due for third elections. In other words, all these countries have succeeded in holding two elections in a row. Many of them are the relatively 'bad' latecomers or have experienced breakdowns. The other panel consists of countries that are now due to hold their fourth, or later, election. In other words, as of the end of 2001 these countries had successfully held at least three multiparty elections in a row. These are the relatively good cases. Within panel group comparisons are used to generalise about each group. A between panel group comparison can tell us if the latter group is actually different from the first or if, as suggested above, there is a similar trend of positive learning taking place.

TABLE 4
COMPARISON OF ELECTIONS OVER TWO PANELS OF COUNTRIES

Category: Next Election to Executive Branch:	No. of Poll	Total/ Elections	Participation				Competition				Legitimacy		
			Free and Fair	Voter Turnout (Geo.mean)	Opposition participate	Authorit. Guard Gone	Winner's Share of Votes (Geo.mean)	Winning Party's share of seats (Geo.mean)	2nd Party's Share of seats (Geo.mean)	Turnover of Power	Losers Accept	Peaceful	Break- down
3rd	1st		43%	65% (.1876)	59%	9%	57% (17.23)	59% (16.78)	13% (12.71)	14%	16%	7%	4%
	2nd	42	19 49%	44 64% (.1829)	26 73%	4 12%	19 67% (16.45)	22 70% (21.00)	20 7% (12.67)	6 0%	7 22%	3 22%	2 0%
4th +	1st	39	20 67%	41 64% (.1689)	30 83%	5 6%	20 67% (16.14)	19 66% (23.58)	18 14% (13.17)	- 28%	9 55%	9 28%	- 0%
	2nd	18	12 67%	18 69% (.1648)	15 83%	1 17%	8 60% (12.54)	10 69% (21.31)	10 11% (11.12)	5 11%	10 50%	5 56%	- 0%
	3rd	18	12 76%	18 64% (.1114)	15 100%	3 35%	8 47% (9.35)	10 53% (18.13)	10 22% (13.72)	2 41%	9 71%	10 47%	- 0%
		17	13	17	17	6	8	9	9	7	12	8	-

Note: For notes on the categories, see Table 2 above.

Two general observations are immediately obvious. First, the group with a longer track record has consistently constituted a better class. Their first and second elections were of much higher democratic quality than the group now due for third elections in coming years. The second observation is that the trend towards a steady improvement is similar for both panels. Taken together, these two conclusions corroborate the hypothesis about learning-by-doing or democratisation by holding elections and, at the same time, qualify it. It seems that over both panels a socialisation or learning experience is taking place whereby the democratic qualities of elections improve with experience and increasing institutionalisation. An uninterrupted series of multiparty elections has led to an identifiably higher democratic quality in a group of African states. Democratic elections constitute a core characteristic of modern representative democracy, hence democratisation seems to be entrenched simply by the holding of a series of elections. This finding is not trivial, particularly in light of the prevalent Afro-pessimism that tends to degrade the value of elections as instruments of democratisation in Africa. Authoritarian rulers that orchestrate fake competitive multiparty elections subvert the drive towards democracy by making donors and intellectuals mistake them for real democracies, the argument runs. This might undoubtedly be true in a few cases. But if the wider picture is that elections lead to the better performance of essential institutional functions, it seems that elections in and of themselves are a worthwhile exercise.

On the other hand, there are obvious differences among the African countries. The panel-group comparison confirms that the 'younger generation' of democratising countries in Africa started off from a less promising position. Founding elections in this group were generally much less democratic than such elections among the 'older' generation. The same is true for second elections. Even if the trend towards better quality is replicated by the new beginners, it is less pronounced and has yet to produce the same degree of improvements in democratic quality.

A FORMULA FOR DEMOCRATIC DEVELOPMENT?

The study of political change in Africa suffers from inadequate theoretical specification, methodological rigour and, perhaps most of all, insufficient collection of data suitable for comparative analysis. It has been suggested in this article that one way to improve on the current state of affairs is to focus on partial regimes rather than on 'bundled wholes' of thick concepts. This article utilises an extensive data collection exercise on the democratic quality of elections in Africa and suggests some preliminary conclusions about prevailing trends and developments that run contrary to earlier

assessments. This strategy is not a panacea, but it does attempt to solve one part of the big puzzle of political development in general, and of regime change and democratisation in particular.

Democratisation has always involved struggles over political power. Such struggles sometimes involve the life and death of combatants. The central element in this struggle concerns the fundamental rules of the game. Many different actors participate in these struggles. Given the stipulation that democratisation in Africa is a desirable outcome, there is an important lesson to be drawn from this study. That things start off badly is no reason to believe that the struggle is already lost. To the contrary, for local as well as international actors the message is: keep up the good fight and the battle will often be won eventually. The evidence at hand suggests that the quality of elections will improve if pressure is sustained and the process of holding multiparty elections continues. The analysis also suggests that it is always better to continue to hold elections, even if, at first, the quality seems dire. Democratic quality tends to improve with third and following elections. There is nothing deterministic about this, however. We should neither stop being critical nor cease to voice concern about bad records. Outcomes can be bad even with quite a few elections in a row under conditions involving incoherent external pressure and a particularly stubborn 'big man' at the helm, as the Zimbabwean example shows all too well. The empirical evidence presented here goes a long way to suggest an important conclusion. A series of multiparty elections will, more often than not, contribute to democratisation. After all, democratic elections are the *sine qua non* of a representative democracy.

APPENDIX I
ELECTIONS IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

Country	Type	No	Date	Free and Fair?	T-out	Opposition Participate?	Old Authoritarians Participate?	1st	2nd	Turnover	Losers Accepted?	Peaceful?	Breakdown?	Date
Angola	Pres	1	30-Sep-92	Yes, irregularities not significant.	.91	Yes, all	Yes	50	40	No	No, not at all	Yes	Yes, civil war	Jan 93
	Parl	1	30-Sep-92	Yes, irregularities not significant.	.91	Yes, all	Yes	59	32	No	No, not at all	Yes	Yes, civil war	Jan 93
Benin	Pres	1	24-Mar-91	Yes, irregularities not significant.	.64	Yes, all	Yes	27	1	Half, new party or person	Yes, immediately	Yes	No	,
	2	18-Mar-96	Yes, entirely	.88	Yes, all	Yes	Yes	37	1	Half, new party or person	Not at first OR some but not all	Yes	No	,
	3	18-Mar-01	Irregularities affected results	.70	Yes, all	Yes	Yes	29	,	No	No, not at all	Yes	No	,
	Parl	1	17-Feb-91	Yes, irregularities not significant.	.53	Yes, all	Yes	14	1	Half, new party or person	Yes, immediately	Yes	No	,
	2	28-Mar-95	Yes, irregularities not significant.	.76	Yes, all	Yes	Yes	23	1	Half, new party or person	Not at first but later OR some but not all	Yes	No	,
	3	30-Mar-99	Yes, irregularities not significant.	.70	Yes, all	Yes, all	No	33	13	Half, new party or person	Yes, immediately	Yes	No	,
Botswana	Parl	1	01-Oct-69	Yes, irregularities not significant.	.55	Some parties	No	,	,	Yes	Not at first but later OR some but not all	Yes	No	,
	2	01-Oct-74	Yes, irregularities not significant.	.31	Some parties	Some parties	No	,	,	No	Yes immediately	Yes	No	,
	3	01-Oct-79	Yes, irregularities not significant.	.55	Yes, all	Yes, all	No	,	,	No	Yes immediately	Yes	No	,
	4	01-Oct-84	Yes, irregularities not significant.	.78	Yes, all	Yes, all	No	,	,	No	Yes immediately	Yes	No	,
	5	07-Oct-89	Yes, entirely	.68	Yes, all	Yes, all	No	91	9	No	Yes immediately	Yes	No	,
	6	15-Oct-94	Yes, entirely	.77	Yes, all	Yes, all	No	68	33	No	Yes immediately	Yes	No	,
	7	16-Oct-99	Yes, entirely	.77	Yes, all	Yes, all	No	83	15	No	Yes immediately	Yes	No	,

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ELECTIONS IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

Country	Type	No	Date	Free and Fair?	T-out	Opposition Participate?	Old Authoritarians Participate?	1st	2nd	Turnover	Losers Accept?	Peaceful?	Breakdown?	Date
Burkina Faso	Pre	1	01-Dec-91	Irregularities affected results	.22	No	Yes	86	0	No	No, not at all	Isolated incidents	No	,
		2	15-Nov-98	Irregularities affected results	.56	Yes, all	Yes	88	7	No	Not at first but later OR some but not all	Isolated incidents	No	,
Parl	1	24-May-92	No, not at all	.34	Yes, all	Yes	Yes	73	12	No	Not at first but later OR some but not all	Isolated incidents	No	,
	2	11-May-97	Irregularities affected results	.44	Yes, all	Yes	Yes	90	5	No	Not at first but later OR some but not all	Isolated incidents	No	,
Burundi	Pres	1	01-Jun-93-	Yes, irregularities not significant	.97	Yes, all	Yes	65	32	Yes	No, not at all	Isolated incidents	Yes, ctvil war	Oct 93
	Parl	1	30-Jun-93	Yes, irregularities not significant	.91	Yes, all	Yes	80	20	Yes	No, not at all	Isolated incidents	Yes, ctvil war	Oct 93
Cameroon	Pres	1	11-Oct-92	Irregularities affected results	.72	Some parties	Yes	40	36	No	No, not at all	Isolated incidents	No	,
		2	12-Oct-97	Irregularities affected results	.81	No	Yes	93	3	No	No, not at all	Isolated incidents	No	,
Parl	1	01-Mar-92	Irregularities affected results	.61	Some parties	Yes	Yes	49	36	No	No, not at all	Isolated incidents	No	,
	2	17-May-97	Irregularities affected results	.76	Yes, all	Yes	Yes	64	24	No	No, not at all	Isolated incidents	No	,
Cape Verde	Pres	1	17-Feb-91	Yes, irregularities not significant	.59	Yes, all	Yes	74	26	Yes	Yes, immediately	Isolated incidents	No	,
		2	18-Feb-96	Yes, irregularities not significant	.50	No	Old party or previous mnisters	100	0	No	Yes, immediately	Yes	No	,
Parl	3	25-Feb-01	Yes, irregularities not significant	.59	Yes, all	Old party or previous mnisters	47	46	Yes	Yes, immediately	Yes, immediately	Yes	No	,
	1	13-Jan-91	Yes, irregularities not significant	.80	Yes, all	Yes	Yes	71	29	Yes	Yes, immediately	Isolated incidents	No	,

Country	Type	No	Date	Free and Fair?	T-out	Opposition Participate?	Old Authoritarians Participate?	1st	2nd	Turnover	Losers Accept?	Peaceful?	Breakdown?	Date
Cape Verde cont.	1	17-Dec-95	Yes, irregularities not significant	.76	Yes, all	Old party or previous ministers	69	29	No	Yes, immediately	Isolated incidents	No		
	3	14-Jan-01	Yes, irregularities not significant	.58	Yes, all	Old party or previous ministers	56	42	Yes	Yes, immediately	Yes	No		
	Pres	1	25-Oct-92	No, not at all	.50	Some parties	Yes		Yes	No, not at all	No, not at all	Yes, other		Nov 92
C.A.R.	1	19-Sep-93	Yes, irregularities not significant	.56	Yes, all	Yes	37	22	Half, new party or person	Not at first but later OR some but not all	Isolated incidents	No		
	2	19-Dec-99	Yes, irregularities not significant	.56	Yes, all	Yes	52	19	No	Not at first but later OR some but not all	Isolated incidents	No		
	Part	1	19-Sep-93	Yes, irregularities not significant	.68	Yes, all	Yes	40	15	Half, new party or person	Yes, immediately	Isolated incidents	No	
	2	13-Dec-98	Yes, irregularities not significant	.59	Yes, all	Yes	43	18	Half, new party or person	Yes, immediately	No, not at all	No		
	Pres	1	03-Jul-96	Yes, irregularities not significant	.75	Yes, all	Yes	44	12	No	Not at first but later OR some but not all	Isolated incidents	No	
Chad	2	27-May-01	Irregularities affected results	.61	Yes, all	Yes	63	16	No	Not at first but later OR some but not all	Isolated incidents	No		
	Part	1	23-Feb-97	Yes, irregularities not significant	.49	Yes, all	Yes	52	23	No	Not at first but later OR some but not all	Isolated incidents	No	
	Pres	1	11-Mar-90	Irregularities affected results	.60	Yes, all	Yes	55	45	No	No, not at all	No, not at all	Yes, coup	Sep 95
Comoros	Pres	1	16-Mar-96	Yes, irregularities not significant	.62	Some parties	Old party or previous ministers	21	16	Yes	No, not at all	No, not at all	Yes, coup	Jan 99
	Part	1	29-Nov-92	Irregularities affected results	.50	Some parties	Yes	52	48	No	No, not at all	No, not at all	No	
	2	26-Dec-93	Irregularities affected results	.50	Some parties	Yes	68	10	No	No, not at all	No, not at all	Yes, coup		Sep 95
	1	08-Dec-96	Irregularities affected results	.20	No	Old party or previous ministers	68	10	No	No, not at all	No, not at all	Isolated incidents	Yes, coup	Jan 99

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Country	Type	No	Date	Free and Fair?	T-out	Opposition Participate?	Old Authoritarians Participate?	1st	2nd	Turnover	Losers Accept?	Peaceful?	Breakdown?	Date
Comoros cont.		2	26-Dec-93	Irregularities affected results	.50	Some Parties	Yes	68	10	No	No, not at all	No, not at all	Yes, coup	Sep 95
		1	08-Dec-96	Irregularities affected results	.20	No	Old party or previous ministers	84	7	No	No, not at all	Isolated incidents	Yes, coup	Jan 99
DRC	Pres												Yes, civil war	Jan 94
	Pral												Yes, civil war	Jan 94
R. o. C.	Pres	1	16-Aug-92	Yes, irregularities not significant	.50	Yes, all	Yes	36	23	Yes	Yes, immediately	Isolated incident	Yes, other reasons	Dec 92
	Parl	1	21-Jul-92	Yes, irregularities not significant	.50	Yes, all	Yes	31	23	Yes	Yes, immediately	Isolated incidents	Yes, other reasons	Dec 92
		1	06-Oct-93	Irregularities affected results	.50	Yes, all	Yes	38	22	No	No, not at all	No, not at all	Yes, civil war	May 97
Ivory Coast	Pres	1	28-Oct-90	Yes, irregularities not significant	.60	Some parties	Yes	82	18	No	Not at first but later OR some but not all	No, not at all	No	
		2	22-Oct-95	Irregularities affected results	.46	Some parties	Old party or previous ministers	95	4	No	No, not at all	No, not at all	Yes, coup	Dec 99
	Prs	1	22-Oct-00	Irregularities affected results	.37	Some parties	Yes	59	33	Yes	No, not at all	No, not at all	No	
	Parl	1	25-Nov-90	Irregularities affected results	.35	Some parties	Yes	87	5	No	OR some but not all	No, not at all	No	
		2	26-Nov-95	Irregularities affected results	.30	Yes, all	Yes	85	10	No	OR some but not all	Isolated incidents	Yes, coup	Dec 99
		1	10-Dec-00	Irregularities affected results	.33	Some parties	Old party or previous ministers	43	42	Yes	No, not at all	No, not at all	No	
Djibouti	Pres	1	15-May-93	Irregularities affected results	.50	Some parties	Yes	61	22	No	No, not at all	Isolated	No	

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ELECTIONS IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

Country	Type	No	Date	Free and Fair?	T-out	Opposition Participate?	Old Authoritarians Participate?	1st	2nd	Turnover	Losers Accept?	Peaceful?	Breakdown?	Date
		2	12-Apr-99	Yes, irregularities not significant	.60	Yes, all	Old party or previous ministers	74	26	Half, new party or person	Not at first but later OR some but not all	Yes	No	,
	Parl	1	18-Dec-92	Irregularities affected results	.47	No	Yes	100	0	No	No, not at all	Isolated incidents	No	,
		2	19-Dec-97	Yes, irregularities significant	.57	Yes, all	Yes	100	0	No	Yes, immediately	Isolated incidents	No	,
EqGuinea	Pres	1	25-Feb-96	No, not at all	.50	No	Yes	98	1	No	No, not at all	Isolated incidents	No	,
	Part 1	1	21-Nov-93	No, not at all	.50	Some parties	Yes	85	8	No	No, not at all	Isolated incidents	No	,
		2	07-Mar-99	Irregularities affected results	.95	Yes, all	Yes	94	5	No	No, not at all	Isolated incidents	No	,
Eritrea	Pres	,	,	,	,	,	,	,	,	,	,	,	,	,
	Parl	,	,	,	,	,	,	,	,	,	,	,	,	,
Ethiopia	Parl	1	07-May-95	Yes, irregularities not significant	.50	Some parties	No	98	1	No	No, not at all	Isolated incidents	No	,
	Parl	2	14-May-00	Yes, irregularities not significant	.90	Yes, all	No	32	24	No	Yes, immediately	Isolated incidents	No	,
Gabon	Pres	1	05-Dec-93	Irregularities affected results	.86	Yes, all	Yes	51	27	No	No, not at all	No, not at all	No	,
		2	06-Dec-98	Irregularities affected results	.54	Yes, all	Yes	67	17	No	No, not at all	Isolated incidents	No	,
	Parl	1	21-Oct-91	Irregularities affected results	.50	Some parties	Yes	55	16	No	No, not at all	Isolated incidents	No	,
	Parl	2	09-Feb-97	Yes, irregularities not significant	.50	Yes, all	Yes	71	8	No	Not at first but later OR some but not all	Isolated incidents	No	,

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ELECTIONS IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

Country	Type	No	Date	Free and Fair?	T-out	Opposition Participate?	Old Authoritarians Participate?	1st	2nd	Turnover	Losers Accept?	Peaceful?	Breakdown?	Date
Gambia	Pres	3	09-Dec-01	Irregularities affected results	.28	Yes, all	Yes	79	10	No	Not at first but later OR some but not all	Isolated incidents	No	, ,
		1	05-May-82	Irregularities affected results	.57	Yes, all	Yes	, ,	, ,	No	No, not at all	Isolated incidents	No	, ,
		2	05-May-87	Irregularities affected results	.80	Yes, all	Yes	59	28	No	No, not at all	Yes	No	, ,
		3	29-Apr-92	Yes, irregularities significant	.56	Yes, all	Yes	58	22	No	Yes, immediately	Isolated incidents	Yes, coup	Jul 94
		1	26-Sep-96	Irregularities affected results	.80	Some parties	Yes	56	33	No	Not at first but later OR some but not all	Isolated incidents	No	, ,
		2	18-Oct-01	Yes, irregularities not significant	.50	Yes, all	Yes	53	33	No	Yes, immediately	No, not at all	No	, ,
Ghana	Parl	1	05-May-82	Irregularities affected results	.57	Yes, all	Yes	77	9	No	No, not at all	Isolated incidents	No	, ,
		2	05-May-87	Irregularities affected results	.80	Yes, all	Yes	89	14	No	No, not at all	Yes	No	, ,
		3	29-Apr-92	Yes, irregularities not significant	.56	Yes, all	Yes	61	, ,	No	Yes, immediately	Isolated incidents	Yes, coup	Jul 94
		1	02-Jan-97	Irregularities affected results	.73	Yes, all	Yes	52	34	No	Not at first but later OR some but not all	Yes	No	, ,
		2	17-Feb-02	Irregularities affected results	.50	No	Yes	94	4	No	No, not at all	Isolated incidents	No	, ,
		1	03-Nov-92	Irregularities affected results	.48	Yes, all	Yes	59	30	No	Not at first but later OR some but not all	Isolated incidents	No	, ,
2	07-Dec-96	Yes, irregularities not significant	.77	Yes, all	Yes	57	40	No	Yes, immediately	Yes	No	, ,		

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ELECTIONS IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

Country	Type	No	Date	Free and Fair?	T-out	Opposition Participate?	Old Authoritarians Participate?	1st	2nd	Turnover	Losers Accept?	Peaceful?	Breakdown?	Date
		3	28-Dec-00	Yes, irregularities not significant	.60	Yes, all	Old party or previous ministers	48	44	Yes	Yes, immediately	Isolated incidents	No	,
	Parl	1	29-Dec-92	Yes, irregularities not significant	.29	No	Yes	98	4	No	No, not at all	Isolated incidents	No	,
		2	07-Dec-96	Yes, irregularities not significant	.77	Yes, all	Yes	67	31	No	Yes, immediately	Yes	No	,
		3	07-Dec-00	Yes, irregularities not significant	.70	Yes, all	Old party or previous ministers	50	46	Yes	Yes, immediately	Isolated incidents	No	,
Guinea	Pres	1	19-Dec-93	Irregularities affected results	.79	Yes, all	Yes	52	20	No	No, not at all	Isolated incidents	No	,
		2	14-Dec-98	Irregularities affected results	.70	Yes, all	Yes	54	25	No	No, not at all	Isolated incidents	No	,
	Parl	1	11-Jun-95	Yes, irregularities not significant	.62	Some parties	Yes	62	17	No	Not at first but later	Isolated incidents	No	,
Guinea Bissau	Pres	1	07-Aug-94	Yes, irregularities not significant	.81	Yes, all	Yes	46	22	No	OR some but not all	Isolated incidents	Yes, coup	Jun 98
		1	16-Jan-00	Yes, irregularities not significant	.72	Yes, all	Old party or previous ministers	39	23	Yes	Yes, immediately	Isolated incidents	No	,
	Parl	1	03-Jul-94	Yes, irregularities not significant	.45	Yes, all	Yes	64	19	No	Not at first but later	Isolated incidents	Yes, coup	Jun 98
		1	28-Nov-99	Yes, irregularities not significant	.80	Yes, all	Old party or previous ministers	37	27	Yes	Yes, immediately	Isolated incidents	No	,
Kenya	Pres	1	29-Dec-92	Irregularities affected results	.68	Yes, all	Yes	36	26	No	Not at first but later	No, not at all	No	,
		2	30-Dec-97	Irregularities affected results	.65	Yes, all	Yes	40	31	No	OR some but not all	Isolated incidents	No	,
	Parl	1	29-Dec-92	Irregularities affected results	.68	Yes, all	Yes	56	16	No	Not at first but later	No, not at all	No	,

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ELECTIONS IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

Country	Type	No	Date	Free and Fair?	T-out	Opposition Participate?	Old Authoritarians Participate?	1st	2nd	Turnover	Losers Accept?	Peaceful?	Breakdown?	Date
		2	30-Dec-97	Irregularities affected results	.64	Yes, all	Yes	51	18	No	Not at first but later OR some but not all	Isolated incidents	No	
Lesotho	Parl	1	28-Mar-93	Yes, irregularities not significant	.72	Yes, all	Old party or previous ministers	100	0	Yes	Not at first but later OR some but not all	Isolated incidents	Yes, coup	Aug 94
		1	23-May-98	Yes, irregularities not significant	.72	Yes, all	No	99	1	No	Not at first but later OR some but not all	Isolated incidents	No	
Liberia	Pres	1	09-Jul-97	Irregularities affected results	.89	Yes, all	Yes	75	10	No	Yes, immediately	Isolated incidents	No	
	Parl	1	19-Jul-97	Irregularities affected results	.89	Yes, all	Yes	76	11	No	Yes, immediately	Isolated incidents	No	
Madagascar	Pres	1	01-Jul-82	Irregularities affected results	.40	Some parties	Yes	80	20	No	No, not at all	Isolated incidents	No	
		2	01-Mar-89	Irregularities affected results	.40	Yes, all	Yes	62	20	No	Not at first but later OR some but not all	Isolated incidents	No	
		3	10-Feb-93	Yes, irregularities not significant	.74	Yes, all	Yes	45	29	Yes	Yes, immediately	No, not at all	No	
		4	02-Jan-97	Yes, irregularities not significant	.61	Yes, all	Yes	37	23	Yes	Yes, immediately	Isolated incidents	No	
		5	16-Dec-01	Irregularities affected results	.50	Yes, all	Yes	46	41	Yes	No, not at all	Isolated incidents	No	
	Parl	1	01-Jul-83	Irregularities affected results	.40	Some parties	Yes	88	5	No	No, not at all	Isolated incidents	No	
		2	01-Mar-89	Irregularities affected results	.40	Yes, all	Yes	89		No	Not at first but later OR some but not all	Isolated incidents	No	
		3	16-Jun-92	Yes, irregularities not significant	.63	Yes, all	Yes	33	11	Yes	Yes, immediately	No, not at all	No	
		4	17-May-98	Yes, irregularities not significant	.60	Yes, all	Yes	42	11	Half, new party or person	Yes, immediately	Isolated incidents	No	

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Country	Type	No	Date	Free and Fair?	T-out	Opposition Participate?	Old Authoritarians Participate?	1st	2nd	Turnover	Losers Accept?	Peaceful?	Breakdown?	Date
Malawi	Pres	1	17-May-94	Yes, irregularities not significant	.80	Yes, all	Yes	47	34	Yes	Yes, immediately	Isolated incidents	No	,
		2	15-Jun-99	Yes, irregularities not significant	.93	Yes, all	Old party or previous ministers	52	45	No	Not at first but later OR some but not all	Isolated incidents	No	,
	Parl	1	17-May-94	Yes, irregularities not significant	.80	Yes, all	Yes	48	32	Half, new party or person	Yes, immediately	Isolated incidents	No	,
		2	15-Jun-99	Irregularities affected results	.90	Yes, all	Old party or previous ministers	48	34	Yes	Not at first but later OR some but not all	Isolated incidents	No	,
Mali	Pres	1	26-Apr-92	Yes, irregularities not significant	.20	Yes, all	No	45	14	Yes	Yes, immediately	Isolated incidents	No	,
		2	11-May-97	Yes, irregularities not significant	.28	No	No	96	4	No	No, not at all	Isolated incidents	No	,
	Parl	1	08-Mar-92	Yes, irregularities not significant	.20	Yes, all	No	65	8	Yes	Yes, immediately	Isolated incidents	No	,
		2	13-Apr-97	No, not at all	.20	Some parties	No	,	,	No	No, not at all	No, not at all	No	,
Mauritania		3	03-Aug-97	Irregularities affected results	.21	Some parties	No	88	5	No	Not at first but later OR some but not all	No, not at all	No	,
	Pres	1	24-Jan-92	Irregularities affected results	.52	Yes, all	Yes	63	33	No	Not at first but later OR some but not all	Isolated incidents	No	,
		2	12-Dec-97	Irregularities affected results	.75	Some parties	Yes	90	7	No	Not at first but later OR some but not all	Yes	No	,
	Parl	1	13-Mar-92	Irregularities affected results	.38	Some parties	Yes	85	1	No	No, not at all	Isolated incidents	No	,
		2	18-Oct-96	Irregularities affected results	.52	Some parties	Yes	89	1	No	Not at first but later OR some but not all	Isolated incidents	No	,
		3	19-Oct-01	Yes, irregularities not significant	.55	Yes, all	Yes	79	5	No	Yes, immediately	Yes	No	,

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Country	Type	No	Date	Free and Fair?	T-out	Opposition Participate?	Old Authorities Participate?	1st	2nd	Turnover	Losers Accept?	Peaceful?	Breakdown?	Date
Mauritius	Parl	1	01-Jul-76	Irregularities affected results	.84	Yes, all	Yes	49	40	Half, new party or person	Not at first but later OR some but not all	Isolated incidents	No	,
		2	01-Jul-82	Yes, irregularities not significant	.90	Yes, all	Yes	,	,	Yes	Not at first but later	Isolated incidents	No	,
		3	01-Jul-83	Irregularities affected results	.87	Yes, all	Old party or previous ministers	,	,	Half, new party or person	OR some but not all	Yes	No	,
		4	01-Jul-87	Yes, irregularities not significant	.85	Yes, all	Old party or previous ministers	,	,	No	Yes, immediately	Yes	No	,
		5	15-Sep-91	Yes, entirely	.82	Yes, all	No	81	,	No	Yes, immediately	Yes	No	,
		6	20-Dec-95	Yes, entirely	.80	Yes, all	No	90	3	Half, new party or person	Yes, immediately	Yes	No	,
		7	11-Sep-00	Yes, entirely	.81	Yes, all	No	81	11	Half, new party or person	Yes, immediately	Yes	No	,
Mozambique	Pres	1	29-Oct-94	Yes, irregularities not significant	.88	Yes, all	Yes	53	34	No	Not at first but later OR some but not all	Isolated incidents	No	,
		2	05-Dec-99	Yes, irregularities not significant	.70	Yes, all	Yes	52	48	No	Not at first but later OR some but not all	Yes	No	,
	Parl	1	29-Oct-94	Yes, irregularities not significant	.88	Yes, all	Yes	52	45	No	Not at first but later OR some but not all	Isolated incidents	No	,
		2	05-Dec-99	Yes, irregularities not significant	.63	Yes, all	Yes	53	47	No	Not at first but later OR some but not all	Yes	No	,
Namibia	Pres	1	08-Dec-94	Yes, irregularities not significant	.75	Yes, all	Old party or previous ministers	75	24	No	Yes, immediately	Isolated incidents	No	,
		2	01-Dec-99	Yes, irregularities not significant	.63	Yes, all	No	77	10	No	Yes, immediately	Isolated incidents	No	,
	Parl	1	11-Nov-89	Irregularities affected results	.95	Yes, all	Yes	57	29	Yes	Yes, immediately	Isolated incidents	No	,

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Country	Type	No	Date	Free and Fair?	T-out	Opposition Participate?	Old Authoritarians Participate?	1st	2nd	Turnover	Losers Accept?	Peaceful?	Breakdown?	Date
Niger		2	08-Dec-94	Yes, irregularities not significant	.75	Yes, all	Old party or previous ministers	74	21	No	Not at first but later OR some but not all Yes, immediately	Yes	No	,
		3	01-Dec-99	Yes, irregularities not significant	.63	Yes, all	No	76	10	No	Yes, immediately	Isolated incidents	No	,
	Pres	1	27-Mar-93	Yes, irregularities not significant	.30	Yes, all	Yes	27	34	Yes	No, not at all	Isolated incidents	Yes, coup	Jan 96
		1	15-Sep-96	Irregularities affected results	.59	Some parties	Yes	52	20	No	No, not at all	Yes	Yes, coup	Apr 99
		1	24-Nov-99	Yes, irregularities not significant	.40	Yes, all	Old party or previous ministers	32	22	Yes	Not at first but later OR some but not all Yes, immediately	Isolated incidents	No	,
Nigeria	Parl	1	14-Feb-93	Yes, irregularities not significant	.33	Yes, all	Yes	35	26	Yes	Yes, immediately	Isolated incidents	No	,
		2	12-Jan-95	Yes, irregularities not significant	.35	Yes, all	Old party or previous ministers	35	29	Yes	Not at first but later OR some but not all	Isolated incidents	Yes, coup	Jan 96
		1	23-Nov-96	Irregularities affected results	.39	Some parties	Yes	70	13	No	No, not at all	Isolated incidents	Yes, coup	Apr 99
		1	24-Nov-99	Yes, irregularities not significant	.99	Yes, all	Old party or previous ministers	46	20	Yes	Not at first but later OR some but not all	Isolated incidents	No	,
	Pres	1	12-Jun-93	Irregularities affected results	.30	Some parties	No	52	48	Yes	No, not at all	No, not at all	Yes, coup	Nov 93
Nigeria		1	27-Feb-99	Irregularities affected results	.52	Some parties	Old party or previous ministers	63	37	Yes	Not at first but later OR some but not all	Isolated incidents	No	,
	Parl	1	04-Jul-92	Irregularities affected results	.50	Some parties	Old party or previous ministers	54	46	Half, new party or person	Not at first but later OR some but not all	Isolated incidents	Yes, coup,	Nov 93
		1	01-Apr-98	No, not at all	.50	Some parties	Yes	,	,	No	No, not at all	Isolated incidents	Yes, other reasons	May 98
		1	20-Feb-99	Yes, irregularities not significant	.41	Yes, all	Old party or previous ministers	61	20	Half, new party or person	Not at first but later OR some but not all	Isolated incidents	No	,

APPENDIX I cont.
ELECTIONS IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

Country	Type	No	Date	Free and Fair?	T. out	Opposition Participate?	Old Authoritarians Participate?	1st	2nd	Turnover	Losers Accept?	Peaceful?	Breakdown?	Date
Rwanda	Pres	1											Yes, civil war	Jan 89
	Parl	1											Yes, civil war	Jan 89
Sao Tome	Pres	1	03-Mar-91	Yes, irregularities not significant	.60	Yes, all	Old party or previous ministers	83		Half, new party or person	Not at first but later OR some but not all	Isolated incidents	No	
	Pres	2	21-Jul-96	Yes, irregularities not significant	.77	Yes, all	Yes	41	39	No	Yes, immediately	Yes	No	
	Pres	3	29-Jul-01	Yes, irregularities not significant	.71	Yes, all	No	56	39	Yes	Yes, immediately	Isolated incidents	No	
	Parl	1	20-Jan-91	Yes, irregularities not significant	.77	Yes, all	Yes	60	38	Yes	Yes, immediately	Isolated incidents	No	
	Parl	2	02-Oct-94	Yes, irregularities not significant	.52	Yes, all	Yes	49	26	Yes	Yes, immediately	Isolated incidents	No	
	Parl	3	08-Nov-98	Yes, irregularities not significant	.64	Yes, all	Old party or previous ministers	56	29	No	Yes, immediately	Yes	No	
Senegal	Pres	1	01-Jul-83	Irregularities affected results	.58	Yes, all	Old party or previous ministers	83	15	No	No, not at all	Isolated incidents	No	
	Pres	2	01-Jul-88	Irregularities affected results	.59	Yes, all	Old party or previous ministers	73	26	No	No, not at all	Isolated incidents	No	
	Pres	3	21-Feb-93	Yes, irregularities not significant	.51	Yes, all	No	58	32	No	Not at first but later OR some but not all	Isolated incidents	No	
	Pres	4	19-Mar-00	Yes, irregularities not significant	.62	Yes, all	No	41	30	Yes	Yes, immediately	Isolated incidents	No	
	Parl	1	01-Jul-83	Irregularities affected results	.56	Yes, all	Old party or previous ministers	92	7	No	No, not at all	No, not at all	No	
	Parl	2	01-Jul-88	Irregularities affected results	.58	Yes, all	Old party or previous ministers	86	14	No	No, not at all	Isolated incidents	No	
	Parl	3	09-May-93	Yes, irregularities not significant	.41	Yes, all	No	70	22	No	Yes, immediately	Isolated incidents	No	

APPENDIX I cont.
ELECTIONS IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

Country	Type	No	Date	Free and Fair?	T-out	Opposition Participate?	Old Authoritarians Participate?	1st	2nd	Turnover	Losers Accept?	Peaceful?	Breakdown?	Date
		4	24-May-98	Yes, irregularities not significant	.40	Yes, all	No	66	16	No	Not at first but later OR some but not all	Isolated incidents	No	,
		5	01-Apr-01	Yes, irregularities not significant	.67	Yes, all	No	74	8	Yes	Yes, immediately	Isolated incidents	No	,
Seychelles	Pres	1	23-Jul-93	Yes, irregularities not significant	.86	Yes, all	Yes	60	37	No	Yes, immediately	Isolated incidents	No	,
		2	22-Mar-98	Yes, irregularities not significant	.84	Yes, all	Yes	67	209	No	Yes, immediately	Yes	No	,
		3	02-Sep-01	Irregularities affected results	.84	Yes, all	Yes	54	45	No	Not at first but later OR some but not all	Yes	No	,
	Parl	1	23-Jul-93	Yes, irregularities not significant	.86	Yes, all	Yes	85	12	No	Yes, immediately	Isolated incidents	No	,
S Leone	Pres	2	22-Mar-98	Yes, irregularities not significant	.84	Yes, all	Yes	88	9	No	Yes, immediately	Yes	No	,
		1	26-Feb-96	Irregularities affected results	.47	Some parties	Old party or previous ministers	36	23	Yes	Not at first but later OR some but not all	No, not at all	Yes, coup	Mar 97
	Parl	1	26-Feb-96	Irregularities affected results	.47	Some parties	Old party or previous ministers	33	21	Half, new party or person	Not at first but later OR some but not all	No, not at all	Yes, coup	Mar 97
Somalia	Pres		,	,	,	,	,	,	,	,	,	,	Yes, civil war	Jan 89
	Parl		,	,	,	,	,	,	,	,	,	,	Yes, civil war	Jan 89
S Africa	Parl	1	26-Apr-94	Yes, irregularities not significant	.86	Yes, all	Yes	63	20	Yes	Yes, immediately	Isolated incidents	No	,
		2	02-Jun-99	Yes, irregularities not significant	.89	Yes, all	Old party or previous ministers	66	10	No	Yes, immediately	Isolated incidents	No	,
Sudan	Pres	1	06-Mar-96	Irregularities affected results	.55	Some parties	Yes	76	,	No	No, not at all	No, not at all	No	,
		2	20-Dec-00	Irregularities affected results	.50	Some parties	Yes	86	10	No	No, not at all	Isolated incidents	No	,
Parl	1	06-Mar-96	Irregularities affected results	.55	Some parties	Yes	90	,	No	No, not at all	No, not at all	No	,	,
		2	20-Dec-00	Irregularities affected results	.50	Some parties	Yes	99	1	No	No, not at all	Isolated incidents	No	,

APPENDIX I cont.
ELECTIONS IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

Country	Type	No	Date	Free and Fair?	T-out	Opposition Participate?	Old Authoritarians Participate?	1st	2nd	Turnover	Losers Accept?	Peaceful?	Breakdown?	Date
Swaziland	Parl	1	11-Oct-93	Irregularities affected results	.50	Some parties	Yes	,	,	No	Not at first but later	Isolated incidents	No	,
		2	24-Oct-98	Irregularities affected results	.50	Some parties	Yes	,	,	No	Not at first but later	Isolated incidents	No	,
Tanzania	Pres	1	19-Nov-95	Irregularities affected results	.76	Yes, all	Old party or previous ministers	62	28	No	Not at first but later	Isolated incidents	No	,
		2	29-Oct-00	Yes, irregularities not significant	.84	Yes, all	Old party or previous ministers	75	17	No	Yes, immediately	Isolated incidents	No	,
	Parl	1	19-Nov-95	Irregularities affected results	.77	Yes, all	Yes	78	10	No	Not at first but later	Isolated incidents	No	,
		2	29-Oct-00	Yes, irregularities not significant	.84	Some parties	Old party or previous ministers	91	6	No	Not at first but later	Isolated incidents	No	,
Togo	Pres	1	25-Aug-93	No, not at all	.36	Some parties	Yes	96	3	No	No, not at all	No, not at all	No	,
		2	21-Jun-98	Irregularities affected results	.70	Yes, all	Yes	52	34	No	No, not at all	Isolated incidents	No	,
	Parl	1	20-Feb-94	Irregularities affected results	.65	Yes, all	Yes	43	42	No	Not at first but later	No, not at all	No	,
		2	21-Mar-99	Irregularities affected results	.50	Some parties	Yes	98	2	No	No, not at all	Isolated incidents	No	,
Uganda	Pres	1	09-May-96	Yes, irregularities not significant	.73	Some parties	Yes	74	24	No	Not at first but later	Isolated incidents	No	,
		2	12-Mar-01	Yes, irregularities not significant	.70	Yes, all	Yes	69	28	No	Yes, immediately	Yes	No	,
	Parl	1	27-Jun-96	Yes, irregularities not significant	.61	Some parties	Yes	56	,	No	Not at first but later	Yes	No	,
		2	26-Jun-01	Yes, irregularities not significant	.70	Some parties	Old party or previous ministers	,	,	No	Yes, immediately	Isolated incidents	No	,

APPENDIX I cont.
ELECTIONS IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

Country	Type	No	Date	Free and Fair?	T-out	Opposition Participate?	Old Authoritarians Participate?	1st	2nd	Turnover	Losers Accept?	Peaceful?	Breakdown?	Date
Zambia	Pres	1	31-Oct-91	.46 Yes, irregularities not significant	.46	Yes, all	Yes	76	24	Yes	Yes, immediately	Isolated incidents	No	,
		2	18-Nov-96	.56 Irregularities affected results	.56	Yes, all	No	70	12	No	No, not at all	Isolated incidents	No	,
		3	27-Dec-01	.68 Irregularities affected results	.68	Yes, all	No	28	27	No	No, not at all	Isolated incidents	No	,
	Parl	1	31-Oct-91	.46 Yes, irregularities not significant	.46	Yes, all	Yes	83	17	Yes	Yes, immediately	Isolated incidents	No	,
		2	18-Nov-96	.56 Irregularities affected results	.56	Some parties	No	88	3	No	No, not at all	Isolated incidents	No	,
		3	27-Dec-01	.68 Irregularities affected results	.68	Yes, all	No	49	31	No	No, not at all	Yes	No	,
Zimbabwe	Pres	1	28-Mar-90	.54 Yes, irregularities not significant	.54	Some parties	No	78	16	No	Not at first but later OR some but not all	Isolated incidents	No	,
		2	17-Mar-96	.32 Irregularities affected results	.32	Some parties	No	92	5	No	No, not at all	No, not at all	No	,
	Parl	1	28-Feb-80	.84 Yes, irregularities not significant	.84	Yes, all	Yes	57	20	Yes	Yes, immediately	Isolated incidents	No	,
		2	28-Mar-85	.76 Yes, irregularities not significant	.76	Yes, all	Old party or previous ministers	67	15	No	Yes, immediately	Isolated incidents	No	,
		3	28-Mar-90	.49 Irregularities affected results	.49	Yes, all	No	96	3	No	Not at first but later OR some but not all	No, not at all	No	,
		4	09-Apr-95	.31 Irregularities affected results	.31	Some parties	No	98	2	No	Not at first but later OR some but not all	Isolated incidents	No	,
		5	25-Jun-00	.48 Irregularities affected results	.48	Yes, all	No	61	38	No	No, not at all	No, not at all	No	,

NOTES

This article has been greatly improved by valuable comments offered by Michael Bratton, John F. Clark, Michael Coppedge, Axel Hadenius, Goran Hyden, Ken Mease, Gerardo Munck, Andreas Schedler, Stephen Snook, Fredrik Ugglå, the two anonymous referees and the editor of this journal. Any remaining errors or oversights are the author's sole responsibility. This research was supported by Sida, research grant no. SWE-1999-231.

1. S.P. Huntington *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* (Normon: University of Oklahoma, 1991).
2. Couched in various terms. See, for example: D. Collier and S. Levitsky, 'Democracy with Adjectives: Conceptual Innovation in Comparative Research', *World Politics*, 49 (1997), 430–51; D. Collier and R. Adcock, 'Democracy and Dichotomies: A Pragmatic Approach to Choices about Concepts', *Annual Review of Political Science*, 2 (1999), 537–65; S. Mozaffar and A. Schedler, 'The Comparative Study of Electoral Governance: Introduction', *International Political Science Review*, 23/1 (2002), 5–27; M. Coppedge, 'Thickening Thin Concepts: Issues in Large-N Data Generation', in D. Collier and G. Munck (eds.), *Regimes in Latin America: Concepts, Methods, and Findings* (forthcoming).
3. I use 'Africa' to refer to the 48 sub-Saharan African countries.
4. M. Bratton, 'Second Elections in Africa', *Journal of Democracy*, 9/3 (1998), 51–66; M. Bratton and D.N. Posner, 'A First Look at Second Elections in Africa', in R. Joseph (ed.), *State, Conflict, and Democracy in Africa* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1999), 377–408; M. Bratton and N. van de Walle, *Democratic Experiments in Africa: Regime Transitions in Comparative Perspective* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997).
5. It is important to note here that the measure of alternation in power is not influenced by constitutional limits on the number of presidential terms. An alternation of person in power is only coded as a turnover if and when there is not only a change in person but also party affiliation of the president or majority in parliament. In other words, if a president steps down after the first or (more commonly) second term because of a constitutional requirement and his successor for the third term is the candidate from the very same party, it is not given the status of a turnover.
6. J.A. Wiseman, 'The Continuing Case for Demo-Optimism in Africa', *Democratization*, 6/2 (1999), 128–55.
7. See, for example, Collier and Adcock 'Democracy and Dichotomies'.
8. R. Dahl, *Democracy and Its Critics* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989), Ch. 12.
9. R. Joseph, 'Democratization in Africa after 1989: Comparative and Theoretical Perspectives', *Comparative Politics*, 29 (1997), 363–82; R. Joseph, 'Africa, 1990–1997: From Abertura to Closure', *Journal of Democracy*, 9/2 (1998), 3–17.
10. For example C. Ake, *Democracy and Development in Africa* (Washington, DC: Brookings Inst., 1996); P. Chabal and J.-P. Daloz, *Africa Works: Disorder as Political Instrument* (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1999); M. Chege, 'Between Africa's Extremes', in L. Diamond and M. Plattner (eds.), *The Global Resurgence of Democracy* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2nd edn. 1996), 350–57; A. Mbembe, 'Complex Transformations in the Late Twentieth Century', *Africa Demos*, 3 (1995), 28–30; L. Villalón, 'The African State at the End of the Twentieth Century', in L. Villalón and P.A. Huxtable (eds.), *The African State at a Critical Juncture* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1998), 3–26.
11. Wiseman, 'The Continuing Case for Demo-Optimism in Africa'.
12. P. Chabal, 'A Few Considerations on Democracy in Africa', *International Affairs*, 74/2 (1998), 289–303.
13. For a good discussion on this point, see C.C. Gibson, 'Of Waves and Ripples: Democracy and Political Change in Africa in the 1990s', *Annual Review of Political Science* (2002), 201–21. A similar situation seems to have developed regarding democratisation in Eastern Europe and Latin America. See, G. Munck, 'The Regime Question: Theory Building in Democracy Studies', *World Politics*, 54 (2002), 119–44.
14. Collier and Adcock, 'Democracy and Dichotomies'.
15. Bratton, 'Second Elections in Africa'; Bratton and Posner, 'A First Look at Second Elections

- in Africa'; Bratton and van de Walle, *Democratic Experiments in Africa*.
16. G. Hyden, M. Leslie and F. Ogunidimu (eds.), *Media and Democracy in Africa* (Piscataway, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2002).
 17. The terminology was coined by R. Lemarchand, 'Political Clientelism and Ethnicity in Tropical Africa: Competing Solidarities in Nation-Building', *American Political Science Review*, 66/1 (1972), 68–90; J.-F. Medard, 'The Underdeveloped State in Tropical Africa: Political Clientelism or Neo-Patrimonialism?' in C. Clapham (ed.), *Private Patronage and Public Power: Political Clientelism in the Modern State* (London: Frances Pinter, 1982); R. Joseph, *Prebendalism and Democracy in Nigeria* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987); and R.H. Bates, *Markets and States in Tropical Africa* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press 1981).
 18. H.W.O. Okoth Ogendo, 'The Quest for Constitutional Government', in G. Hyden, H.W.O. Okoth Ogendo and D. Olowu (eds.), *African Perspectives on Governance* (Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 1999); P. Chabal and J.-P. Daloz, *Africa Works. Disorder as Political Instrument* (Indiana University Press, 1999).
 19. G. Hyden, and C. Leys, 'Elections and Politics in Single-Party Systems: The Case of Kenya and Tanzania', *British Journal of Political Science*, 2 (1972), 250–65.
 20. This finding led J. Barkan to advocate that a proportional system of representation does not really make much difference in agrarian societies and that a single-member district plurality system is equally good in ensuring a distribution of seats in parliament that reflects the total vote. J.D. Barkan, 'Elections in Agrarian Societies', *Journal of Democracy*, 6/4 (1995), 106–16. It is also discussed in P. Chabal, *Power in Africa* (London: St. Martin's Press, 1986); and S.I. Lindberg, 'It's Our Time to 'Chop': Do Elections in Africa Feed Neopatrimonialism Rather than Counter-Act It?' *Democratization*, 10/2 (2003), 121–40.
 21. See B. Baker, 'The Class of 1990: How Have the Autocratic Leaders of sub-Saharan Africa Fared under Democratisation?' *Third World Quarterly*, 19/1 (1998), 115–27.
 22. R. Dahl, *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971); Dahl, *Democracy and Its Critics*.
 23. Cf. Schedler, 'The Menu of Manipulation'.
 24. For a recent example of this, see D. Altman and A. Pérez-Linan, 'Assessing the Quality of Democracy: Freedom, Competitiveness and Participation in Eighteen Latin American Countries', *Democratization*, 9/2 (2002), 85–100.
 25. For example, A. Lijphart, 'Unequal Participation: Democracy's Unresolved Dilemma', *American Political Science Review*, 91/1 (1997), 1–14.
 26. Opposition participation is measured with three values: 'Yes, all' for total boycotts, 'Some parties' for partial boycotts, and 'No' for elections where all major political parties participate.
 27. Baker, 'The Class of 1990'.
 28. T. Carothers, 'The Rule of Law Revival', *Foreign Affairs*, 77/2 (1998), 95–106; see also L. Diamond's discussion of behavioural requirements of political actors in consolidated democracies, L. Diamond, *Developing Democracy: Towards Consolidation* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999), 69.
 29. Cases are coded according to the following rule: 'No' for elections where at least one of the presidential candidates or the leadership of one main party are former authoritarian rulers, 'Some' when at least one candidate or leadership of one main party are former close associates (ministers or similar) of a former authoritarian regime, and 'Yes' when none of the main contenders are related to a former authoritarian regime in this way.
 30. Diamond, 'Elections without Democracy'; Schedler, 'The Menu of Manipulation'; N. Van de Walle, 'Africa's Range of Regimes', *Journal of Democracy*, 13/2 (2002), 66–80; Dahl, *Democracy and Its Critics*.
 31. For example, see V. Bogdanor and D. Butler (eds.), *Democracy and Elections* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983); A. Downs, *An Economic Theory of Democracy* (New York: Harper Collins, 1957); M. Duverger, *Les Partis Politiques* (Paris: Colin, 1954); A. Lijphart, *Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in Twenty-One Countries* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984); A. Lijphart, *Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries* (New Haven: Yale University

- Press, 1999); A. Lijphart and C.H. Waisman, 'Institutional Design and Democratization', in A. Lijphart and C.H. Waisman (eds.), *Institutional Design in New Democracies: Eastern Europe and Latin America* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996); P. Mair (ed.), *The West European Party System* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990); B.G. Powell, *Contemporary Democracies: Participation, Stability and Violence* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1982); B.G. Powell, *Elections as Instruments of Democracy* (London: Yale University Press, 2000); D. Rae, *The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971); G. Sartori, 'Political Development and Political Engineering', in J.D. Montgomery and A.O. Hirschman (eds.), *Public Policy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968); G. Sartori, *Comparative Constitutional Engineering* (New York: New York University Press, 2nd edn. 1997).
32. Botswana, Ethiopia, Lesotho, Mauritius and South Africa.
 33. South Africa, Angola, Namibia, Mozambique, Liberia, Burundi and Sierra Leone. An additional six countries operate PR systems in small multi-member constituencies. These systems have a strong majoritarian effect wherefore the reasoning about the effects of PR-systems does not apply.
 34. The indicator measures the winning candidate's share of votes (first round) as a percentage of total valid votes.
 35. This indicator measures the largest party's share of total seats in parliament.
 36. R. Günther, N.P. Diamandouros and H.-J. Puhle, *The Politics of Democratic Consolidation: Southern Europe in a Comparative Perspective* (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995), 13; A. Schedler, 'Measuring Democratic Consolidation', *Studies in Comparative International Development*, 36/1 (2001), 66–92.
 37. A. Przeworski, 'Some Problems in the Study of Transitions to Democracy', in G. O'Donnell and P. Schmitter (eds.), *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Prospects for Democracy* (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), 57–61. For a variant of the argument with an emphasis on a bounded uncertainty, see P. Schmitter and T.L. Karl, 'What Democracy Is ... and Is Not', *Journal of Democracy*, 3/1 (1991), 75–88.
 38. Elections are coded as 'No' if there is no turnover, 'Half' if there is an alternation in power but the new president is an immediate successor to the former president of the same party, or, in parliamentary elections if there is a partly new coalition forming a majority in parliament, and 'Yes' if there is a new president from a different party, or, there is a new party/coalition of new parties with a legislative majority.
 39. Losers' acceptance is measured on the basis of three values: 'No' when none of the main losing parties accepted the outcome, 'Not at first/some' when either some or all losing parties rejected the results at first but within three months accepted it, or, if some but not all, losing parties did not accept the results, and 'Yes, all immediately' when all losing parties conceded defeat immediately after the results were pronounced.
 40. Assassination of political opponents, voter intimidation, attacks against the liberty and property of political adversaries, violence against elected officials and/or electoral administrators, riots and ethnic or other forms of 'social' cleansing are examples of serious politically motivated violence that proves major actors do not see elections as legitimate. Schedler, 'Measuring Democratic Consolidation', 70–71. See also J. Elster *et al.*, *Institutional Design in Post-Communist Societies: Rebuilding the Ship at Sea* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 27.
 41. This indicator has three values: 'Yes, significantly' when there is systematic and/or widespread politically related violence during the campaign, on election day and/or during the post-election period, 'Isolated events' when there are non-systematic and isolated incidents of violence, or geographically very limited outbreaks, 'No, peaceful' for cases of entirely peaceful elections.
 42. There are a couple of examples where the irregularities affected the results but there was still an alternation in power, for example the presidential elections in Ivory Coast on 22 October 2000 and parliamentary elections on 10 December the same year, the presidential elections in Madagascar on 16 December 2001, the parliamentary elections in Malawi on 15 June 1999 and the constituent assembly-cum-parliamentary elections in Namibia on 11 November 1989. These are all 'special' cases with particular circumstances that signify failures of

- incumbent rulers to hold on to power, or, in the Namibia case, a highly insecure environment for the transitional election. The normal pattern, of course, is that serious irregularities do not coincide with turnovers.
43. Schedler, 'The Menu of Manipulation'.
 44. Out of Africa's 48 states, six countries held an uninterrupted series of multiparty elections in the period immediately preceding 1990: Botswana from 1965, Mauritius from 1976, Zimbabwe from 1980, Gambia and Madagascar from 1982, and Senegal from 1983. These 'old' elections make an important control group for changes in the international context before/after 1989, which has been largely ignored by other authors. Botswana, Mauritius and Senegal are still on track as examples of a prospective development for some of today's nascent democracies. The wine in the Zimbabwean bottle under Robert Mugabe's leadership has slowly transformed to sour vinegar since the late 1980s, and Gambia's process broke down after the coup in July 1994. On Madagascar a serious crisis developed after the presidential elections of December 2001.
 45. Every individual poll has been given case status. When presidential and parliamentary elections were held on the same day these are noted as two separate cases. This is for several reasons. One is to avoid introduction of bias in the data set introduced by those countries that hold presidential and parliamentary elections on separate occasions that would otherwise acquire double weight in the sample. Furthermore, presidential elections often involve a second round of voting, which might also cause the values to fluctuate. The separate coding of presidential and parliamentary elections does not mean that two elections on the same day are coded as founding and second elections, however. Rather, sequential numbers are assigned to polls within each category of presidential and parliamentary elections only.
 46. K. Bollen, 'Political Democracy: Conceptual and Measurement Traps', *Studies in Comparative International Development*, 25/1 (1990), 7–25.
 47. Cf. Bollen, 'Political Democracy'; M.J. Gasiorowski, 'An Overview of the Political Regime Change Dataset', *Comparative Political Studies*, 29 (1996), 469–84; and M. Coppedge and W.H. Reinicke, 'Measuring Polyarchy', *Studies in Comparative International Development*, 25/1 (1990), 51–73.
 48. G. King, R.O. Keohane and S. Verba, *Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994).
 49. See author's website for download: www.svet.lu.se/Staff/Personal_pages/Staffan_lindberg/Staffan_lindberg.html.
 50. Bratton, 'Second Elections in Africa'.
 51. Schedler, 'The Menu of Manipulation'.
 52. The trend of increasing competition is less pronounced in the corresponding measures for parliamentary elections where the largest party got 61 per cent of the seats in second elections and this level decreased only slightly to 58 per cent in third elections. The wide discrepancy between presidential vote shares and winning party's seat shares reflects the fact that many of the African multiparty systems operate various forms of majoritarian electoral codes.
 53. Madagascar passed a 'three-turnover-test' with the last and controversial presidential election on 16 December 2001 that led to a political stalemate and later (in 2002) a very serious political crisis. At the time of writing, this crisis seems to have been resolved and Madagascar is back on track again. See R. Marcus, 'Participation and the Poverty of Electoral Democracy in Madagascar', paper presented at *African Studies Association's Annual Meeting* (Washington, DC: 5–8 Dec. 2002).
 54. A. Schedler, 'The Nested Game of Democratization by Elections', *International Political Science Review*, 23/1 (2002), 103–23.